Searching for True Dogmatism

Bibliographic Data

ID23175351
AuthorsPeter J Markie (0000-0002-1315-0134, corresponding author)
Year2013
Pages248-269
Publication date2013-09-02
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueSeemings And Justification New Essays On Dogmatism And Phenomenal Conservatism (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.003.0011
OpenAlexW2495033156
ISBN9780199899494
LanguageEN
Citations received12

Is there a true form of Dogmatism consistent with Mentalism and Foundationalism? Michael Huemer has developed an unqualified form of Dogmatism that is consistent with Mentalism and Foundationalism, but unqualified Dogmatism is false. Michael Bergmann has developed a qualified form of Dogmatism that is consistent with Foundationalism but inconsistent with Mentalism. I organize my search for a true form of Dogmatism consistent with Foundationalism and Mentalism as follows. After a brief examination of Dogmatism in both its unqualified and qualified forms, I show that two major arguments for unqualified Dogmatism are unsuccessful and that the view is open to compelling counterexamples. With qualified Dogmatism as the remaining option, I explore how best to develop it in the context of Mentalism and Foundationalism, focusing on one approach, the Knowledge How Proposal, in particular.

Context (archaeology) · Counterexample · Epistemology · Foundationalism · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Hermeneutics and Narrative Identity · Mathematics · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Psychology

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