The prospects of emotional dogmatism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21370529 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eilidh Harrison (0000-0002-8003-2381, University of Glasgow, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 178 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 2535-2555 |
| Publication date | 2021-08-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-020-01561-5 |
| OpenAlex | W3092440826 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 24 |
The idea that emotional experience is capable of lending immediate and defeasible justification to evaluative belief has been amassing significant support in recent years. The proposal that it is my anger , say, that justifies my belief that I’ve been wronged putatively provides us with an intuitive and naturalised explanation as to how we receive epistemic justification for a rich catalogue of our evaluative beliefs. However, despite the fact that this justificatory thesis of emotion is fundamentally an epistemological proposal, comparatively little has been done to explicitly isolate what it is about emotions that bestows them with justificatory ability. The purpose of this paper is to provide a novel and thorough analysis into the prospects of phenomenology-based—or dogmatist —views of emotional justification. By surveying and rejecting various instantiations of the emotional dogmatist view, I endeavour to provide an inductive case for the conclusion that emotional phenomenology cannot be the seat of the emotions’ power to immediately justify evaluative belief
Anger · Defeasible estate · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 1.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |