Angela Mendelovici

Biographic Data

ID1045598
NAMEAngela Mendelovici
GIVEN NAMESAngela
FAMILY NAMEMendelovici
SIGNATUREMENDELOVICI A
AFFILIATIONSWestern University
ORCID0000-0002-5496-0141
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS10
TOTAL CITATIONS3
WORKS AS AUTHOR10
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2014
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX1

  • Is Narrow Content 's ‘narrow content’ narrow content

    David Bourget, Angela MendeloviciARTICLEInquiry2026

  • Brentano on phenomenal and transitive consciousness, unconscious consciousness, and phenomenal intentionality

    Open AccessAngela MendeloviciARTICLEEuropean Journal of Philosophy2023

    In Brentano’s Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value, Uriah Kriegel argues that Brentano’s work forms a “live philosophical program” (p. 14, italics omitted) that contemporary philosophy has much to learn from and that is promising and largely correct. To this end, Kriegel argues that Brentano’s notion of consciousness is the contemporary notion of phenomenal consciousness, that Brentano’s rejection of unconscious mentality is a grave mistake t…

  • Debunking Debunking

    David Bourget, Angela Mendelovici et al.ARTICLEMidwest Studies in Philosophy2023

    On explanationist accounts of genealogical debunking, roughly, a belief is debunked when its explanation is not suitably related to its content. We argue that explanationism cannot accommodate cases in which beliefs are explained by factors unrelated to their contents but are nonetheless independently justified. Justification-specific versions of explanationism face an iteration of the problem. The best account of debunking is a probabilistic acc…

  • Facing up to the problem of intentionality

    Open AccessAngela Mendelovici, David BourgetARTICLEPhilosophical Perspectives2023References: 7

    We distinguish between different problems of “aboutness”: the “hard” problem of explaining the everyday phenomenon of intentionality and three less challenging “easy” sets of problems concerning the posits of folk psychology, the notions of representation invoked in the mind‐brain sciences, and the intensionality (with an “s”) of mental language. The problem of intentionality is especially hard in that, as is the case with the hard problem of phe…

  • Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness

    Angela Mendelovici, David BourgetARTICLEThe Philosophical Review2023

    Michael Tye is perhaps best known for his defense of tracking representationalism, a view that combines representationalism (the view that an experience’s phenomenal character is determined by its representational content) with a tracking theory of representation (the view that mental representation is a matter of causal covariation, carrying information, or, more generally, tracking). In Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness, Tye takes an…

  • Kolors Without Colors, Representation Without Intentionality

    Open AccessAngela Mendelovici, David BourgetARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…2022Cited by: 1

  • A Mark of the Mental

    Angela Mendelovici, David BourgetARTICLEThe Philosophical Review2019References: 8

    Karen Neander's A Mark of the Mental is a noteworthy and novel contribution to the long-running project of naturalizing intentionality. The aim of the book is to “solve the part of Brentano's problem that is within reach” (3). Brentano's problem is the problem of explaining intentionality; the part of this problem that is supposedly within reach is that of explaining nonconceptual sensory-perceptual intentionality; and Neander aims to solve it vi…

  • Functional Role Theories and Tracking Theories Again

    Angela MendeloviciBOOKPhenomenal Basis of Intentionality2018

    This chapter considers functional role theories of intentionality , on which original intentionality is a matter of a representation's functional roles. According to short-arm functional role theories, these functional roles only include functional relations between representations, while according to long-arm versions of the theory, the relevant functional roles can include relations to items in the external environment. This chapter argues that…

  • The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

    Angela MendeloviciBOOKPhenomenal Basis of Intentionality2018

    Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in-principle…

  • Naturalizing Intentionality

    Open AccessAngela Mendelovici, David BourgetARTICLEPhilosophy Compass2014Cited by: 2References: 56

    This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds …