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Brentano on phenomenal and transitive consciousness, unconscious consciousness, and phenomenal intentionality

Bibliographic Data

ID21603350
AuthorsAngela Mendelovici (0000-0002-5496-0141, Department of Philosophy Western University London Canada, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume31
Issue2
Pages458-467
Publication date2023-06-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ejop.12685
OpenAlexW3200905387
LanguageEN
References cited13

In Brentano’s Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value, Uriah Kriegel argues that Brentano’s work forms a “live philosophical program” (p. 14, italics omitted) that contemporary philosophy has much to learn from and that is promising and largely correct. To this end, Kriegel argues that Brentano’s notion of consciousness is the contemporary notion of phenomenal consciousness, that Brentano’s rejection of unconscious mentality is a grave mistake that can be fairly neatly excised from his overall view, and that Brentano’s notion of intentionality is the contemporary notion of phenomenal intentionality. This paper raises some doubts about these claims, suggesting that Brentano’s notion of consciousness might more closely align with the contemporary notion of transitive consciousness than with that of phenomenal consciousness, that Brentano’s rejection of unconscious mentality cannot be so easily excised from his overall view but that it is not such a grave mistake, and that Brentano’s notion of intentionality may not be that of phenomenal intentionality but rather that of generic abountness. I wrap up by considering the extent to which we might agree with Kriegel that Brentano’s work forms a live philosophical program that contemporary philosophy has much to learn from

Cognitive science · Consciousness · Epistemology · Intentionality · Psychoanalysis · Transitive relation · Unconscious mind · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology

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  • What Is It Like to Be a Bat

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Highly citedNo

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