Krista Lawlor
Biographic Data
| ID | 1046103 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Krista Lawlor |
| GIVEN NAMES | Krista |
| FAMILY NAME | Lawlor |
| SIGNATURE | LAWLOR K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Stanford University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2803-1613 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 21 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Telling as Joint Action
Knowledge and reasonableness
Précis of Assurance
Replies to Leite, Turri, and Gerken
Varieties of Coreference
Knowing What One Wants
Knowing Beliefs, Seeking Causes
Knowing what one believes sometimes takes effort: it sometimes involves seeking to know one’s beliefs as causes. And when one gains self-knowledge of one’s belief this way—that is, through causal self-interpretation —one engages in a characteristically human kind of psychological liberation. By investigating the nature of causal self-interpretation, the author discovers some surprising features of this liberty. In doing so, she counters a trend i…
Enough is Enough
Reason and the Past
Confused Thought and Modes of Presentation
Ruth Millikan has long argued that the phenomenon of confused thought requires us to abandon certain traditional programmes for mental semantics. On the one hand she argues that confused thought involves confused concepts, and on the other that Fregean senses, or modes of presentation, cannot be useful in theorizing about minds capable of confused thinking. I argue that while we might accept that concepts can be confused, we have no reason to aba…
Knowing What One Wants
Varieties of Coreference
Telling as Joint Action
Knowing Beliefs, Seeking Causes
Knowing what one believes sometimes takes effort: it sometimes involves seeking to know one’s beliefs as causes. And when one gains self-knowledge of one’s belief this way—that is, through causal self-interpretation —one engages in a characteristically human kind of psychological liberation. By investigating the nature of causal self-interpretation, the author discovers some surprising features of this liberty. In doing so, she counters a trend i…
Enough is Enough
Enough is Enough
Reason and the Past
Confused Thought and Modes of Presentation
Ruth Millikan has long argued that the phenomenon of confused thought requires us to abandon certain traditional programmes for mental semantics. On the one hand she argues that confused thought involves confused concepts, and on the other that Fregean senses, or modes of presentation, cannot be useful in theorizing about minds capable of confused thinking. I argue that while we might accept that concepts can be confused, we have no reason to aba…
Knowing Beliefs, Seeking Causes
Knowing what one believes sometimes takes effort: it sometimes involves seeking to know one’s beliefs as causes. And when one gains self-knowledge of one’s belief this way—that is, through causal self-interpretation —one engages in a characteristically human kind of psychological liberation. By investigating the nature of causal self-interpretation, the author discovers some surprising features of this liberty. In doing so, she counters a trend i…
Knowing What One Wants
Varieties of Coreference
Précis of Assurance
Replies to Leite, Turri, and Gerken
Telling as Joint Action
Knowledge and reasonableness
Computer Science (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (8 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Citation (5 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Library science (5 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Psychology (3 works)