Confused Thought and Modes of Presentation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351175 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Krista Lawlor (0000-0002-2803-1613, Stanford University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 218 |
| Pages | 21-36 |
| Publication date | 2005-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00382.x |
| OpenAlex | W2150933618 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 1 |
Ruth Millikan has long argued that the phenomenon of confused thought requires us to abandon certain traditional programmes for mental semantics. On the one hand she argues that confused thought involves confused concepts, and on the other that Fregean senses, or modes of presentation, cannot be useful in theorizing about minds capable of confused thinking. I argue that while we might accept that concepts can be confused, we have no reason to abandon modes of presentation. Making sense of confused thought requires recognizing modes of presentation
Cognitive science · Epistemology · Phenomenon · Presentation (obstetrics) · Semantics (computer science) · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychotherapy Techniques and Applications · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
| Citations per year | 0.25 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2010 - 2024 (15) |
| Highly cited | No |