Nicholas R Miller
Biographic Data
| ID | 1047041 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nicholas R Miller |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nicholas R |
| FAMILY NAME | Miller |
| SIGNATURE | MILLER N R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Maryland, Baltimore County |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6894-3919 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 28 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 322 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 28 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1975 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 8 |
Helen Cowie Interview
Interview between Nicholas Miller and Helen Cowie on the role of animals in exploration, published as part of a special issue on this topic in the journal Terrae Incognitae
Ranked-choice voting and the spoiler effect: A supplementary note
Animal Studies and Exploration History: Amundsen’s Sledge Dogs Who Helped Discover the South Pole
Reflections on Arrow’s theorem and voting rules
Closeness matters: Monotonicity failure in IRV elections with three candidates
Election Inversions under Proportional Representation
It has been shown by P eter K urrild‐ K litgaard, using several empirical examples under the D anish electoral system, that proportional representation ( PR ) can produce ‘election inversions’ such that a coalition of parties collectively supported by a majority of voters fails to win a majority of parliamentary seats. However, K urrild‐ K litgaard's examples result from imperfections in the D anish PR system introduced to serve goals other than …
What to Do About Election Inversions Under Proportional Representation
An election inversion occurs when a party, or coalition of parties, wins more seats in the legislature than another party, or coalition of parties, despite the fact that the other party, or coalition of parties, won a larger number of votes cast in an election. It is well known that such inversions can and do occur under the kind of ‘majoritarian’ electoral systems commonly used in English-speaking countries. It has recently been observed that su…
The Alternative Vote and Coombs Rule versus First-Past-the-Post: A social choice analysis of simulated data based on English elections, 1992–2010
The house size effect and the referendum paradox in U.S. presidential elections
Why the Electoral College is good for political science (and public choice)
Banzhaf voting power, random elections, and the Electoral College winner’s advantage
Agendas and sincerity: A second response to Schwartz
Agenda trees and sincere voting: A response to Schwartz
In Search of the Uncovered Set
This paper pursues a number of theoretical explorations and conjectures pertaining to the uncovered set in spatial voting games. It was stimulated by the article “The Uncovered Set and the Limits of Legislative Action” by W. T. Bianco, I. Jeliazkov, and I. Sened (2004, Political Analysis 12:256—78) that employed a grid-search computational algorithm for estimating the size, shape, and location of the uncovered set, and it has been greatly facilit…
The butterfly effect under STV
The structure of the Banks set
Cycle avoiding trajectories, strategic agendas, and the duality of memory and foresight: An informal exposition
The Geometry of Majority Rule
We present some basic results concerning the spatial theory of voting in such a way that the theorems and their proofs should be accessible to a broad audience of political scientists. We do this by making the presentation essentially geometrical. We present the following results in particular: Plott's `pairwise symmetry' condition for an unbeaten point; McKelvey's `global cycling' theorem; Ferejohn, McKelvey and Packel's cardioid construction fo…
Centripetal forces in spatial voting: On the size of the Yolk
Nice Strategies Finish First: A Review of The Evolution of Cooperation
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Bicameralism and the Theory of Voting: A Comment
Bicameralism and the Theory of Voting: A Comment
Pluralism and Social Choice
Pluralist political theory identifies certain patterns of political preferences as promoting the "stability" of democratic political systems and others as threatening to such stability. Social choice theory likewise identifies certain patterns of political preferences as leading to "stability" in social choice under majority rule and related collective decision rules, and other patterns as leading to "unstable" social choice. But the preference p…
A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting: Further Graph- Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting
The Condorcet, or minimal undominated, set of proposals has been identified as a solution set for majority voting. Unfortunately, the Condorcet set may be very large and may include Pareto-inefficient proposals. An alternative solution set is proposed here: the uncovered set, from which every other proposal in the tournament representing majority preference is reachable in no more than two steps. It is shown that this set has a number of desirabl…
Social preference” and game theory: A comment on “the dilemma of a paretian liberal”
A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting: Further Graph- Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting
The Condorcet, or minimal undominated, set of proposals has been identified as a solution set for majority voting. Unfortunately, the Condorcet set may be very large and may include Pareto-inefficient proposals. An alternative solution set is proposed here: the uncovered set, from which every other proposal in the tournament representing majority preference is reachable in no more than two steps. It is shown that this set has a number of desirabl…
Pluralism and Social Choice
Pluralist political theory identifies certain patterns of political preferences as promoting the "stability" of democratic political systems and others as threatening to such stability. Social choice theory likewise identifies certain patterns of political preferences as leading to "stability" in social choice under majority rule and related collective decision rules, and other patterns as leading to "unstable" social choice. But the preference p…
Graph-Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting
In this article, language, concepts, and theorems from the theory of directed graphs are used to characterize and analyze the structure of majority preference. A number of results are then derived concerning sincere, sophisticated, and cooperative decisions under two common majority procedures. These results supplement the work of Black and Farquharson. Perhaps contrary to common-sense thinking, general strategic manipulation of processes has ben…
The Geometry of Majority Rule
We present some basic results concerning the spatial theory of voting in such a way that the theorems and their proofs should be accessible to a broad audience of political scientists. We do this by making the presentation essentially geometrical. We present the following results in particular: Plott's `pairwise symmetry' condition for an unbeaten point; McKelvey's `global cycling' theorem; Ferejohn, McKelvey and Packel's cardioid construction fo…
Centripetal forces in spatial voting: On the size of the Yolk
Why the Electoral College is good for political science (and public choice)
In Search of the Uncovered Set
This paper pursues a number of theoretical explorations and conjectures pertaining to the uncovered set in spatial voting games. It was stimulated by the article “The Uncovered Set and the Limits of Legislative Action” by W. T. Bianco, I. Jeliazkov, and I. Sened (2004, Political Analysis 12:256—78) that employed a grid-search computational algorithm for estimating the size, shape, and location of the uncovered set, and it has been greatly facilit…
Closeness matters: Monotonicity failure in IRV elections with three candidates
Logrolling, vote trading, and the paradox of voting: A game-theoretical overview
Reflections on Arrow’s theorem and voting rules
The Alternative Vote and Coombs Rule versus First-Past-the-Post: A social choice analysis of simulated data based on English elections, 1992–2010
Cycle avoiding trajectories, strategic agendas, and the duality of memory and foresight: An informal exposition
Social preference” and game theory: A comment on “the dilemma of a paretian liberal”
What to Do About Election Inversions Under Proportional Representation
An election inversion occurs when a party, or coalition of parties, wins more seats in the legislature than another party, or coalition of parties, despite the fact that the other party, or coalition of parties, won a larger number of votes cast in an election. It is well known that such inversions can and do occur under the kind of ‘majoritarian’ electoral systems commonly used in English-speaking countries. It has recently been observed that su…
Agenda trees and sincere voting: A response to Schwartz
The structure of the Banks set
Election Inversions under Proportional Representation
It has been shown by P eter K urrild‐ K litgaard, using several empirical examples under the D anish electoral system, that proportional representation ( PR ) can produce ‘election inversions’ such that a coalition of parties collectively supported by a majority of voters fails to win a majority of parliamentary seats. However, K urrild‐ K litgaard's examples result from imperfections in the D anish PR system introduced to serve goals other than …
Logrolling and the arrow paradox: A note
The house size effect and the referendum paradox in U.S. presidential elections
The butterfly effect under STV
Logrolling and the arrow paradox: A note
Social preference” and game theory: A comment on “the dilemma of a paretian liberal”
Logrolling, vote trading, and the paradox of voting: A game-theoretical overview
Graph-Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting
In this article, language, concepts, and theorems from the theory of directed graphs are used to characterize and analyze the structure of majority preference. A number of results are then derived concerning sincere, sophisticated, and cooperative decisions under two common majority procedures. These results supplement the work of Black and Farquharson. Perhaps contrary to common-sense thinking, general strategic manipulation of processes has ben…
A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting: Further Graph- Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting
The Condorcet, or minimal undominated, set of proposals has been identified as a solution set for majority voting. Unfortunately, the Condorcet set may be very large and may include Pareto-inefficient proposals. An alternative solution set is proposed here: the uncovered set, from which every other proposal in the tournament representing majority preference is reachable in no more than two steps. It is shown that this set has a number of desirabl…
Pluralism and Social Choice
Pluralist political theory identifies certain patterns of political preferences as promoting the "stability" of democratic political systems and others as threatening to such stability. Social choice theory likewise identifies certain patterns of political preferences as leading to "stability" in social choice under majority rule and related collective decision rules, and other patterns as leading to "unstable" social choice. But the preference p…
Bicameralism and the Theory of Voting: A Comment
Bicameralism and the Theory of Voting: A Comment
Nice Strategies Finish First: A Review of The Evolution of Cooperation
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Centripetal forces in spatial voting: On the size of the Yolk
The Geometry of Majority Rule
We present some basic results concerning the spatial theory of voting in such a way that the theorems and their proofs should be accessible to a broad audience of political scientists. We do this by making the presentation essentially geometrical. We present the following results in particular: Plott's `pairwise symmetry' condition for an unbeaten point; McKelvey's `global cycling' theorem; Ferejohn, McKelvey and Packel's cardioid construction fo…
The structure of the Banks set
Cycle avoiding trajectories, strategic agendas, and the duality of memory and foresight: An informal exposition
In Search of the Uncovered Set
This paper pursues a number of theoretical explorations and conjectures pertaining to the uncovered set in spatial voting games. It was stimulated by the article “The Uncovered Set and the Limits of Legislative Action” by W. T. Bianco, I. Jeliazkov, and I. Sened (2004, Political Analysis 12:256—78) that employed a grid-search computational algorithm for estimating the size, shape, and location of the uncovered set, and it has been greatly facilit…
The butterfly effect under STV
Agenda trees and sincere voting: A response to Schwartz
Agendas and sincerity: A second response to Schwartz
Banzhaf voting power, random elections, and the Electoral College winner’s advantage
Why the Electoral College is good for political science (and public choice)
The Alternative Vote and Coombs Rule versus First-Past-the-Post: A social choice analysis of simulated data based on English elections, 1992–2010
The house size effect and the referendum paradox in U.S. presidential elections
Election Inversions under Proportional Representation
It has been shown by P eter K urrild‐ K litgaard, using several empirical examples under the D anish electoral system, that proportional representation ( PR ) can produce ‘election inversions’ such that a coalition of parties collectively supported by a majority of voters fails to win a majority of parliamentary seats. However, K urrild‐ K litgaard's examples result from imperfections in the D anish PR system introduced to serve goals other than …
What to Do About Election Inversions Under Proportional Representation
An election inversion occurs when a party, or coalition of parties, wins more seats in the legislature than another party, or coalition of parties, despite the fact that the other party, or coalition of parties, won a larger number of votes cast in an election. It is well known that such inversions can and do occur under the kind of ‘majoritarian’ electoral systems commonly used in English-speaking countries. It has recently been observed that su…
Closeness matters: Monotonicity failure in IRV elections with three candidates
Reflections on Arrow’s theorem and voting rules
Political science (24 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (20 works) · Law (19 works) · Voting (17 works) · Economics (16 works) · Law (16 works) · Computer Science (15 works) · Mathematical economics (15 works) · Politics (15 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (14 works)