A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting
Further Graph- Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231644 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nicholas R Miller (0000-0001-6894-3919, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1980 |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 68 |
| Publication date | 1980-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2110925 |
| OpenAlex | W2335150423 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 137 |
| References cited | 8 |
The Condorcet, or minimal undominated, set of proposals has been identified as a solution set for majority voting. Unfortunately, the Condorcet set may be very large and may include Pareto-inefficient proposals. An alternative solution set is proposed here: the uncovered set, from which every other proposal in the tournament representing majority preference is reachable in no more than two steps. It is shown that this set has a number of desirable properties, and that several important voting processes lead to decisions within it. Ihis article extends some earlier work by further applying concepts and theorems from the theory of directed graphs to characterize and analyze the structure of majority preference
Approval voting · Bullet voting · Cardinal voting systems · Combinatorics · Condorcet method · Graph · Mathematical economics · Mathematical optimization · Pareto principle · Political science · Set (abstract data type · Social choice theory · Tournament · Voting · Advanced Algebra and Logic · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics · Theoretical Computer Science
Cycles and Social Choice
Economic Methods in Positive Political Theory
The Future of Analytical Politics
Public Choice Theory
Who Controls the Bureaucracy?
Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
Social Choice and Legitimacy
Some Rules of Constitutional Design
Making and breaking coalitions
Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals
Plurality rule and Condorcet criterion over restricted domains
An axiomatic characterization of Split Cycle
Generalized medians and a political center
An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule
On the instability of majority decision-making
Escaping Arrow’s theorem
Two’s Company, Three’s an Equilibrium
Generous Legislators? A Description of Vote Trading Agreements
Centrality Orderings in Social Networks
Why Do Courts Delay
Prosociality in Majority Decisions
Party relevance and party survival in new democracies
Constitutional stability
Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory
Federal Directives, Local Discretion and the Majority Rule
Applications of Shapley-Owen Values and the Spatial Copeland Winner
Institutional determinants of trade policy
Agenda trees and sincere voting
Supermajority voting, social indifference and status quo constraints
Problems in the Theory of Institutional Design
Heresthetics and choice from tournaments
Predicting majority rule
Axioms for defeat in democratic elections
The stability set as a social choice correspondence
Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint
Identifying stable network structures and sets of key players using a W -covering perspective
Majority tournaments
Choosing from a weighted tournament
On the solution of w-stable sets
On the manipulability of voting rules
The solution of generalized stable sets and its refinement
Representation in majority tournaments
A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value
King-chicken choice correspondences
A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions
The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
Condorcet choice correspondences
Computing the minimal covering set
Structure of transitive valued binary relations
The almost surely shrinking yolk
A Borda measure for social choice functions
Do Local Politicians Respond to Citizens' Demands? A Microanalysis of Norwegian Local Government
Legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in American States
Do supermajority rules limit or enhance majority tyranny? evidence from the US States, 1960–1997
The strange history of social choice, and the contribution of the Public Choice Society to its fifth revival
Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies
The supermajority core of the US Senate and the failure to join the League of Nations
Constitutional political economy in the European Union
Centripetal forces in spatial voting
Majority rule outcomes and the structure of debate in one-issue-at-a-time decision-making
The structure of the Banks set
Selecting the Condorcet Winner
Cycle avoiding trajectories, strategic agendas, and the duality of memory and foresight
Split Cycle
On the (mis)measurement of legislator ideology and shirking
Determinants of legislative success in House committees
Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the spatial model with valence
Parliamentary procedure
Gordon Tullock and Public Choice
An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule
Insincere voting under the successive procedure
Bicameralism and the Theory of Voting
Preference-based choice functions
La norme majoritaire
A Theory Waiting to Be Discovered and Used
Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics
Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions
Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information
The Constrained Instability of Majority Rule
The Uncovered Set and the Limits of Legislative Action
Explaining Variance; Or, Stuck in a Moment We Can't Get Out Of
In Search of the Uncovered Set
Agendas and the Control of Political Outcomes
Uncovering Evidence of Conditional Party Government
How Preferences Change Institutions
Congressional Politics of U.S. Immigration Reforms
Bridging qualified majority and unanimity decisionmaking in the EU
Results on Sophisticated Voting in an Experimental Setting
Voter Turnout and Candidate Strategies in American Elections
Sophisticated Voting in Supermajoritarian Settings
Legislative Rules in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes
Sophisticated Voting in Congress
Referendum Design
The Empirical Uses of Theoretical Models
Is Rule by Majorities Special
Do Individuals Value Distributional Fairness? How Inequality Affects Majority Decisions
Political Information, Political Involvement, and Reliance on Ideology in Political Evaluation
Testing the Predictions of the Multidimensional Spatial Voting Model with Roll Call Data
Formal Models of Legislative Processes
The Tyranny of the Supermajority
Condorcet Social Choice Functions
A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
Majority rule and allocation
Comparing Strategies in a Spatial Model of Electoral Competition
Graph-Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting
Computational Criteria for Voting Systems
The Paradox of Vote Trading
Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria
| Unique citing works | 137 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,19 |
| Citation span | 1983 - 2025 (43) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 137 |