The Uncovered Set and the Limits of Legislative Action
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7971068 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William T Bianco (0000-0002-2581-6837, Pennsylvania State University), Ivan Jeliazkov (University of California, Irvine), Itai Sened (0000-0002-2875-5240, Washington University in St. Louis) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 256-276 |
| Publication date | 2004-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Analysis (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1047-1987 • E-ISSN: 1476-4989 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pan/mph018 |
| OpenAlex | W1966596266 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 21 |
| References cited | 33 |
We present a simulation technique for sorting out the size, shape, and location of the uncovered set to estimate the set of enactable outcomes in “real-world” social choice situations, such as the contemporary Congress. The uncovered set is a well-known but underexploited solution concept in the literature on spatial voting games and collective choice mechanisms. We explain this solution concept in nontechnical terms, submit some theoretical observations to improve our theoretical grasp of it, and provide a simulation technique that makes it possible to estimate this set and thus enable a series of tests of its empirical relevance
Action (physics · Algorithm · Econometrics · Economics · GRASP · Mathematical economics · Political science · Politics · Relevance (law · Set (abstract data type · Social choice theory · Sorting · Voting · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
Social Choice and Legitimacy
Generalized medians and a political center
Party relevance and party survival in new democracies
Predicting majority rule
A finite exact algorithm for epsilon-core membership in two dimensions
The supermajority core of the US Senate and the failure to join the League of Nations
The Bicameral Roots of Congressional Deadlock
A Theory Waiting to Be Discovered and Used
The Constrained Instability of Majority Rule
In Search of the Uncovered Set
Uncovering Evidence of Conditional Party Government
Legislative Rules in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes
Testing the Predictions of the Multidimensional Spatial Voting Model with Roll Call Data
Congressional Politics of U.S. Immigration Reforms
The Entry of the M5S and the Reshaping of Party Politics in Italy (2008–2018)
The Calculus of Consensus Democracy
Using Roll Call Estimates to Test Models of Politics
Probability and Plausibility of Cycles in Three-party Systems
Government‐Opposition Voting and the Truth Behind It
Closing the Deal
Ministerial Selection and Intraparty Organization in the Contemporary British Parliament
The Rational Choice Controversy
Game Theory and Political Theory
Why Parties?
Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice
Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions
The Uncovered Set and the Core
Agendas and the Control of Political Outcomes
Uncovering Evidence of Conditional Party Government
Voter Turnout and Candidate Strategies in American Elections
Multidimensional Analysis of Roll Call Data via Bayesian Simulation
Paradoxes of Parties in Congress
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions
A Sequential Choice Theory Perspective on Legislative Organization
The Geometry of Majority Rule
Legislative Organization with Informational Committees
Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship
A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
An Institutional Theory of Divided Government and Party Polarization
Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting
Bargaining in Legislatures
Stability and Centrality of Legislative Choice in the Spatial Context
| Unique citing works | 21 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2005 - 2025 (21) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 21 |