An Institutional Theory of Divided Government and Party Polarization
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6230175 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Ingberman, Daniel E Ingberman, John Villani |
| Year | 1993 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 429 |
| Publication date | 1993-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2111380 |
| OpenAlex | W2326299428 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 56 |
| References cited | 21 |
This paper develops a simple model of institutionally driven party competition which may explain the persistence of divided government. In the basic model, two parties that are solely motivated to win elections compete for two offices, the legislature and the executive. Parties offer positions in a single dimension to a single-district sophisticated electorate that understands the institutionally defined relationship between electoral and policy outcomes. When parties are risk-averse, competition for the two offices leads to a prisoner's dilemma: the parties can jointly improve on the one-shot Nash equilibrium in which they adopt convergent positions. Several extensive form election games are shown to allow the parties to solve their prisoner's dilemma in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, parties adopt widely separated positions, and divided government and splitticket voting occur with high probability. Unlike typical voting models, in the basic model there is no tendency for electoral equilibrium to produce the (expected) median voter's ideal policy outcome. These results are robust to a variety of extensions, including significant sincere voting, multiple policy dimensions, and defections by incumbent candidates
Best response · Competition (biology · Dilemma · Divided government · Economics · Epsilon-equilibrium · Game theory · Government (linguistics · Legislature · Microeconomics · Nash equilibrium · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Politics · Prisoner's dilemma · Public economics · Subgame · Subgame perfect equilibrium · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law
Primary Election Systems and Representation
Political Resource Allocation
Partisan Models and the Search for Party Effects in the US Senate
Interest Group Theory
The Party Faithful
How Parties Nominate Presidents
The Comparative Advantage of State Interest Organization Research
Theories of Parties
The Road Less Taken
Party Coalitions in the US Congress
Social and Economic Justice Movements and Organizations
Who Sings in the Heavenly Chorus?
Party Nominating Procedures and Recruitment—State and Local Level
Activists, Influence, and Representation in American Elections
Methodological Issues in the Study of Political Parties
Political Parties and Consultants
State Parties Research
The Mobilization and Influence of Business Interests
What a Difference Twenty-Five Years Makes
Interest Groups and Agendas
Interest Groups in American Elections
The State of Research on Political Parties and Interest Groups
The Evolution of National Party Organizations
Lobbying and Influence
Urban Interest Groups
The Evolution and Alteration of American Party Coalitions
The Pure Partisan Institution
Linking Political Parties and Interest Groups
The President, Party Politics, and Constitutional Development
Winning Isn't Everything
Methodological Perspectives on Interest Groups
American Political Parties
Fiscal Policy, Legislature Size, and Political Parties
Deviations From Constituent Interests
The Oxford handbook of American political parties and interest groups
Executive veto power and credit claiming
Testing Structural Explanations for U.S. Military Intervention
Is Neutrality a Feature or a Bug? Delegation, Discretion, and the Democratic Implications of Administrative Law in a Polarized Institutional Environment
A note on voting
A Spatial Model of U.S. Senate Elections
The Uncovered Set and the Limits of Legislative Action
Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections
The Choosers or the Choices? Voter Characteristics and the Structure of Electoral Competition as Explanations for Ticket Splitting
Policy Balancing and Preferences for Party Control of Government
A New Kind of Balancing Act
Partisan Ambivalence, Split‐Ticket Voting, and Divided Government
Experimenting With the Balancing Hypothesis
Top-Down Divergence
Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election
Vote Choice and the Preference for Divided Government
Who's Responsible for the Economy? The Formation and Consequences of Responsibility Attributions
Racial, Ethnic or Rational Voters? Splitting Tickets in South Africa
Adapting Identities
Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections
The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government
A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Candidate reputations and the ‘incumbency effect’
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
Bureaucrats Versus Voters
Divided we govern
An economic theory of democracy
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Cooperation and punishment under repeated majority voting
The pure theory of large two-candidate elections
The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs
The Polarization of American Politics
Structure-Induced Equilibria and Perfect-Foresight Expectations
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model
Presidential Commitment and the Veto
A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis
A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism
Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty
Candidate Motivation
| Unique citing works | 56 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,81 |
| Citation span | 1995 - 2019 (25) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 56 |