Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23367255 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Reinhard Selten (Bielefeld University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1975 |
| Volume | 4 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 25-55 |
| Publication date | 1975-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Game Theory (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-7276 • E-ISSN: 1432-1270 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/bf01766400 |
| OpenAlex | W1998191601 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 334 |
| References cited | 3 |
Economics · Equilibrium selection · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Repeated game · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications · Guidance and Control Systems · Mathematics
Investment and Bargaining in Joint Ventures
Spectrum Auctions
Issue Advocacy and Mass Political Sophistication
Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster
Adaptive parsimony as an evolutionary solution to the equilibrium selection problem
A General Explanation of the Cuban Missile Crisis
Rationality and complexity in the work of Elinor Ostrom
Parental Presence and Encouragement Do Not Influence Helping in Young Children
Papers on pragmasemantics
Outline of the foundations for a theory of implicatures
Cournot competition in spatial markets
A Nobel Prize for Game Theorists
Homo Sociologicus
Behavioral Game Theory and Contemporary Economic Theory
Effects of exclusion on acceptance in ultimatum games
Game theory and the social contract
Extensive games with possibly unaware players
Individual differences in reasoning
Prêmio Nobel de Economia de 1994
Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Asymmetric Information
Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence
An Institutional Theory of Divided Government and Party Polarization
Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability
An agenda for the study of institutions
Information asymétrique et principes d'induction
L'indétermination et la méthode de John F. Nash
Concurrence spatiale et distorsions de localisation en information incomplète
Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
Veto Threats
Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo
An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods
Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality
Innovation and Reputation
A Sorting-cum-Learning Model of Education
Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information
Deterrence versus Defense
The Complexity of Cooperation
Inventory Holding as a Strategic Weapon to Deter Entry
Appropriability and the Extraction of a Common Property Resource
Price Wars in Price-Setting Supergames
Conflict of Interest, Bond Rating and the Value Maximization Rule
Patents, Priority and Imitation or, the Economics of Races and Waiting Games
Sunk Costs and Strategic Commitment
Equilibria in Extensive Games
Reading Cournot, Reading Nash
Rational Choice
Why Experiment in Economics
Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model
Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
An Eye for an Eye Leaves Everyone Blind
The Power to Hurt
Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols
Learning to Cooperate
Commitment in sequential bargaining - An experiment
Investing to get a head start in contests
Rationality and complexity in the work of Elinor Ostrom
Is Everything Neutral
Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies
Preference Change
Game-theoretic models
Population and Savings
Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships
Food Needs and Work Capacity
Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition
Peasants' Risk Aversion and the Choice of Marketing Intermediaries and Contracts
A Note on Interlinked Rural Economic Arrangements
Axiomatic Bargaining Theory
Agrarian Structure, Technological Innovations, and the State
Institutional Analysis of Credit Co‐Operatives
Theories of Sharecropping
Poverty and the Environmental Resource Base
On Choice Among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts
A Comparison of Principal–Agent and Bargaining Solutions
The Objects of Social Contracts
The Commodity Basis of Well‐Being
Well‐Being
Credit Rationing, Tenancy, Productivity, and the Dynamics of Inequality
Analysis of Allocation Mechanisms When Nutrition Affects Productivity
Production Relations in Semi‐Arid African Agriculture
Resource Allocation Mechanisms
Public Goods and Common‐Property Resources
Agricultural Institutions for Insurance and Stabilization
Real National Income as a Measure of General Well‐Being
Political Morality and the State
Uncertainty, Insurance, and Social Norms
Inequality, Malnutrition, and the Disfranchised
Food, Care, and Work
Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organization
Rural Credit Markets
Adaptation to Undernourishment
The Economic theory of agrarian institutions
Classical Utilitarianism in a Limited World
Fertility and Resources
Some Aspects of Linked Product and Credit Market Contracts Among Risk‐Neutral Agents
Agricultural Producer Co‐Operatives
Households and Credit Restraints
Automata and Inner States for Repeated Games
Game Theory
| Unique citing works | 334 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 6,96 |
| Citation span | 1978 - 2026 (49) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 279 |