Adaptive parsimony as an evolutionary solution to the equilibrium selection problem
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19081423 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J B André (0000-0001-9069-447X, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, corresponding author), Jean-Baptiste André |
| Year | 2023 |
| Publication date | 2023-06-30 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | PREPRINT |
| Publisher | California Digital Library (CDL) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.32942/x26k6m |
| OpenAlex | W4382699001 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 12 |
Many games, especially repeated games, have multiple Nash equilibria. This multiplicity limits the predictive power of game theory for understanding animal behavior, and plays an important role in evolutionary anthropology as a seemingly irrefutable argument that cultural group selection is necessary for human cooperation. In this article, I propose a solution to this problem inspired by the notion of convergence stability from adaptive dynamics. The multiplicity of equilibria is due to the possibility of strategies that are arbitrary in the sense that they are individually adaptive only because others use them. While arbitrariness is a possibility in standard game theory, since it is always possible to design patterns of behavior as complex as one wishes, it cannot be gradually shaped by biological evolution. Evolution can stay in an arbitrary equilibrium if it starts there, but it cannot converge to an arbitrary equilibrium if it starts from a different initial state. I propose an equilibrium refinement, the concept of evolutionarily parsimonious equilibrium, that captures this convergence constraint. Using examples, I show that it supports the selection of biologically reasonable equilibria in many of the most important games in the literature. In particular, it eliminates the vast majority of equilibria in repeated games and provides a better understanding of the conditions necessary for the evolution of reciprocal cooperation
Economics · Equilibrium selection · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Nash equilibrium · Reciprocal · Repeated game · Solution concept · Computer Science · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Artificial Intelligence
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| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |