Daniel E Ingberman
Biographic Data
| ID | 4372185 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel E Ingberman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel E |
| FAMILY NAME | Ingberman |
| SIGNATURE | INGBERMAN D E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Pennsylvania |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 58 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1985 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
An Institutional Theory of Divided Government and Party Polarization
This paper develops a simple model of institutionally driven party competition which may explain the persistence of divided government. In the basic model, two parties that are solely motivated to win elections compete for two offices, the legislature and the executive. Parties offer positions in a single dimension to a single-district sophisticated electorate that understands the institutionally defined relationship between electoral and policy …
Circumventing formal structure through commitment: Presidential influence and agenda control
Presidential Commitment and the Veto
A president's power to veto is widely recognized as an important weapon in the struggle with Congress over legislation. In this paper we investigate the effectiveness of the veto weapon with a simple model of presidential powers that incorporates informal institutional structure-the president's unique position as the focus of public attention-into an otherwise standard agenda-control model of the formal institutional structure governing the legis…
[Privatization as Institutional Choice]: Comment
Running against the status quo: Institutions for direct democracy referenda and allocations over time
Presidential Commitment and the Veto
A president's power to veto is widely recognized as an important weapon in the struggle with Congress over legislation. In this paper we investigate the effectiveness of the veto weapon with a simple model of presidential powers that incorporates informal institutional structure-the president's unique position as the focus of public attention-into an otherwise standard agenda-control model of the formal institutional structure governing the legis…
An Institutional Theory of Divided Government and Party Polarization
This paper develops a simple model of institutionally driven party competition which may explain the persistence of divided government. In the basic model, two parties that are solely motivated to win elections compete for two offices, the legislature and the executive. Parties offer positions in a single dimension to a single-district sophisticated electorate that understands the institutionally defined relationship between electoral and policy …
Running against the status quo: Institutions for direct democracy referenda and allocations over time
Circumventing formal structure through commitment: Presidential influence and agenda control
Running against the status quo: Institutions for direct democracy referenda and allocations over time
[Privatization as Institutional Choice]: Comment
Circumventing formal structure through commitment: Presidential influence and agenda control
Presidential Commitment and the Veto
A president's power to veto is widely recognized as an important weapon in the struggle with Congress over legislation. In this paper we investigate the effectiveness of the veto weapon with a simple model of presidential powers that incorporates informal institutional structure-the president's unique position as the focus of public attention-into an otherwise standard agenda-control model of the formal institutional structure governing the legis…
An Institutional Theory of Divided Government and Party Polarization
This paper develops a simple model of institutionally driven party competition which may explain the persistence of divided government. In the basic model, two parties that are solely motivated to win elections compete for two offices, the legislature and the executive. Parties offer positions in a single dimension to a single-district sophisticated electorate that understands the institutionally defined relationship between electoral and policy …
Economics (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (3 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (3 works) · Control (management (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works)