General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23326316 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard D Mckelvey (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1979 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 1085 |
| Publication date | 1979-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Econometrica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-9682 • E-ISSN: 1468-0262 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1911951 |
| OpenAlex | W1982285343 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 249 |
| References cited | 4 |
Econometrics · Economics · Mathematical economics · Political science · Politics · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Institutions and Their Design
The Necessity of Commensuration Bias in Grant Peer Review
Feminism and rational choice theory
Moves on a Chess Board’
Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy
Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government
A Problem with Referendums
An empirical stochastic model of Argentina’s Impossible Game (1955–1966)
The Geometry of Voting Cycles
A Model of a Legislature with Two Parties and a Committee System
Prospects for Formal Models of Legislatures
Transitional Governance in the United States
Policy Distance and Parliamentary Government
Parliamentary Floor Voting Procedures and Agenda Setting in Europe
Bicameralism and the Core
Formal Models of Legislative Processes
Multilateral Sanctions and Foreign Policy Success
Burocracia y eficiencia en la provisión de bienes públicos
O nó da reforma tributária no Brasil (1995-2008)
The P-Set
Executive Veto and Informational Strategy
Contending Models of Portfolio Allocation and Office Payoffs to Party Factions
Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
A Dead Senator Tells No Lies
The Robustness of the Structure-Induced Equilibrium
A Model of Farsighted Voting
Voter Expectations in Multi-Stage Voting Systems
Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information
Endogenous Tariff Theory
The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure
Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics
Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems
Presidential Commitment and the Veto
Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice
Legislative choice of regulatory forms
An agenda for the study of institutions
Why so much stability
Amend the old or address the new
Les conséquences des choix politiques
La norme majoritaire
Catastrophe theory and dynamic games
Recent Work in Game Theory and Coalition Theory
Rational Choice and Politics
Rational Choice and the Victorian Voter
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
Mood Matching and Arms Control
Collective Choice in the Commons
Coalition Formation and the Regime Divide in New Democracies
The Sum of the Parts Can Violate the Whole
Convergence and Restricted Preference Maximizing under Simple Majority Rule
Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
Economic Methods in Positive Political Theory
A Decade of Experimental Research on Spatial Models of Elections and Committees
Direct Democracy
Does the 1 Person 1 Vote Principle Apply?
The Future of Analytical Politics
Central Issues In The Study Of International Conflict
Laboratory Experiments
Partisan Bonds
Deliberative Democracy between Theory and Practice
Governing the Firm
Elections, Parties, Democracy
The elusive median voter
The Possibility of Social Choice
Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
Formal political theory
Democracy Defended
The Shared Challenges of Institutional Theories
Lingua Franca of Ideology? Common and Country-Specific Measures of Symbolic and Operational Ideology in Asian and Western Countries
From Schumpeterian Democracy to Constitutional Democracy
Optimal democratic mechanisms
On the instability of majority decision-making
Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory
The State of the Discipline in American Political Science
Social democratic party positions on the EU
Right as Opposed to Wrong as Opposed to Left
Constitutional coordination in unstable party systems
Majority voting with stochastic preferences
Choosing how we choose
Manipulation in planning
Economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy
Coalition government formation and policy payoffs
William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting.” American Political Science Review 62 (March)
Winning Elections with Unpopular Policies
Symposium. The Directional Theory of Issue Voting
The Distribution of A Priori Voting Power in the EC Council of Ministers and the European Parliament
A Theory Waiting to Be Discovered and Used
How Preferences Change Institutions
Beyond the Median
Optimality in Social Choice
The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making
Multicountry Studies of Latin American Legislatures
A Comprehensive Decision-Making Exposition of Coalition Politics
Supermajority voting, social indifference and status quo constraints
Problems in the Theory of Institutional Design
Predicting majority rule
Growth rates in multidimensional spatial voting
| Unique citing works | 249 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 5,3 |
| Citation span | 1979 - 2026 (48) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 195 |