Does the 1 Person 1 Vote Principle Apply?
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23740263 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ian R Turner (0000-0003-4054-5841, Washington University in St. Louis), Norman Schofield (0000-0002-1529-7789, Washington University in St. Louis), Maria Gallego (0000-0001-7270-2659, Wilfrid Laurier University) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Pages | 1-20 |
| Publication date | 2015-05-15 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | OTHER |
| Venue | Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1002/9781118900772.etrds0086 |
| OpenAlex | W1565893411 |
| ISBN | 9781118900772 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 17 |
In this essay we address the puzzle that exists in American politics based on the tension of convergence to the electoral mean because of the MVT (mean voter theorem) and the studies showing divergence in candidate positioning. We provide a model in which voters and states are not treated equally because of vast regional differences. In contrast with the MVT, candidates who campaign in each state may converge to the national electoral mean while adopting diverging positions in different states, as they take differences in voter preferences and valences across states into account. At the state level, we show that while candidates give maximal weight in their policy position to pivotal voters, they give minimal weight to those voting for them with almost certainty; and that in their national position while candidates give maximal weight to swing states they give minimal weight to nonpivotal states. Something that remains hidden when differences across states are ruled out as they are in MVT. Then we adapt the variable choice set logit model of Gallego et al . (2013) to study the 2008 Presidential election and find that even though Obama's and McCain's position in swing states differs from the national electoral mean, their national position are close but on opposite sides of the national mean. Given the differential treatment candidates give voters and states in their national position, incorporating the Electoral College vote in the model, the “one person, one vote” principle may fail to obtain in the 2008 US Presidential election when candidates' valences and campaign spending differ across states.
Convergence (economics) · Economics · Electoral college · Mathematical economics · Political science · Politics · Position (finance) · Presidential system · State (computer science) · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics
Party Competition and Responsible Party Government
Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
An economic theory of democracy
U.S. Presidential Elections 1968-80
The variable choice set logit model applied to the 2004 Canadian election
Stability in Competition
A Model of Farsighted Voting
Modeling Party Strategies and Policy Representation in Multiparty Elections
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |