A Model of Farsighted Voting
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232469 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Elizabeth Maggie Penn (0000-0002-2018-4367, Harvard University Press, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 36-54 |
| Publication date | 2009-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00356.x |
| OpenAlex | W2165267412 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 26 |
| References cited | 28 |
I present a new method of interpreting voter preferences in settings where policy remains in effect until replaced by new legislation. In such settings voters consider not only the utility they receive from a given policy today, but also the utility they will receive from policies likely to replace that policy in the future. The model can be used to characterize both long‐term preferences and distributions over policy outcomes in situations where policy is ongoing and voters are farsighted
Economics · Legislation · Microeconomics · Policy analysis · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Voting · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Public Administration
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| Unique citing works | 26 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,73 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2026 (16) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 26 |