Proposal Rights and Political Power
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231816 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tasos Kalandrakis (0000-0002-2959-9390, University of Rochester, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 441-448 |
| Publication date | 2006-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00193.x |
| OpenAlex | W2116192087 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 20 |
| References cited | 53 |
In a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players' voting rights or their impatience. For all monotonic voting rules and discount factors, and for all divisions of the good among players, there exists a stationary proposal‐making rule such that this division represents players' expected payoffs in a Stationary Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The result highlights the significance of proposal rights in determining political power in collective deliberations
Bargaining power · Economics · Equilibrium selection · Game theory · Law and economics · Majority rule · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Nash equilibrium · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Repeated game · Subgame · Subgame perfect equilibrium · Voting · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining
Proportional Payoffs in Legislative Bargaining with Weighted Voting
Le mécanisme optimal de vote au sein du conseil des représentants d’un système fédéral
Fair Play in Assemblies
Bargaining and Bicameralism
Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics
The downsides of information transmission and voting
Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo
Institutional Arrangements and Logrolling
Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Rules
Slicing and Bundling
Who gets what, when, and how revisited
The imperfect agenda-setter
Coalitions
A Model of Farsighted Voting
Explaining Institutional Change
A Priori Bounds on Legislative Bargaining Agreements
Parties Getting Impatient
The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending
Demand Commitment in Legislative Bargaining
Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
Information and Legislative Organization
Why Parties?
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
Non-Cooperative Games
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures
Democracy and Its Critics, by Robert A. Dahl
Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz. 1962. “Two Faces of Power.” American Political Science Review 56 (December)
Democracy and Its Critics
Power and Powerlessness
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
The power of the proposal maker in a model of endogenous agenda formation
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
The rational voter
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union
More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the European Union
Why Power Indices for Assessing European Union Decision-Making
The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter
Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules
Bicameral Winning Coalitions and Equilibrium Federal Legislatures
Relevance of Voting Power
An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism
Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Various Concepts of Power Equivalence Among Ostensibly Unrelated Approaches
The concept of power
Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power
Seniority in Legislatures
Presidential Pork
Two Faces of Power
Bargaining in Legislatures
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures
A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice
Voting and Vetoing
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
| Unique citing works | 20 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,05 |
| Citation span | 2007 - 2023 (17) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 20 |