A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3136207 |
|---|---|
| Authors | L S Shapley (Princeton University), Martin Shubik (0000-0003-1956-6808, Princeton University) |
| Year | 1954 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 787-792 |
| Publication date | 1954-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1951053 |
| OpenAlex | W2002616065 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 412 |
| References cited | 3 |
In the following paper we offer a method for the a priori evaluation of the division of power among the various bodies and members of a legislature or committee system. The method is based on a technique of the mathematical theory of games, applied to what are known there as "simple games" and "weighted majority games." We apply it here to a number of illustrative cases, including the United States Congress, and discuss some of its formal properties.The designing of the size and type of a legislative body is a process that may continue for many years, with frequent revisions and modifications aimed at reflecting changes in the social structure of the country; we may cite the role of the House of Lords in England as an example. The effect of a revision usually cannot be gauged in advance except in the roughest terms; it can easily happen that the mathematical structure of a voting system conceals a bias in power distribution unsuspected and unintended by the authors of the revision. How, for example, is one to predict the degree of protection which a proposed system affords to minority interests? Can a consistent criterion for "fair representation" be found? It is difficult even to describe the net effect of a double representation system such as is found in the U. S. Congress (i.e., by states and by population), without attempting to deduce it a priori. The method of measuring "power" which we present in this paper is intended as a first step in the attack on these problems
A priori and a posteriori · Calculus (dental · Distribution (mathematics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Legislative process · Legislature · Mathematical economics · Operations research · Political science · Politics · Population · Power (physics · Representation (politics · Simple (philosophy · Sociology · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics
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| Unique citing works | 412 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 5,89 |
| Citation span | 1956 - 2026 (71) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 406 |