Martin Shubik
Biographic Data
| ID | 274453 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Martin Shubik |
| GIVEN NAMES | Martin |
| FAMILY NAME | Shubik |
| SIGNATURE | SHUBIK M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Yale University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1956-6808 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 58 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 495 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 57 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1951 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Research Note: Terrorist Groups as Business Firms: A New Typological Framework
Existing typological frameworks do not adequately categorize terrorist groups by their operational characteristics. We propose a new framework which compares terrorist groups to business firms. In our framework, terrorist groups are mapped on two axes: centralization of resources and centralization of operations. We separate terrorist groups into four typologies echoing familiar business arrangements: Hierarchy, Venture Capital, Franchise, and Br…
Stable Prices, Money, and the Cost of Living
An analysis of indexed units of account such as that proposed by Robert Hall
Game Theory: Some Observations
The core of endo-status games and one-to-one ordinal preference games
Terrorism, technology, and the socioeconomics of death
Warfare, as an organized endeavor, is facing a paradigmatic shift. Throughout most of history, only states could effectively muster the capacity to kill an enemy in significant numbers. The weakness of the nation‐state and the increasing permeability of borders are reducing the effectiveness of the state and increasing the role of non‐state actors. Concurrently, the increasingly cheap availability of technical information and dual‐use material is…
Game Theory at Princeton, 1949-1955: A Personal Reminiscence
Research Article| December 01 1992 Game Theory at Princeton, 1949–1955: A Personal Reminiscence Martin Shubik Martin Shubik Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1992) 24 (Supplement): 151–163. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-24-Supplement-151 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon …
A strategic market game of a finite exchange economy with a mutual bank
Risk, Organizations, and Society
The transactions cost of money (a strategic market game analysis)
Open Questions in Defense Economics and Economic Warfare
A distinction is made concerning five distinct war scenarios, and a discussion is given of the different economic requirements for each of these scenarios. These requirements pose a considerable number of new economic problems that were not present in defense economics prior to World War II
A model of a sudden-death field-goal football game as a sequential duel
Strategic market game: A dynamic programming application to money, banking and insurance
A strategic market game with transactions costs
Game Theory and Sociology in the 1980s
A Game Theoretic Approach to Political Economy
A Game-Theoretic Approach to Political Economy: Vol. 2 of Game Theory in the Social Sciences
Journal Article A Game-Theoretic Approach to Political Economy: Vol. 2 of Game Theory in the Social Sciences Get access A Game- Theoretic Approach to Political Economy: Vol. 2 of Game Theory in the Social Sciences. By MARTIN SHUBIK. (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: The MIT Press, 1984. Pp. viii + 744. £49.75 hardback.) Malcolm Pemberton Malcolm Pemberton University College London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google…
Cooperative Game Solutions: Australian, Indian, and U.S. Opinions
As part of several lectures the audiences in Australia, India, and the United States were asked how the gain from a cooperative agreement should be divided among three individuals. The responses are considered in the context of various cooperative solutions that have been suggested in the theory of games. More questions are raised than answered
Noncooperative exchange using money and broker-dealers
Some thoughts on geopolitical factors affecting natural gas supply schemes for Western Europe
Political risk: Analysis, process, and purpose
The capitalist himself is a practical man, who, it is true, does not always reflect on what he says outside his office, but who always knows what he does inside the latter.– K. Marx Capital, ch. 5
Approximate cores of replica games and economies
Approximate cores of replica games and economies. Part I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
Game Theory and Social Science
Strategic war: What are the questions and who should ask them
War gaming: For whom and what
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
In the following paper we offer a method for the a priori evaluation of the division of power among the various bodies and members of a legislature or committee system. The method is based on a technique of the mathematical theory of games, applied to what are known there as "simple games" and "weighted majority games." We apply it here to a number of illustrative cases, including the United States Congress, and discuss some of its formal propert…
The Dollar Auction game: A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior and Escalation
There is an extremely simple, highly amusing, and instructive parlor game which can be played at any party by arranging for the auction of a dollar. This game illustrates some of the difficulties with the noncooperative equilibrium concept and games in extensive form (von Neuman and Morgenstern, 1945). The game is simplicity itself and is usually highly profitable to its promoter. The auctioneer auctions off a dollar bill to the highest bidder, w…
Game theory, behavior, and the paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma: Three Solutions
The Prisoners' Dilemma game is a deceptively simple 2 x 2 matrix game which can be used to illustrate the value and the limitations of game theoretic thinking. Its simplicity makes it most attractive as a paradigm to explain human behavior. Furthermore it is easy to experiment with. The very simplicity of this game is a danger. Analogies between it and human affairs are best employed to study their inadequacies and to pinpoint what has been left …
Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior
Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment
A general model of noncooperative trading equilibrium is described in which prices depend in a natural way on the buying and selling decisions of the traders, avoiding the classical assumption that individuals must regard prices as fixed. The key to the approach is the use of a single, specified commodity as "cash," which may or may not have intrinsic value. The model, in several variants, is treated as a noncooperative game, in the spirit of Nas…
On the study of disarmament and escalation
a national defense policy, and in particular in their relation to deterrence. In the course of the last twenty years there has been a considerable growth in methods and theories concerning different aspects of human behavior. In particular, in situations involving conscious choice under conditions of possible conflict or cooperation there has been a development in political science, mathematical economics, programming, psychology, simulation, gam…
Game Theory at Princeton, 1949-1955: A Personal Reminiscence
Research Article| December 01 1992 Game Theory at Princeton, 1949–1955: A Personal Reminiscence Martin Shubik Martin Shubik Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1992) 24 (Supplement): 151–163. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-24-Supplement-151 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon …
Approximate cores of replica games and economies. Part I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving
Examines the system of military combat simulations, exploring the extent and status of gaming in the defense community and considering their purpose, operations, uses, benefits, and costs
Voting, or a Price System in a Competitive Market Structure
In this brief note it is demonstrated that if all the conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium are satisfied, then simple majority voting to determine the distribution of goods may be less efficient than a price system.The argument here may be somewhat cryptic for those not familiar with the work of Anthony Downs. A considerably more discursive presentation of the background material is given in "A Two Party System, General Equil…
On homo politicus and the instant referendum
Research Note: Terrorist Groups as Business Firms: A New Typological Framework
Existing typological frameworks do not adequately categorize terrorist groups by their operational characteristics. We propose a new framework which compares terrorist groups to business firms. In our framework, terrorist groups are mapped on two axes: centralization of resources and centralization of operations. We separate terrorist groups into four typologies echoing familiar business arrangements: Hierarchy, Venture Capital, Franchise, and Br…
Simulation in International Relations: Developments for Research and Teaching
Some reflections on the design of game theoretic models for the study of negotiation and threats
One of the greatest sources of misunderstanding in the social sciences is the inability of many political scientists, sociologists, generalists, and a great many economists and psychologists, to understand what is meant by a formal model, and to comprehend what constitutes a legitimate or an unsound use of that model. On certain occasions, more mathematically inclined social scientists may use simple examples to illustrate methodology. Unfortunat…
Strategic war: What are the questions and who should ask them
Cooperative Game Solutions: Australian, Indian, and U.S. Opinions
As part of several lectures the audiences in Australia, India, and the United States were asked how the gain from a cooperative agreement should be divided among three individuals. The responses are considered in the context of various cooperative solutions that have been suggested in the theory of games. More questions are raised than answered
On concepts of efficiency
The "Bridge Game" Economy: An Example of Indivisibilities
A Game Theorist Looks at the Antitrust Laws and the Automobile Industry
Terrorism, technology, and the socioeconomics of death
Warfare, as an organized endeavor, is facing a paradigmatic shift. Throughout most of history, only states could effectively muster the capacity to kill an enemy in significant numbers. The weakness of the nation‐state and the increasing permeability of borders are reducing the effectiveness of the state and increasing the role of non‐state actors. Concurrently, the increasingly cheap availability of technical information and dual‐use material is…
A strategic market game with transactions costs
Noncooperative exchange using money and broker-dealers
Approximate cores of replica games and economies
An Example of a Trading Economy with Three Competitive Equilibria
Perception of Payoff Structure and Opponent's Behavior in Related Matrix Games
Empirical results indicate to what extent judges recognize similanties between payoff matrices that vary in game theoretic information conditions. Judges failed to note similarities in patterns of payoffs between matrices but did recognize patterns of behavior of an opponent
The United States and the Restoration of World Trade
Information, Theories of Competition, and the Theory of Games
Russia's Soviet Economy
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
In the following paper we offer a method for the a priori evaluation of the division of power among the various bodies and members of a legislature or committee system. The method is based on a technique of the mathematical theory of games, applied to what are known there as "simple games" and "weighted majority games." We apply it here to a number of illustrative cases, including the United States Congress, and discuss some of its formal propert…
A Game Theorist Looks at the Antitrust Laws and the Automobile Industry
Economics, Management Science, and Operations Research
Models of Man: Social and Rational . H. A. Simon
Strategy in the Missile Age . Bernard Brodie
The General Theory of n-Person Games
Some reflections on the design of game theoretic models for the study of negotiation and threats
One of the greatest sources of misunderstanding in the social sciences is the inability of many political scientists, sociologists, generalists, and a great many economists and psychologists, to understand what is meant by a formal model, and to comprehend what constitutes a legitimate or an unsound use of that model. On certain occasions, more mathematically inclined social scientists may use simple examples to illustrate methodology. Unfortunat…
Stratégie et structure des marchés. Concurrence, oligopole et théorie des jeux
Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior
Simulation in International Relations: Developments for Research and Teaching
On the study of disarmament and escalation
a national defense policy, and in particular in their relation to deterrence. In the course of the last twenty years there has been a considerable growth in methods and theories concerning different aspects of human behavior. In particular, in situations involving conscious choice under conditions of possible conflict or cooperation there has been a development in political science, mathematical economics, programming, psychology, simulation, gam…
On homo politicus and the instant referendum
Game theory, behavior, and the paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma: Three Solutions
The Prisoners' Dilemma game is a deceptively simple 2 x 2 matrix game which can be used to illustrate the value and the limitations of game theoretic thinking. Its simplicity makes it most attractive as a paradigm to explain human behavior. Furthermore it is easy to experiment with. The very simplicity of this game is a danger. Analogies between it and human affairs are best employed to study their inadequacies and to pinpoint what has been left …
Voting, or a Price System in a Competitive Market Structure
In this brief note it is demonstrated that if all the conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium are satisfied, then simple majority voting to determine the distribution of goods may be less efficient than a price system.The argument here may be somewhat cryptic for those not familiar with the work of Anthony Downs. A considerably more discursive presentation of the background material is given in "A Two Party System, General Equil…
The assignment game I: The core
Comment on Ordeshook, “Pareto Optimality in Electoral Competition”
The confusion in this paper appears to be caused by the author's failure to appreciate fully a lengthy footnote (footnote 5) in my article. In this note a distinction was made between announcing or failing to announce a mixed strategy. The results from either of these approaches will be Pareto optimal ex post but not ex ante . Thus, if a price system works (which it usually does not), the citizens ex ante should prefer it to the vote unless they …
Political science and public policy: A review essay
The "Bridge Game" Economy: An Example of Indivisibilities
The Dollar Auction game: A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior and Escalation
There is an extremely simple, highly amusing, and instructive parlor game which can be played at any party by arranging for the auction of a dollar. This game illustrates some of the difficulties with the noncooperative equilibrium concept and games in extensive form (von Neuman and Morgenstern, 1945). The game is simplicity itself and is usually highly profitable to its promoter. The auctioneer auctions off a dollar bill to the highest bidder, w…
Perception of Payoff Structure and Opponent's Behavior in Related Matrix Games
Empirical results indicate to what extent judges recognize similanties between payoff matrices that vary in game theoretic information conditions. Judges failed to note similarities in patterns of payoffs between matrices but did recognize patterns of behavior of an opponent
On the Role of Numbers and Information in Competition
II est souvent insisté, dans les interprétations données aux résultats de Arrow et Debreu établissant l'existence de l'équilibre concurrentiel, sur l'importance en cette matière de la taille du marché et du nombre de participants. Cependant on constate que, d'un point de vue strictement mathématique, ces résultats sont totalement indépendants de ces derniers paramètres. Il n'en est pas de même des théorèmes établissant la convergence du noyau (co…
The Uses and Methods of Gaming
Economics (44 works) · Political science (28 works) · Mathematical economics (27 works) · Computer Science (26 works) · Economic theories and models (20 works) · Sociology (20 works) · Law (19 works) · Game theory (18 works) · Economic Theory and Institutions (16 works) · Microeconomics (15 works)