Portfolio Allocation and the Vote of No Confidence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6227697 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sona N Golder (0000-0003-2259-2943), Jacquelyn A Thomas (Florida State University) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 29-39 |
| Publication date | 2014-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1234 • E-ISSN: 1469-2112 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0007123412000580 |
| OpenAlex | W2078989907 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 14 |
| References cited | 25 |
There is a contradiction between theory and empirics with respect to portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies. While the canonical model of legislative bargaining predicts the existence of a ‘formateur bonus’, empirical studies show that portfolios are allocated in a manner that favours smaller parties. This article argues that the difference between the empirical pattern and the theoretical predictions can be explained by the vote of no confidence, which provides an incentive for large formateur parties to overcompensate smaller coalition partners in exchange for their sustained support over time. This argument is tested by exploiting variations in the presence of no confidence votes across national and regional levels in France. As predicted, we find that larger formateur parties receive a greater share of portfolios if the vote of no confidence is absent than if it is present
Argument (complex analysis · Contradiction · Economics · Empirical evidence · Financial economics · Incentive · Legislature · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Portfolio · Portfolio allocation · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Social Policy and Reform Studies
Avoiding distraction
The quantitative and qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios to European radical right parties
Partisan distribution of ministerial portfolios in Asian-Pacific democracies
Coalition government formation and policy payoffs
The Formateur’s Bonus in European Constitutional Monarchies, 1901–99
Response to Martin and Vanberg
The vote of no confidence
Bargaining in legislatures, portfolio allocation, and the electoral costs of governing
Electoral Systems With a Majority Bonus as Unconventional Mixed Systems
When do different systems of government lead to similar power-sharing? The case of government formation
Measuring the formation of a new government
The distribution of individual cabinet positions in coalition governments
Partisan Portfolio Allocation in African Democracies
Nonunitary Parties, Government Formation, and Gamson's Law
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics
Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy
Participation in the 2010 French regional elections
The 2004 French Regional Elections
The 2010 French regional elections
Government Formation and Policy Formulation in the German States
Negotiation in legislatures over government formation
Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945–83
Understanding Interaction Models
Party Size and Portfolio Payoffs
Explaining and predicting coalition outcomes
The portfolio allocation paradox
The Presidential Calculus
A Model of Farsighted Voting
The Logic of Gamson's Law
The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies
Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analysis
A Theory of Coalition Formation
Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections
Bargaining in Legislatures
Buying Supermajorities
Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining
| Unique citing works | 14 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,17 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2026 (13) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 14 |