The distribution of individual cabinet positions in coalition governments
A sequential approach
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6259459 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alejandro Ecker (0009-0009-1792-2080, University of Vienna Austria), Thomas M Meyer (0000-0002-0389-9918, University of Vienna Austria), Wolfgang C Müller (0000-0001-9085-9465, University of Vienna Austria) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 802-818 |
| Publication date | 2015-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Political Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0304-4130 • E-ISSN: 1475-6765 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1475-6765.12108 |
| PMID | 27546952 |
| OpenAlex | W1961475453 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 31 |
| References cited | 40 |
Multiparty government in parliamentary democracies entails bargaining over the payoffs of government participation, in particular the allocation of cabinet positions. While most of the literature deals with the numerical distribution of cabinet seats among government parties, this article explores the distribution of individual portfolios. It argues that coalition negotiations are sequential choice processes that begin with the allocation of those portfolios most important to the bargaining parties. This induces conditionality in the bargaining process as choices of individual cabinet positions are not independent of each other. Linking this sequential logic with party preferences for individual cabinet positions, the authors of the article study the allocation of individual portfolios for 146 coalition governments in Western and Central Eastern Europe. The results suggest that a sequential logic in the bargaining process results in better predictions than assuming mutual independence in the distribution of individual portfolios
Cabinet (room · Conditionality · Delegate · Distribution (mathematics · Economics · Government (linguistics · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Politics · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Engineering · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Coalition Politics in Central Eastern Europe
The quantitative and qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios to European radical right parties
Coalizer
Parties’ foreign policy approach and the outcome of coalition allocation negotiations
Fairness and qualitative portfolio allocation in multiparty governments
When ideological lenses crack. The joint effect of the Great Recession and clarity of government responsibility on economic assessments
Coalition politics under exceptional exogenous constraints
Coalition Mood in European Parliamentary Democracies
The Political Dynamics of Portfolio Design in European Democracies
Coalition dynamics
The intra-party bargain over ministerial appointments
Pieces of the puzzle? Coalition formation and tangential preferences
Equitability or proportionality? Local-level portfolio allocation in Germany
Party campaign statements and portfolio allocation in coalition governments
Do voters want their parties to be office- or policy-seekers in coalition negotiations
Social democracy transformed? Party change and union ties
Rebuilding the coalition ship at sea
Selecting Ministers in Times of Crisis
Cabinet payoffs in coalition governments
The effects of electoral anticipation on portfolio allocation
Coalition Prospects and Policy Change
The Advantage of Incumbents in Coalitional Bargaining
Legislative Oversight and Control of Independent Portfolios
Cabinet Formation and Coalition Governance
Who Gets What in Foreign Affairs? Explaining the Allocation of Foreign Ministries in Coalition Governments
Analysing Payoff Salience in Coalition Allocation
The Allocation of Committee Chairs and the Oversight of Coalition Cabinets in Belgium
Who’s fit for the job? Allocating ministerial portfolios to outsiders and experts
Congruence between voters and parties
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A Coalescência Revisitada
Making and Breaking Governments
Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining
Multiparty Government
Democratic Delegation and Accountability
Democratic Politics and Party Competition
Die Politik des Ressortzuschnitts zwischen Koalitionsarithmetik und thematischer Profilierung. Eine koalitionspolitische Erklärung für Kompetenzänderungen der Bundesministerien, 1957-2013
Comparative Democracy
Parties and Democracy
Uncertainty, Complexity, and Gamson’s Law
The influence of presidential heads of state on government formation in European democracies
Experience and the distribution of portfolio payoffs in the European Commission
Measuring portfolio salience in Eastern European parliamentary democracies
The missing piece
Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi‐presidential democracies compared
Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation
Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies
Disentangling the Value of a Ministry
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New Empirical Strategies for the Study of Parliamentary Government Formation
Does substance matter? A model of qualitative portfolio allocation and application to German state governments between 1990 and 2010
Context and Coalition-Bargaining
Dividing the Indivisible
Gamson rule not for all
Who gets what in coalition governments? Predictors of portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies
Determinants of cabinet size
The portfolio allocation paradox
The Role of Parliamentary Committees in Coalition Governments
Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process
Shadowing Ministers
Treating Words as Data with Error
Divisor Methods for Sequential Portfolio Allocation in Multi‐Party Executive Bodies
Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm
Contending Models of Portfolio Allocation and Office Payoffs to Party Factions
Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy
Portfolio Allocation and the Vote of No Confidence
Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments
Qualitative Dimensions of Coalition Payoffs
| Unique citing works | 31 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,44 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 31 |