Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy
Intraparty Bargaining in Japan
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6230554 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Yoshikuni Ono (0000-0002-9222-4014, International University of Japan, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 553-567 |
| Publication date | 2012-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00586.x |
| OpenAlex | W1513455978 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 26 |
| References cited | 46 |
How do the dynamics of portfolio allocation work within parties? While much of the existing literature focuses on portfolio allocation among parties in coalition governments, bargaining over cabinet portfolios also takes place within parties because many parties have internal divisions or factions that influence these decisions. By analyzing data on portfolio allocation in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan from 1960 through 2007, this study demonstrates that, contrary to the proportionality proposition (Gamson's Law), substantial variance exists in allocation outcomes over time because party leaders allocate cabinet portfolios among factions as a means of preventing defections and challenges from their party's members. The resulting portfolio allocation reflects the bargaining dynamics within the party: I find that party leaders surrender more portfolios as they become more vulnerable to challenges posed by internal rivals
Business · Cabinet (room · Democracy · Economics · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Politics · Portfolio · Portfolio allocation · Proposition · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Finance · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Stock markets and economic uncertainty
The quantitative and qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios to European radical right parties
The logic of delegation and institutional contexts
The Liberal Democratic Party
Causes, Effects, and Forms of Factionalism in Southeast Asia
Rule by the elderly
Partisan distribution of ministerial portfolios in Asian-Pacific democracies
Indirect executive accountability of prime ministers
Hidden Majoritarianism and Women’s Career Progression in Proportional Representation Systems
Examining the appointment of women to ministerial positions across Europe
Entering the men's domain? Gender and portfolio allocation in European governments
Disentangling the Value of a Ministry
Bargaining in legislatures, portfolio allocation, and the electoral costs of governing
Within‐party Allocation of Committee Seats
Why Change a Winning Team? Explaining Post-Election Cabinet Reshuffles in Four Westminster Democracies
Selecting Ministers in Times of Crisis
Analyzing gender gaps in bicameral legislatures
Political Dynasties and the Selection of Cabinet Ministers
Multiple Principals and Legislative Cohesion
Personal Attributes of Legislators and Parliamentary Behavior
The distribution of individual cabinet positions in coalition governments
Gamson rule not for all
Testing the “China Model” of Meritocratic Promotions
Arguing for a Negligible Effect
Bending the Iron Law
Who Answers for the Government? Bureaucrats, Ministers, and Responsible Parties
Parties and party systems
Why Parties?
Political Parties and Hard Choices
L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik. “A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System,” American Political Science Review 48 (1954)
Homogeneity, independence, and power indices
Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Models with Beta-Distributed Dependent Variables
The missing piece
Changing policy views at the local level
Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation
Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies
Theories of Government Formation and the 1996 General Election in Japan
Implications of the Effective Number of Parties for Cabinet Formation
The Lady's Not for Turning’ but What About the Rest? Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party 1979–89
As a Matter of Factions
The Timing of Cabinet Reshuffles in Five Westminster Parliamentary Systems
The portfolio allocation paradox
Formation rules and minority governments
Effective” Number of Parties
Electoral Rules, Career Ambitions, and Party Structure
Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm
Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies
Contending Models of Portfolio Allocation and Office Payoffs to Party Factions
Keeping Tabs on Partners
A Comparative Approach to Legislative Organization
Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments
Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments
Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift
Electoral Reform and the Fate of Factions
Japan's Political Marketplace
A Theory of Coalition Formation
Replacing Cabinet Ministers
Leadership Effects in Parliamentary Elections in Australia and Britain
The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies
Bargaining in Legislatures
Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan
Ministerial Selection and Intraparty Organization in the Contemporary British Parliament
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining
Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics
| Unique citing works | 26 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,17 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2026 (13) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 26 |