Response to Martin and Vanberg
Evaluating a Stochastic Model of Government Formation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7410352 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matt Golder (0000-0002-5006-1368, Pennsylvania State University), Sona N Golder (0000-0003-2259-2943, Pennsylvania State University), David A Siegel (0000-0003-1619-6119, Duke University) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 76 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 880-886 |
| Publication date | 2014-09-05 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3816 • E-ISSN: 1468-2508 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s002238161400053x |
| OpenAlex | W2103860432 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 14 |
In a 2012 Journal of Politics article, we presented a zero-intelligence model of government formation. Our intent was to provide a “null” model of government formation, a baseline upon which other models could build. We made two claims regarding aggregate government formation outcomes: first, that our model produces aggregate results on the distributions of government types, cabinet portfolios, and bargaining delays in government formation that compare favorably to those in the real world; and second, that these aggregate distributions vary in theoretically intuitive ways as the model parameters change. In this issue, Martin and Vanberg (MV) criticize our model on theoretical and empirical grounds. Here we not only show how MV’s evaluation of our model is flawed, but we also illustrate, using an analogy to common statistical practice, how one might properly attempt to falsify stochastic models such as ours at both the individual and the aggregate level
Aggregate (composite · Analogy · Baseline (sea · Econometrics · Economics · Epistemology · Government (linguistics · Mathematical economics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
Negotiation in legislatures over government formation
Bargaining and Majority Rules
Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders
Modeling the Institutional Foundation of Parliamentary Government Formation
A Step in the Wrong Direction
New Empirical Strategies for the Study of Parliamentary Government Formation
The portfolio allocation paradox
Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process
Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies
Social Networks and Collective Action
Who “Wins”? Determining the Party of the Prime Minister
A New Approach to the Study of Parties Entering Government
Portfolio Allocation and the Vote of No Confidence
The Conditional Impact of Incumbency on Government Formation
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,14 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2019 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |