Measuring the formation of a new government

The case of the Israeli parliament 1949–2016

Bibliographic Data

ID6291950
AuthorsOsnat Akirav (0000-0001-6270-6963, Western Galilee College, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume26
Issue1
Pages97-112
Publication date2020-01-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Legislative Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1357-2334 • E-ISSN: 1743-9337
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13572334.2020.1731973
OpenAlexW3008306697
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited16

We test three criteria for recording data about the formation of a new government and the allocation of its portfolios using the case of Israel. We then analyse Gamson's Law and compare our results to the conclusions of four other datasets. With regard to theory, we suggest that studies (1) include cases in which MPs leave the government and take their seats with them, (2) include the number of seats of the support parties in the total number of the government and (3) count portfolios rather than ministers. From the empirical perspective, following these procedures produces different conclusions than previous studies regarding Israel. The formateur's bonus is substantial and the direct election of the prime minister increased it. Furthermore, large parties hold more portfolios than small parties, and when we exclude support parties from the dataset this tendency increases

Democracy · Electoral system · Government (linguistics · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Philosophy · Public Administration

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