Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3342842 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William H Riker (University of Rochester, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1980 |
| Volume | 74 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 432-446 |
| Publication date | 1980-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1960638 |
| OpenAlex | W4245824675 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 324 |
| References cited | 15 |
While contemporary political science (as, for example, in such subjects as political socialization, studies of public opinion, etc.) tends to emphasize the study of values and tastes (because of an assumption that political outcomes-like market outcomes-are determined by the amalgamation of individual preferences), the older tradition of political science emphasized the study of institutions. The line of research in political theory followed during the last generation has involved seeking an equilibrium of tastes; but it has revealed that such an equilibrium exists only rarely, if at all. The inference then is that prudence in research directs the science of politics toward the investigation of empirical regularities in institutions, which, though congealed tastes, are "unstable constants" amenable to scientific investigation
Disequilibrium · Economics · Epistemology · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Prudence · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Philosophy · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
New Perspectives and Evidence on Political Communication and Campaign Effects
Formal Models
Rational Choice Institutionalism
Political Parties In and Out of Legislatures
Public Choice Economics
Old Questions and New Answers about Institutions
Setting the Agenda
The Engines of European Integration
Designing Federalism
Elections, Parties, Democracy
Dominance and subordination in world politics
Lost in Translation
L'Année de la régulation n° 7 (2003-2004)
Power, institutions, and the production of inequality
Capitalism and Democracy
How Institutions Evolve
Formale und informale Institutionen in defekten Demokratien
The power of liberal international organizations
Power in Global Governance
Democracy Defended
The Shared Challenges of Institutional Theories
The Political Economy of Skills in Comparative-Historical Perspective
Historical Institutionalism in Rationalist and Sociological Perspective
The State and International Relations
Policing and global governance
How Institutions Evolve
Some Rules of Constitutional Design
Political Institutions
Explanations and Designs in Political Science
It Takes a Model to Beat a Model
Zimbabwe opposition’s quest for electoral reforms in the post-GNU era
Science, institutions, and values
On the instability of majority decision-making
Ideology and the Direction of Causation in the Acquisition and Maintenance of Shared Belief Systems
Groups Agendas as the Root of Party Position Change
The Manchin Paradox
The Evolution of National Constitutions
The Decline of the Death Penalty and the Discovery of Innocence
Legislative Development in Africa
Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State
Meritocracy and Autocratic Power-Sharing
Term Limits as a Boon to Legislative Scholarship
Role of institutions in public management
The Rikerian Arrow at the Heart of Democratic Backsliding
Agenda Control by Committee Chairs in Fragmented Multi-party Parliaments
Prosociality in Majority Decisions
Choosing anarchy
Strategic agenda setting and Prime Ministers’ approval ratings
Covid-19 and the second exams fiasco across the UK
The role of bureaucrats in designing policy outcomes
Enlargement and Institutional Reform in the European Union
Institutional Design, Uncertainty, and Path Dependency during Transitions
Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects
The politics within institutions for regulating public spending
From Schumpeterian Democracy to Constitutional Democracy
Constitutional coordination in unstable party systems
Decentralized Governance, Constitution Formation, and Redistribution
New Institutional Economics
Taking the Lead
A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces
Why Are Some Institutions Replaced while Others Persist? Evidence from State Constitutions
On the importance of personal sources of power in politics
Europeanization Beyond the Goodness of Fit
Legislative Process in International Organizations
Presidents’ Strategic Action and Policy Change in Mexico
The Union for the Mediterranean, or the Changing Context of Euro-Mediterranean Relations
Fiscal transparency puzzle and electoral institutions
Policy Spaces
Reconsidering the new institutional approach to China
Right as Opposed to Wrong as Opposed to Left
Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization
Delayed cooperation
The role of committee systems in post-communist legislatures
The Transformation of Political Institutions
Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory
If Politics Matters
Gradual Institutional Change in Congressional Ethics
Number of Parties, Endogenous Partisan Preferences, and Electoral Turnout Rates
Buying treaties with cigarettes
Empirical Strategies in International Development Research
Modeling Public Decision Preferences Using Context-Specific Value Hierarchies
Membership Balance, Open Meetings, and Effectiveness in Federal Advisory Committees
Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Policy Compromise
An Altimeter for Mr. Escher's Stairway
The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making
Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter
Some economic applications of Scott domains
The Return to History and the New Institutionalism in American Political Science
Presidential Reorganization and the Politics of Public Agencies
The Origins of Budgetary Preferences
U.S. Treaty Making with American Indians
Collective Action for Sustainable Forestry
Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking
Equilibrium institutions
The median voter model in public choice theory
Citizens’ preferences about voting rules
A general probabilistic spatial theory of elections
On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox
Existence of a ?structurally stable? equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule
The stability of international coalitions in United Nations voting from 1946 to 1973
A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
An economic theory of democracy
Social Choice and Individual Values
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Voting and the Summation of Preferences
Stable outcomes in majority rule voting games
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power
An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process
| Unique citing works | 324 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 7,04 |
| Citation span | 1980 - 2026 (47) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 324 |