Why Are Some Institutions Replaced while Others Persist? Evidence from State Constitutions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12761024 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Adam Cayton (0000-0002-4836-6963, University of Colorado Boulder, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 267-289 |
| Publication date | 2015-07-23 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | State Politics & Policy Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1532-4400 • E-ISSN: 1946-1607 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1532440015594663 |
| OpenAlex | W2370076085 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 52 |
Why are some institutions quickly replaced while others endure for more than a century? Majority cycling over institutions is theoretically unavoidable, but politics provides few opportunities to study it empirically. Using data on state constitutional characteristics and legislative composition from 1834 to 2012, this article advances the theory that institutions are more likely to be endogenously replaced when the society of actors differs from the time of enactment, and that institutional characteristics can exacerbate or mitigate these risks. Results show that political change interacts with institutional particularism to preserve or undermine state constitutions. More particularistic constitutions have shorter life spans because they are more vulnerable to changes in the political environment
Composition (language · Economics · Institutional change · Law and economics · Legislature · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Sociology · State (computer science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Administration
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Follow the Leader?
Setting the Agenda
Information and Legislative Organization
Personal Roots of Representation
No Middle Ground
Why Parties?
The Endurance of National Constitutions
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
Proportional hazards tests and diagnostics based on weighted residuals
Regression Models and Life-Tables
Home Style
The Calculus of Consent
The Reasoning Voter
Social Choice and Individual Values
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Patterns of democracy
Event History Modeling
Logrolling, arrow paradox and cyclical majorities
Constitutional change and agenda control
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
Why so much stability
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Congress
Social Choice and Individual Values
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
Taking Time Seriously
The Measurement of the Partisan Balance of State Government
The Principles and Traditions Underlying American
How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity
After the Public Interest Prevails
After Enactment
Structure-Induced Equilibria and Perfect-Foresight Expectations
Party Polarization and "Conflict Extension" in the American Electorate
Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa
Change, Continuity, and the Evolution of the Law
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
The Lifecycle of Public Policy
Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics
Was James Madison Wrong? Rethinking the American Preference for Short, Framework-Oriented Constitutions
Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |