Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232803 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Thomas R Palfrey (0000-0003-0769-8109, California Institute of Technology, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 379-388 |
| Publication date | 2009-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Annual Review of Political Science (BOOK_SERIES) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1094-2939 • E-ISSN: 1545-1577 |
| Publisher | Annual Reviews (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.091007.122139 |
| OpenAlex | W2139523938 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 28 |
| References cited | 51 |
This article summarizes a small part of the literature on laboratory experiments in political economy. The experiments discussed are primarily aimed at testing predictions of equilibrium models of voting in committees and elections. The specific topics discussed are voter turnout, the Condorcet jury theorem, and the swing voter's curse. The latter two topics address questions of information aggregation by voting rules. All the experiments find significant evidence of strategic voting and, with a few exceptions, find support for the equilibrium predictions of the theories
Condorcet method · Curse · Economics · Information aggregation · Jury · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Public economics · Ranked voting system · Sociology · Turnout · Voting · Voting behavior · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
Efficiency, Legitimacy, and the Administrative State
Fostering trust in human-robot interaction via perspective-taking and anthropomorphism
Other people’s money
Law or strategic calculus? Abstention in the Argentine Supreme Court
Conflicted voters
Political autonomy and independence
Putting Politics in the Lab
Increased Realism at Lower Cost
Understanding U.S. public support for domestic climate change policies
The Promise of Experiments for Studying the Presidency
Other-regarding preferences, in-group bias and political participation
Voting Islamist or voting secular? An empirical analysis of voting outcomes in Egypt’s “Arab Spring”
Voting “Ford” or Against
Vote Trading in Power-Sharing Systems
Please Don't Vote for Me
The Principles of Experimental Design and Their Application in Sociology
Do Politicians Take Risks Like the Rest of Us? An Experimental Test of Prospect Theory Under MPs
Voting correctly in lab elections with monetary incentives
Balancing the ticket while appealing to the base
Voting systems and strategic manipulation
The effects of direct voting and deliberation on legitimacy beliefs
Which decision‐making arrangements generate the strongest legitimacy beliefs? Evidence from a randomised field experiment
Anxiety and Vote Decision Making in Winner-Take-All Elections
Field Experimental Work on Political Institutions
Transparency, Replication, and Cumulative Learning
Political Economy Models of Elections
Congress, Lawmaking, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1971–2000
Taking Others into Account
A Decade of Experimental Research on Spatial Models of Elections and Committees
Experimental Foundations of Political Science
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
The Probability Weighting Function
Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
Elections with limited information
A Group Rule—Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate
An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections
An economic theory of democracy
An experimental study of storable votes
Self-Interest, Inequality, and Entitlement in Majoritarian Decision-Making
Why people vote
A strategic calculus of voting
The Downsian model of electoral participation
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models
Retrospective voting
Rational expectations in elections
The rationally uninformed electorate
An Experimental Test of the Core in a Simple N-Person Cooperative Nonsidepayment Game
Beliefs and Voting Decisions
Fairness in Majority Rule Games with a Core
A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage
Neighborhood Information Exchange and Voter Participation
Bureaucratic Agenda Control
The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study
Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms
An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Models of Political Participation
Stability and Coordination in Duverger's Law
Bargaining in Legislatures
A Theory of Voting Equilibria
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules
Bargaining in Legislatures
Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty
Minority Representation in Multimember Districts
Information Asymmetries and Simultaneous versus Sequential Voting
Convicting the Innocent
The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium
The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout
Committee Decisions under Majority Rule
| Unique citing works | 28 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,75 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2026 (17) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 28 |