Please Don't Vote for Me
Voting in a Natural Experiment with Perverse Incentives
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9704438 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jörg L Spenkuch (0000-0003-1489-7288, Northwestern University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 125 |
| Issue | 585 |
| Pages | 1025-1052 |
| Publication date | 2015-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12131 |
| OpenAlex | W3125351403 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 23 |
Whether individuals vote strategically is one of the most important questions at the intersection of economics and political science. Exploiting a flaw in the German electoral system by which a party may gain seats by receiving fewer votes, this article documents patterns of preference misrepresentation in a large, real‐world election. During the 2005 elections to the Bundestag, the sudden death of a right‐wing candidate necessitated a by‐election in one electoral district. Knowing the results in all other districts and given the paradoxical incentives in place, a substantial fraction of the electorate voted for a party other than their most preferred one, or abstained
Economics · Geography · German · Incentive · Microeconomics · Misrepresentation · Natural experiment · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Preference · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory
Making Votes Count
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions
Manipulation of Voting Schemes
An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections
An economic theory of democracy
Social Choice and Individual Values
Social Choice and Individual Values
Political Parties
Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy
The Logic of Institutional Preferences
A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections
Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 British General Election
"Sophisticated" Voting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries
Strategic voting in British elections
Measuring strategic voting in multiparty plurality elections
Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote
A Theory of Voting Equilibria
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,3 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2023 (8) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |