Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions
Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23355151 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mark Allen Satterthwaite |
| Year | 1975 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 187-217 |
| Publication date | 1975-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Economic Theory (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0531 • E-ISSN: 1095-7235 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2 |
| OpenAlex | W2129678216 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 319 |
| References cited | 11 |
Anti-plurality voting · Approval voting · Arrow · Arrow's impossibility theorem · Ballot · Cardinal voting systems · Condorcet method · Economics · Independence (probability theory) · Independence of irrelevant alternatives · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Preference · Rationality · Set (abstract data type) · Social choice theory · Statistics · Voting · Welfare · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics
Social Choice and Legitimacy
Democratic Deliberation and Social Choice
Risk-limiting Audits and the Margin of Victory in Nonplurality Elections
Voters’ Rationality Under Four Electoral Rules
Consensus, Negotiation and Mediation
Strategic Voting in Plurality Elections
Contingent valuation
Formal Models of Legislative Processes
Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof
Project selection with partially verifiable information
Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics
Noncooperative Counter-threats to Vote Trading
Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions
Graph-Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting
A Comparison of Efficiency of Multicandidate Electoral Systems
All voting is strategic
The Role of Leaders in Democratic Deliberations
Analyses géométriques et probabilistes des règles de vote, avec une application au scrutin majoritaire à deux tours
Information imparfaite et économie publique
Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice
Ships That Pass in the Night
Are Hypothetical Referenda Incentive Compatible
Policy Uncertainty in Two-Level Games
Decision Theory
Personal Utilities and Public Judgements
Voids or Fragmentation
Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy
An empirical study of some election systems
Social Choice and Public Reason
Locally robust implementation and its limits
Cycles and Social Choice
The Routledge Handbook of Elections, Voting Behaviorand Public Opinion
Opinion Diffusion and Analysis on Social Networks
Welfare Economics
Public Choice Theory
Bergson-Wohlfahrtsfunktion und normative Ökonomie
Deliberative Democracy between Theory and Practice
The Economic Vote
Designing Federalism
Social Choice Theory
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Strategic Voting Under Proportional Representation
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
The Possibility of Social Choice
Chapter 17 Contingent Valuation
What's to Know About Hypothetical Bias in Stated Preference Valuation Studies?
Contingent Valuation
A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
Incentive and informational properties of preference questions
Lost in Translation
Formal political theory
Naturalism and Moral Conventionalism
Public Reason's Chaos Theorem
Democracy Defended
Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
Gerrymander-proof representative democracies
Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation
Implementación en la asignación de proyectos con las regalías en Colombia
Ethics of Strategic Voting in Popular Elections
The marginalist Marxism of Tugan-Baranovsky
Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability
Performance Evaluation
Formation of Parties and Coalitions in Multiple Referendums
Normed Negative Voting to Depolarize Politics
Specific Tastes or Cliques of Jurors? How to Reduce the Level of Manipulation in Group Decisions
Queen Elisabeth competition
Identifying outlier scores and outlier jurors to reduce manipulation in classical music competitions
Eliminating Group Agency
Isolationism, instrumentalism and fiscal policy
The probability of violating Arrow’s conditions
Priority domains
Where should your daughter go to college? An axiomatic analysis
Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information
On the safety of group manipulation
Stable preference aggregation with infinite population
Cycles in synchronous iterative voting
Plurality rule and Condorcet criterion over restricted domains
Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision
Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model
A modified version of Arrow’s IIA condition
Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
Strategyproof randomized social choice for restricted sets of utility functions
Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains
Freedom and voting power
Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions
Arbiter assignment
Do grades have absolute meaning? An experiment on majority judgment
Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes
Honesty and epistemological implementation of social choice functions with asymmetric information
Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain
A combinatorial topology approach to Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Proxy selection in transitive proxy voting
Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions
Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
The framing of elections
An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule
Group strategy-proof rules in multidimensional binary domains
| Unique citing works | 319 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 6,38 |
| Citation span | 1976 - 2026 (51) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 290 |