Risk-limiting Audits and the Margin of Victory in Nonplurality Elections
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13036680 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anand D Sarwate (0000-0001-6123-5282, Toyota Technological Institute at Chicago, corresponding author), Stephen Checkoway (Johns Hopkins University), Hovav Shacham (University of California San Diego) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 4 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Publication date | 2013-01-11 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Statistics Politics and Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2151-7509 • E-ISSN: 2194-6299 |
| Publisher | De Gruyter (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1515/spp-2012-0003 |
| OpenAlex | W59785752 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 32 |
Post-election audits are an important method for verifying the outcome of an election. Recent work on risk-limiting, post-election audits has focused almost exclusively on plurality elections. Several organization and municipalities use nonplurality methods such as range voting, the Borda count, and instant-runoff voting (IRV). We believe that it is crucial to develop effective methods of performing risk-limiting, post-election audits for these methods. We define a general notion of the margin of victory and develop risk-limiting auditing procedures for these nonplurality methods. For scored systems, we show how to adapt methods from plurality auditing. For IRV, the situation is markedly different. We provide a risk-limiting method for auditing the candidate elimination order. We provide a more efficient audit for the elections in which the margin of the IRV election can be efficiently calculated or bounded. We provide efficiently computable upper and lower bounds on the margin and, where possible, compare them to the exact margins for a large number of real elections
Audit · Business · Computer security · Electronic voting · Limiting · Margin (machine learning · Political science · Politics · Victory · Voting · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Engineering · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Accounting
Condorcet Social Choice Functions
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions
Manipulation of Voting Schemes
Social Choice and Individual Values
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Sharper p-Values for Stratified Election Audits
Social Choice in the South Seas
Single Transferrable Vote
The Single Transferable Vote
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2023 (2) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |