Marcel Thum

Biographic Data

ID1047513
NAMEMarcel Thum
GIVEN NAMESMarcel
FAMILY NAMEThum
SIGNATURETHUM M
AFFILIATIONSTechnische Universität Dresden
ORCID0000-0002-5071-7849
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS13
TOTAL CITATIONS18
WORKS AS AUTHOR13
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1995
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX2

  • Unanimity versus majority

    Open AccessNektaria Glynia, Marcel Thum et al.ARTICLEPublic Choice2026References: 37

    We examine the trade-offs between unanimity and majority voting under incomplete information. While conventional wisdom suggests that unanimity leads to higher reform rejection rates and higher total transfers compared to the majority rule, we show that this does not always hold when the proposer lacks perfect knowledge of responders’ acceptance costs. Using a simple theoretical model, we identify conditions under which uncertainty leads the prop…

  • Terrorism and misperceptions

    Open AccessK Peren Arın, Umair Khalil et al.ARTICLEJournal of Economic Behavior &…2026References: 11

  • Flooding the vote

    Open AccessK Peren Arın, K Peren Arin et al.ARTICLEEuropean Journal of Political…2025Cited by: 1References: 31

  • The Missing Government in Green Finance

    Julian Lamprecht, Marcel ThumARTICLEFinanzArchiv2024

    The recent literature on green finance has extensively discussed the extent to which responsible investors can contribute to a greener economy, particularly regarding climate change. Somewhat surprisingly, governments as key players in climate policies are practically absent in this analysis. Using a simple model of private and public provision of a public good, we show that, even under favorable conditions, interaction with government policies r…

  • Exploring the hidden impact of the Covid-19 pandemic

    Open AccessK Peren Arın, K Peren Arin et al.ARTICLEEconomics & Human Biology2022

  • Tax Evasion, Corruption and Market Entry

    Open AccessAndré Seidel, Marcel ThumARTICLEScottish Journal of Political…2015References: 4

    We analyze the impact of tax policy on the market entry of firms in the presence of corruption and tax evasion. In a world with corruption, firms must bribe corrupt officials to enter the market. For a given level of bribes, higher tax rates and stricter enforcement of taxation decrease tax evasion but typically reduce market entry. However, when the level of bribes reacts to tax policy, higher taxes and stricter enforcement of taxation can have …

  • Climate Policy Negotiations with Incomplete Information

    Open AccessKai A Konrad, Marcel ThumARTICLEEconomica2014Cited by: 2References: 28

    We analyse bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Incomplete information is known as one of the key reasons why negotiations may fail more generally, and why efficiency gains cannot be exploited. We ask whether unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces or increases the likelihood for an efficient negotiation outcome. We find that such commitment behaviour reduces the …

  • Pollution, shadow economy and corruption

    Open AccessAmit K Biswas, Mohammad Reza Farzanegan et al.ARTICLEEcological Economics2012

  • Controlling Migration in an Open Labor Market

    Open AccessMarcel ThumARTICLEPublic Choice2004Cited by: 4References: 21

  • Grundlagen der Volkswirtschaftslehre

    Open AccessUlrich Blum, Alexander Karmann et al.BOOKGrundlagen der Volkswirtschaftslehr…2003

  • Grundlagen der Volkswirtschaftslehre

    Open AccessUlrich Blum, Johannes Bröcker et al.BOOKGrundlagen der Volkswirtschaftslehr…1999

  • Public pensions and immigration policy in a democracy

    Open AccessUlrich Scholten, Marcel ThumARTICLEPublic Choice1996Cited by: 11References: 4

  • Netzwerkeffekte, Standardisierung und staatlicher Regulierungsbedarf

    Marcel ThumBOOKNetzwerkeffekte, Standardisierung…1995

    Netzwerkeffekte, Standardisierung und staatlicher Regulierungsbedarf