Climate Policy Negotiations with Incomplete Information
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9723307 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kai A Konrad (0000-0002-2225-2271, Max Planck Institute Munich), Marcel Thum (0000-0002-5071-7849, Technical University Dresden) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 81 |
| Issue | 322 |
| Pages | 244-256 |
| Publication date | 2014-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecca.12065 |
| OpenAlex | W2144972715 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 28 |
We analyse bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Incomplete information is known as one of the key reasons why negotiations may fail more generally, and why efficiency gains cannot be exploited. We ask whether unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces or increases the likelihood for an efficient negotiation outcome. We find that such commitment behaviour reduces the gains from global cooperation and that, in turn, this reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements
Ask price · Bargaining problem · Business · Climate change · Climate policy · Complete information · Computer security · Economics · Key (lock) · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Outcome (game theory) · Political science · Public economics · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Finance · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law
Strategic ignorance, and the management of performative effects
Under What Conditions Will the Paris Process Produce a Cycle of Increasing Ambition Sufficient to Reach the 2°C Goal
How US withdrawal might influence cooperation under the Paris climate agreement
Closing the emission price gap
The role of relocation mobility in tax and subsidy competition
On the Voluntary Provision of International Public Goods
Strategies for the international protection of the environment
Can Unilateral Leadership Promote International Environmental Cooperation
Coalitional Power and Public Goods
Environmental Protection and the Private Provision of International Public Goods
Can conditional commitments break the climate change negotiations deadlock
Cohesion, Cooperation, and the Value of Doing Things Together
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2014 - 2026 (13) |
| Highly cited | No |