Can Unilateral Leadership Promote International Environmental Cooperation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11895368 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Johannes Urpelainen (Columbia University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 320-339 |
| Publication date | 2011-07-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Interactions (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0305-0629 • E-ISSN: 1547-7444 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/03050629.2011.596018 |
| OpenAlex | W1997990548 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 41 |
Why do governments sometimes exercise unilateral leadership in international environmental cooperation, such as the mitigation of global climate change? It is usually the case that unilateral leadership cannot solve the problem at hand, so it is not clear what the benefits of unilateral leadership are. In this article, I provide a new political rationale for unilateral leadership. I show that if a green politician (worried about environmental destruction) fears that he or she will probably lose power soon, he or she may want to unilaterally implement domestic mitigation policies to reduce the domestic cost of mitigation in the future. By exercising unilateral leadership, this politician ensures that even a future brown politician (only mildly interested in environmental protection) is, due to the domestic cost reduction, willing to engage in international cooperation. The findings imply that while unilateral leadership is not a panacea, it may be a useful commitment device under empirically plausible conditions
Business · Economics · Global Leadership · Panacea (medicine · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Energy, Environment, Economic Growth · Law · Sustainability and Climate Change Governance
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Lessons for effective renewable electricity policy from Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom
Trend‐setters in environmental policy
Climate change policy, market structure, and carbon leakage
Environmental and technology policies for climate mitigation
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After Hegemony
International Organization
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Leadership Revisited
Institutional Design for EMS-Based Government Procurement Policies
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Defeating Kyoto
Environmental performance and policy regimes
Multi-Level Reinforcement
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Positive Feedback
Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements
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Signs of Hubris
| Citations per year | 0.54 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2013 - 2025 (13) |
| Highly cited | No |