Rush T Stewart
Biographic Data
| ID | 1047705 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Rush T Stewart |
| GIVEN NAMES | Rush T |
| FAMILY NAME | Stewart |
| SIGNATURE | STEWART R T |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Rochester |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2777-5263 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 13 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Comparative Base Rate Tracking
The ideals program in algorithmic fairness
Deep Uncertainty and Incommensurability
The precautionary principle is invoked in a number of important personal and policy-related decision contexts. Peterson shows that certain ways of making the principle precise are inconsistent with other criteria of decision making. Some object that the results do not apply to cases of deep uncertainty or value incommensurability, which are alleged to be in the principle’s wheelhouse. First, I show that Peterson’s impossibility results can be gen…
New Possibilities for Fair Algorithms
We introduce a fairness criterion that we call Spanning. Spanning i) is implied by Calibration, ii) retains interesting properties of Calibration that some other ways of relaxing that criterion do not, and iii) unlike Calibration and other prominent ways of weakening it, is consistent with Equalized Odds outside of trivial cases
Spanning in and Spacing out? A Reply to Eva
Identity and the limits of fair assessment
In many assessment problems—aptitude testing, hiring decisions, appraisals of the risk of recidivism, evaluation of the credibility of testimonial sources, and so on—the fair treatment of different groups of individuals is an important goal. But individuals can be legitimately grouped in many different ways. Using a framework and fairness constraints explored in research on algorithmic fairness, I show that eliminating certain forms of bias acros…
Distention for Sets of Probabilities
Bayesians often appeal to “merging of opinions” to rebut charges of excessive subjectivity. But what happens in the short run is often of greater interest than what happens in the limit. Seidenfeld and coauthors use this observation as motivation for investigating the counterintuitive short run phenomenon of dilation, since, they allege, dilation is “the opposite” of asymptotic merging of opinions. The measure of uncertainty relevant for dilation…
Uncertainty, equality, fraternity
Epistemic states of uncertainty play important roles in ethical and political theorizing. Theories that appeal to a “veil of ignorance,” for example, analyze fairness or impartiality in terms of certain states of ignorance. It is important, then, to scrutinize proposed conceptions of ignorance and explore promising alternatives in such contexts. Here, I study Lerner’s probabilistic egalitarian theorem in the setting of imprecise probabilities. Le…
Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting
For two ideally rational agents, does learning a finite amount of shared evidence necessitate agreement? No. But does it at least guard against belief polarization, the case in which their opinions get further apart? No. OK, but are rational agents guaranteed to avoid polarization if they have access to an infinite, increasing stream of shared evidence? No.
On the Possibility of Testimonial Justice
Recent impossibility theorems for fair risk assessment extend to the domain of epistemic justice. We translate the relevant model, demonstrating that the problems of fair risk assessment and just credibility assessment are structurally the same. We motivate the fairness criteria involved in the theorems as also being appropriate in the setting of testimonial justice. Any account of testimonial justice that implies the fairness/justice criteria mu…
Weak pseudo-rationalizability
Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence
Merging of opinions results underwrite Bayesian rejoinders to complaints about the subjective nature of personal probability. Such results establish that sufficiently similar priors achieve consensus in the long run when fed the same increasing stream of evidence. Here, we establish a merging result for sets of probability measures updated by Jeffrey conditioning. This generalizes a number of different merging results in the literature. We also s…
Conditional choice with a vacuous second tier
Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting
For two ideally rational agents, does learning a finite amount of shared evidence necessitate agreement? No. But does it at least guard against belief polarization, the case in which their opinions get further apart? No. OK, but are rational agents guaranteed to avoid polarization if they have access to an infinite, increasing stream of shared evidence? No.
Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence
Merging of opinions results underwrite Bayesian rejoinders to complaints about the subjective nature of personal probability. Such results establish that sufficiently similar priors achieve consensus in the long run when fed the same increasing stream of evidence. Here, we establish a merging result for sets of probability measures updated by Jeffrey conditioning. This generalizes a number of different merging results in the literature. We also s…
Conditional choice with a vacuous second tier
Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence
Merging of opinions results underwrite Bayesian rejoinders to complaints about the subjective nature of personal probability. Such results establish that sufficiently similar priors achieve consensus in the long run when fed the same increasing stream of evidence. Here, we establish a merging result for sets of probability measures updated by Jeffrey conditioning. This generalizes a number of different merging results in the literature. We also s…
On the Possibility of Testimonial Justice
Recent impossibility theorems for fair risk assessment extend to the domain of epistemic justice. We translate the relevant model, demonstrating that the problems of fair risk assessment and just credibility assessment are structurally the same. We motivate the fairness criteria involved in the theorems as also being appropriate in the setting of testimonial justice. Any account of testimonial justice that implies the fairness/justice criteria mu…
Weak pseudo-rationalizability
Uncertainty, equality, fraternity
Epistemic states of uncertainty play important roles in ethical and political theorizing. Theories that appeal to a “veil of ignorance,” for example, analyze fairness or impartiality in terms of certain states of ignorance. It is important, then, to scrutinize proposed conceptions of ignorance and explore promising alternatives in such contexts. Here, I study Lerner’s probabilistic egalitarian theorem in the setting of imprecise probabilities. Le…
Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting
For two ideally rational agents, does learning a finite amount of shared evidence necessitate agreement? No. But does it at least guard against belief polarization, the case in which their opinions get further apart? No. OK, but are rational agents guaranteed to avoid polarization if they have access to an infinite, increasing stream of shared evidence? No.
Identity and the limits of fair assessment
In many assessment problems—aptitude testing, hiring decisions, appraisals of the risk of recidivism, evaluation of the credibility of testimonial sources, and so on—the fair treatment of different groups of individuals is an important goal. But individuals can be legitimately grouped in many different ways. Using a framework and fairness constraints explored in research on algorithmic fairness, I show that eliminating certain forms of bias acros…
Distention for Sets of Probabilities
Bayesians often appeal to “merging of opinions” to rebut charges of excessive subjectivity. But what happens in the short run is often of greater interest than what happens in the limit. Seidenfeld and coauthors use this observation as motivation for investigating the counterintuitive short run phenomenon of dilation, since, they allege, dilation is “the opposite” of asymptotic merging of opinions. The measure of uncertainty relevant for dilation…
New Possibilities for Fair Algorithms
We introduce a fairness criterion that we call Spanning. Spanning i) is implied by Calibration, ii) retains interesting properties of Calibration that some other ways of relaxing that criterion do not, and iii) unlike Calibration and other prominent ways of weakening it, is consistent with Equalized Odds outside of trivial cases
Spanning in and Spacing out? A Reply to Eva
The ideals program in algorithmic fairness
Deep Uncertainty and Incommensurability
The precautionary principle is invoked in a number of important personal and policy-related decision contexts. Peterson shows that certain ways of making the principle precise are inconsistent with other criteria of decision making. Some object that the results do not apply to cases of deep uncertainty or value incommensurability, which are alleged to be in the principle’s wheelhouse. First, I show that Peterson’s impossibility results can be gen…
Comparative Base Rate Tracking
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Mathematics (8 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Mathematical economics (7 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works)