Keith L Dougherty
Biographic Data
| ID | 1048864 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Keith L Dougherty |
| GIVEN NAMES | Keith L |
| FAMILY NAME | Dougherty |
| SIGNATURE | DOUGHERTY K L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Georgia |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8689-1961 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 38 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 86 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 38 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Ranked choice voting with different elimination procedures
Ranked choice voting (RCV) is one of the fastest-growing electoral reforms in the United States, yet few scholars have considered the degree to which RCV could be improved with a different elimination procedure. This paper examines RCV with three different elimination procedures: plurality elimination, negative plurality elimination, and Borda elimination. After some analytical observations, we examine how often RCV with each of these procedures …
Borda count in a forward agenda
The Effects of the Great Compromise on the Constitutional Convention of 1787
The success of any constitutional convention can depend on its provisions for power sharing. We test three claims about the effects of the Great Compromise, a power sharing agreement, on the Constitutional Convention of 1787. First, we find that the convention was not more likely to pass proposals to strengthen the national government after the compromise than before, contrary to claims made by historians. Two small states increased their support…
When ties are possible: Weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality
The effect of unconditional preferences on Sen’s paradox
Congressional apportionment and the fourteenth amendment
The probability of violating Arrow’s conditions
Trends: Creating Parties in Congress: The Emergence of a Social Network
This article examines the creation of political parties in Congress with a focus on ties between emerging party leaders and members, 1789–1802. Using an egocentric selection model, we examine who John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison tied with as a function of the characteristics of the emerging leader, a member of Congress, and dyadic relationships between the two. We also examine whether ties affected the party cho…
Slavery in the Constitution: Why the Lower South Occasionally Succeeded at the Constitutional Convention
The Lower South’s successes at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 contributed to a constitution that prohibited federal interference with the slave trade until 1808, guaranteed fugitive slaves would be returned to their masters, and prevented export tariffs. We explain why the Lower South occasionally succeeded on sectional issues at the convention using a multiple-dimensional model of sincere voting, estimated using a new dataset of delegate …
Authors’ Response
Coalitional Instability and the Three‐Fifths Compromise
Were the initial apportionments of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate inevitable? This article determines the coalitional stability of apportionment rules considered at the Constitutional Convention assuming the Convention limited itself to the rules proposed. Using each state's vote share as a measure of state preference, we find that the stability of legislative apportionment depended upon the states making decisions. Equal a…
The Consistency of James Madison’s Politics
James Madison’s midcareer shift from nationalist to Democratic–Republican launched a debate about his political behavior and the consistency of his political thought. This paper evaluates Madison’s political behavior by comparing his voting record with the voting record of other legislators of his time. Using roll call votes from the Congress of the Confederation and the first four federal congresses, we show that Madison’s politics changed but t…
An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules
The value of formalism: Re-examining external costs and decision costs with multiple groups
An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule
Partisan Agenda Control and the Dimensionality of Congress
Recent studies have questioned the familiar characterization of Congress as unidimensional. We argue that agenda control, orchestrated through the House Rules Committee and other techniques, can make multidimensional congresses appear more unidimensional. We evaluate this argument by examining the relationship between measures of unidimensionality and various measures of party control for the House of Representatives from 1875 to 1997, at both th…
A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention
Previous studies of the U.S. Constitutional Convention have relied on votes recorded for the state blocs or a relatively small number of delegate votes. We construct a new data set covering delegate votes on over 600 substantive roll calls, and use the data in several ways. First, we estimate a single dimensional position for the delegates which reflects their overall voting patterns. Next, we explain these positions using a variety of delegate a…
Constitutional Change and American Pivotal Politics
Recent studies of legislative gridlock espouse the importance of institutional design in separation-of-powers games. However, few scholars have focused on the effects of the adoption of the U.S. Constitution on legislative gridlock. This article attempts to fill that gap by determining whether the Constitution improved the marginal effect of the gridlock interval on the ability to change policy. Results suggest that policy is more responsive to t…
A New Dataset of Delegate Positions on All Substantive Roll Calls at the U.S. Constitutional Convention
Delegate level analysis of the U.S. Constitutional Convention has been limited because the Convention did not record delegate votes. In this article, we introduce the Constitutional Convention Research Group Dataset, which contains 5,121 inferred delegate votes on 620 substantive roll calls at the Convention. The Constitutional Convention Research Group Dataset represents a significant improvement over previous datasets such as those compiled by …
Voting for Pareto optimality: A multidimensional analysis
Buchanan and Tullock’s apple
Personalty interests at the Constitutional Convention: New tests of the Beard thesis
The Properties of Simple Vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases Where Absences and Abstentions Are Important
Little attention has been paid to the differences between absolute majority rule and simple majority rule, which differ in their treatment of absences and ‘votes to abstain’. This article fills that gap by undertaking a probabilistic analysis of the two voting rules assuming two alternatives and a quorum requirement for simple majority rule. The rules are compared in both a modified sincere setting and a strategic setting using five criteria: (1)…
An Empirical Test of Federalist and Anti-Federalist Theories of State Contributions, 1775-1783
This article tests Federalist and Anti-Federalist explanations for state contributions to the confederation government using data on troop requisitions from 1775 to 1783. The Federalists claimed that state politicians acted unilaterally and contributed when the Continental army protected their state's interests. The Anti-Federalists claimed that state politicians understood their duty to the Union and contributed to advance its needs. The results…
An Empirical Test of Federalist and Anti-Federalist Theories of State Contributions, 1775-1783
A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State: Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention
Robertson (2005) and Rakove (1996) argue that Roger Sherman was surprisingly influential at the Constitutional Convention. Using empirically estimated ideal points, we show that Sherman was a pivotal voter from a pivotal state. We also demonstrate that if the votes were tallied by individual delegates, rather than being grouped by the home state, then Sherman would have been less pivotal. This suggests that the voting procedures adopted at the Co…
Voting on slavery at the Constitutional Convention
This paper provides the first empirical study of delegate voting behavior on issues of slavery at the U.S. Constitutional Convention. We analyze two categories of votes: those related to apportionment and those related to the regulation of the slave trade. Although it is widely believed that delegates voted consistent with the interests of their states on issues of slavery, we find that for votes on apportionment, the effect of state interests wa…
A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention
Previous studies of the U.S. Constitutional Convention have relied on votes recorded for the state blocs or a relatively small number of delegate votes. We construct a new data set covering delegate votes on over 600 substantive roll calls, and use the data in several ways. First, we estimate a single dimensional position for the delegates which reflects their overall voting patterns. Next, we explain these positions using a variety of delegate a…
Partisan Agenda Control and the Dimensionality of Congress
Recent studies have questioned the familiar characterization of Congress as unidimensional. We argue that agenda control, orchestrated through the House Rules Committee and other techniques, can make multidimensional congresses appear more unidimensional. We evaluate this argument by examining the relationship between measures of unidimensionality and various measures of party control for the House of Representatives from 1875 to 1997, at both th…
The Pareto Efficiency and Expected Costs of k-Majority Rules
Several authors have analyzed the optimal k-majority rule based on a variety of criteria. Buchanan and Tullock argued that, in constitutional settings, the criterion should be that all changes meet the Pareto criterion; otherwise the status quo should be preferred (we call this the BT criterion). They then asserted that unanimity rule would be the preferred voting rule in this setting. In parliamentary settings, they claimed that a near majority …
Voting for Pareto optimality: A multidimensional analysis
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited
Empirical studies ofdelegatevoting at the Constitutional Convention have relied on the same 16 roll call votes. This article re-examines various assumptions used in the collection of these data. We first create a baseline regression. We then consider the effect of dropping delegates not in attendance, re-inferring the votes from primary sources, examining various subsamples of the roll calls, and reconstructing constituency variables to include s…
The Properties of Simple Vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases Where Absences and Abstentions Are Important
Little attention has been paid to the differences between absolute majority rule and simple majority rule, which differ in their treatment of absences and ‘votes to abstain’. This article fills that gap by undertaking a probabilistic analysis of the two voting rules assuming two alternatives and a quorum requirement for simple majority rule. The rules are compared in both a modified sincere setting and a strategic setting using five criteria: (1)…
Coalitional Instability and the Three‐Fifths Compromise
Were the initial apportionments of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate inevitable? This article determines the coalitional stability of apportionment rules considered at the Constitutional Convention assuming the Convention limited itself to the rules proposed. Using each state's vote share as a measure of state preference, we find that the stability of legislative apportionment depended upon the states making decisions. Equal a…
Odd or Even: Assembly Size and Majority Rule
This paper provides a probabilistic comparison of small assemblies with an even number of members versus an adjacent odd number of members. We show that assemblies with an odd number of members are more likely to pass proposals under absolute majority rule than assemblies with an adjacent even number of members. We also show they are more likely to attain quorum and to pass proposals under simple majority rule with a quorum. The first claim is su…
Suppressing Shays' Rebellion: Collective Action and Constitutional Design under the Articles of Confederation
Under the Articles of Confederation, the American states frequently failed to pay their requisitions to the national government, sapping it of revenue. This paper explains the failure to raise revenue from the states by analyzing the system of requisitions in the context of Shays' Rebellion. Shays' Rebellion is of particular interest because it illustrates the clear conflict between common state interests and constitutional obligations on the one…
A New Dataset of Delegate Positions on All Substantive Roll Calls at the U.S. Constitutional Convention
Delegate level analysis of the U.S. Constitutional Convention has been limited because the Convention did not record delegate votes. In this article, we introduce the Constitutional Convention Research Group Dataset, which contains 5,121 inferred delegate votes on 620 substantive roll calls at the Convention. The Constitutional Convention Research Group Dataset represents a significant improvement over previous datasets such as those compiled by …
Public Goods Theory from Eighteenth Century Political Philosophy to Twentieth Century Economics
Slavery in the Constitution: Why the Lower South Occasionally Succeeded at the Constitutional Convention
The Lower South’s successes at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 contributed to a constitution that prohibited federal interference with the slave trade until 1808, guaranteed fugitive slaves would be returned to their masters, and prevented export tariffs. We explain why the Lower South occasionally succeeded on sectional issues at the convention using a multiple-dimensional model of sincere voting, estimated using a new dataset of delegate …
The value of formalism: Re-examining external costs and decision costs with multiple groups
Marginal cost sharing and the Articles of Confederation
Borda count in a forward agenda
An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules
An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule
Marginal cost sharing and the Articles of Confederation
Suppressing Shays' Rebellion: Collective Action and Constitutional Design under the Articles of Confederation
Under the Articles of Confederation, the American states frequently failed to pay their requisitions to the national government, sapping it of revenue. This paper explains the failure to raise revenue from the states by analyzing the system of requisitions in the context of Shays' Rebellion. Shays' Rebellion is of particular interest because it illustrates the clear conflict between common state interests and constitutional obligations on the one…
Defending the Articles of Conferation: A Response to Sobel
Collective Action under the Articles of Confederation
Collective Action under the Articles of Confederation reminds us of the divide that frequently separates historian from social scientist. According to Keith L. Dougherty, formulas such as the one above help us understand why some states continued to support the Confederation Congress while others did not. Drawing upon Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action (1965), Dougherty develops a theory of joint product, that states would not pay thei…
Public Goods Theory from Eighteenth Century Political Philosophy to Twentieth Century Economics
Charles A. Kromkowski, Recreating the American Republic: Rules of Apportionment, Constitutional Change, and American Political Development, 1700--1870
The Pareto Efficiency and Expected Costs of k-Majority Rules
Several authors have analyzed the optimal k-majority rule based on a variety of criteria. Buchanan and Tullock argued that, in constitutional settings, the criterion should be that all changes meet the Pareto criterion; otherwise the status quo should be preferred (we call this the BT criterion). They then asserted that unanimity rule would be the preferred voting rule in this setting. In parliamentary settings, they claimed that a near majority …
Why Federalism
To Form a More Perfect Union: A new economic interpretation of the United States Constitution
A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State: Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention
Robertson (2005) and Rakove (1996) argue that Roger Sherman was surprisingly influential at the Constitutional Convention. Using empirically estimated ideal points, we show that Sherman was a pivotal voter from a pivotal state. We also demonstrate that if the votes were tallied by individual delegates, rather than being grouped by the home state, then Sherman would have been less pivotal. This suggests that the voting procedures adopted at the Co…
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited
Empirical studies ofdelegatevoting at the Constitutional Convention have relied on the same 16 roll call votes. This article re-examines various assumptions used in the collection of these data. We first create a baseline regression. We then consider the effect of dropping delegates not in attendance, re-inferring the votes from primary sources, examining various subsamples of the roll calls, and reconstructing constituency variables to include s…
Voting on slavery at the Constitutional Convention
This paper provides the first empirical study of delegate voting behavior on issues of slavery at the U.S. Constitutional Convention. We analyze two categories of votes: those related to apportionment and those related to the regulation of the slave trade. Although it is widely believed that delegates voted consistent with the interests of their states on issues of slavery, we find that for votes on apportionment, the effect of state interests wa…
An Empirical Test of Federalist and Anti-Federalist Theories of State Contributions, 1775-1783
This article tests Federalist and Anti-Federalist explanations for state contributions to the confederation government using data on troop requisitions from 1775 to 1783. The Federalists claimed that state politicians acted unilaterally and contributed when the Continental army protected their state's interests. The Anti-Federalists claimed that state politicians understood their duty to the Union and contributed to advance its needs. The results…
An Empirical Test of Federalist and Anti-Federalist Theories of State Contributions, 1775-1783
Odd or Even: Assembly Size and Majority Rule
This paper provides a probabilistic comparison of small assemblies with an even number of members versus an adjacent odd number of members. We show that assemblies with an odd number of members are more likely to pass proposals under absolute majority rule than assemblies with an adjacent even number of members. We also show they are more likely to attain quorum and to pass proposals under simple majority rule with a quorum. The first claim is su…
Personalty interests at the Constitutional Convention: New tests of the Beard thesis
The Properties of Simple Vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases Where Absences and Abstentions Are Important
Little attention has been paid to the differences between absolute majority rule and simple majority rule, which differ in their treatment of absences and ‘votes to abstain’. This article fills that gap by undertaking a probabilistic analysis of the two voting rules assuming two alternatives and a quorum requirement for simple majority rule. The rules are compared in both a modified sincere setting and a strategic setting using five criteria: (1)…
Constitutional Change and American Pivotal Politics
Recent studies of legislative gridlock espouse the importance of institutional design in separation-of-powers games. However, few scholars have focused on the effects of the adoption of the U.S. Constitution on legislative gridlock. This article attempts to fill that gap by determining whether the Constitution improved the marginal effect of the gridlock interval on the ability to change policy. Results suggest that policy is more responsive to t…
A New Dataset of Delegate Positions on All Substantive Roll Calls at the U.S. Constitutional Convention
Delegate level analysis of the U.S. Constitutional Convention has been limited because the Convention did not record delegate votes. In this article, we introduce the Constitutional Convention Research Group Dataset, which contains 5,121 inferred delegate votes on 620 substantive roll calls at the Convention. The Constitutional Convention Research Group Dataset represents a significant improvement over previous datasets such as those compiled by …
Voting for Pareto optimality: A multidimensional analysis
Buchanan and Tullock’s apple
Partisan Agenda Control and the Dimensionality of Congress
Recent studies have questioned the familiar characterization of Congress as unidimensional. We argue that agenda control, orchestrated through the House Rules Committee and other techniques, can make multidimensional congresses appear more unidimensional. We evaluate this argument by examining the relationship between measures of unidimensionality and various measures of party control for the House of Representatives from 1875 to 1997, at both th…
A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention
Previous studies of the U.S. Constitutional Convention have relied on votes recorded for the state blocs or a relatively small number of delegate votes. We construct a new data set covering delegate votes on over 600 substantive roll calls, and use the data in several ways. First, we estimate a single dimensional position for the delegates which reflects their overall voting patterns. Next, we explain these positions using a variety of delegate a…
An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule
The value of formalism: Re-examining external costs and decision costs with multiple groups
Political science (33 works) · Law (30 works) · Law (25 works) · Economics (24 works) · Computer Science (18 works) · Law and economics (18 works) · Politics (18 works) · Voting (16 works) · American Constitutional Law and Politics (15 works) · Legal and Constitutional Studies (15 works)