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An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited

Bibliographic Data

ID4954875
AuthorsJac C Heckelman (0000-0001-7984-0181, Wake Forest University), Keith L Dougherty (0000-0002-8689-1961, University of Georgia)
Year2007
Volume67
Issue4
Pages829-848
Publication date2007-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of Economic History (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0507 • E-ISSN: 1471-6372
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0022050707000411
OpenAlexW2107208723
LanguageEN
Citations received14
References cited18

Empirical studies ofdelegatevoting at the Constitutional Convention have relied on the same 16 roll call votes. This article re-examines various assumptions used in the collection of these data. We first create a baseline regression. We then consider the effect of dropping delegates not in attendance, re-inferring the votes from primary sources, examining various subsamples of the roll calls, and reconstructing constituency variables to include state districts. Our findings suggest that personal interests were indeed important for decision making at the Constitutional Convention, but constituent interests were less important than previously claimed

Constitutional Interpretation · Constitutional law · Convention · Delegate · Economics · Interpretation (philosophy) · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · State (computer science) · Voting · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Computer Science · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies

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    Open Access•Farley Grubb•The Journal of Economic History•2008

  • Personalty interests at the Constitutional Convention

    Open Access•Jac C Heckelman, Keith L Dougherty•Cliometrica•2010

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    Open Access•James M Strickland•Interest Groups & Advocacy•2022

  • The Effects of the Great Compromise on the Constitutional Convention of 1787

    Open Access•Keith L Dougherty, Aaron A Hitefield•American Politics Research•2023

  • The Roots of Direct Democracy in the United States

    Open Access•John Dinan, Jac C Heckelman•State Politics & Policy Quarterly•2024

  • Ideology and Participation

    Open Access•David Gelman•Political Research Quarterly•2018

  • Peasant Aristocrats? Wealth, Social Status and the Politics of Swedish Farmer Parliamentarians 1769–1895

    Open Access•Elin Bengtsson, Mats Olsson•Scandinavian Journal of History•2020

  • A New Dataset of Delegate Positions on All Substantive Roll Calls at the U.S. Constitutional Convention

    Keith L Dougherty, Keith Dougherty et al.•Historical Methods A Journal of…•2012

  • The political economy of environmental legislation

    Open Access•Morakinyo O Adetutu•Public Choice•2025

  • Voting on slavery at the Constitutional Convention

    Open Access•Keith L Dougherty, Jac C Heckelman•Public Choice•2008

  • Philadelphia reconsidered

    Open Access•Stephen C Phillips, Alex P Smith et al.•Public Choice•2022

  • Father Founders

    Open Access•John Collins Pope, Jeremy C Pope et al.•American Journal of Political…•2021

  • A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention

    Open Access•Jac C Heckelman, Keith L Dougherty•The Journal of Economic History•2013

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  • Voting on slavery at the Constitutional Convention

    Open Access•Keith L Dougherty, Jac C Heckelman•Public Choice•2008

  • Economic Interests and the American Constitution

    Open Access•Robert A Mcguire, Robert L Ohsfeldt•The Journal of Economic History•1984

  • The Political Structure of Constitution Making

    Calvin C Jillson, Cecil L Eubanks•American Journal of Political…•1984

  • Constitution Making

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  • An Economic Model of Voting Behaviour over Specific Issues at the Constitutional Convention of 1787

    Open Access•Robert A Mcguire, Robert L Ohsfeldt•The Journal of Economic History•1986

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Unique citing works14
Citations per year0,78
Citation span2008 - 2025 (18)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 13

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