Derk Pereboom
Biographic Data
| ID | 1050160 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Derk Pereboom |
| GIVEN NAMES | Derk |
| FAMILY NAME | Pereboom |
| SIGNATURE | PEREBOOM D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Vermont |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3891-3417 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 32 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 48 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 31 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1988 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Mendelow On Russellian Monism and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties
According to Russellian monism, there are non-structural properties that both underlie physical, structural properties and help constitute, and thus necessitate, phenomenal properties (Alter and Pereboom Citation2023). Derk Pereboom (Citation2011, Citation2014, Citation2015, Citation2019) characterizes the relevant non-structural properties as absolutely intrinsic properties, where ‘P is an absolutely intrinsic property of X just in case P is an …
Causalism: Unifying Action and Free Action
Russellian Monism and Structuralism About Physics
The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility
The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on scholarship on this topic since 1960, with a focus on the past three decades. Chapters address the nature of moral responsibility—whether it is fundamentally a matter of deserved blame …
Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility
Constitution, Non-reductivism, and Emergence 1
This article features an appreciative and critical assessment of Lynne Baker’s account of constitution. I agree with Baker that constitution is not identity and I propose a token multiple realizability argument for this conclusion. I argue for an account that features a closer relation between the microphysical and higher levels than the one that Baker endorses, in particular in the case of higher-level causation. Although Baker maintains that hi…
Love and Freedom
This chapter examines whether love requires freedom of the will. This might be so if love is a response to reasons to love, and freedom of the will just is responsiveness to reasons. Or else, love might require free will if love requires susceptibility to reactive attitudes such as moral resentment, and this susceptibility in turn requires free will. A further possibility is that the kind of love we value most requires free will because it requir…
Responsibility, Regret, and Protest
Is morality viable without the notions of desert, moral demand, and moral obligation, notions threatened by possible limitations in human abilities? This essay contends that it may well be. Instead of invoking desert, blame can be largely forward-looking, recast as appropriate moral protest, and aiming at protection, moral formation, and reconciliation. Moral demands in relationships can be re-envisioned as commitments deriving from care, and fai…
Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life
Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility. He argues that although we may not possess the kind of free will that is normally considered necessary for moral responsibility, this does not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents, or a robust sense of achievement and meaning in life.
Replies to Daniel Stoljar, Robert Adams, and Lynne Baker
Précis of Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism
Free-Will Skepticism and Meaning in Life
This article discusses and defends a hard incompatibilist position. It first explains why it rejects both compatibilism and libertarianism as adequate solutions to the free-will problem. This rejection of compatibilism is based upon the so-called “four-case manipulation argument.”. Regarding libertarianism, the article notes that the two most prominent theories, (centered) EC libertarianism and agent-causal (AC) libertarianism, fail for different…
Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism
In this work, Derk Pereboom explores how physicalism might best be formulated and defended against the best anti-physicalist arguments. Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out and developed.
Kant's Theory of Causation and Its Eighteenth-Century German Background: Eric Watkins (ed. and Trans.), Kant's ''Critique of Pure Reason'': Background Source Materials and Eric Watkins, Kant and the M…
This essay highlights the important contributions Watkins's books have made to our understanding of theories about causation developed in eighteenth-century German philosophy and by Kant in particular. Watkins provides a convincing argument that central to Kant's theory of causation is the notion of a real ground or causal power that is non-Humean (since it doesn't reduce to regularities or counterfactual dependencies among events or states) and …
Can God Be Free
Book Review| January 01 2009 Can God Be Free? William Rowe, Can God Be Free? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 173 pp. Derk Pereboom Derk Pereboom Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 121–127. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2008-035 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Derk Pereboom; Can God Be Free?. The Philosophica…
A Hard‐line Reply to the Multiple‐Case Manipulation Argument
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Four Views on Free Will (Great Debates in Philosophy)
Kant on Transcendental Freedom 1
Transcendental freedom consists in the power of agents to produce actions without being causally determined by antecedent conditions, nor by their natures, in exercising this power. Kant contends that we cannot establish whether we are actually or even possibly free in this sense. He claims only that our conception of being transcendentally free involves no inconsistency, but that as a result the belief that we have this freedom meets a pertinent…
On Baker's Persons and Bodies
Living without Free Will
Most people assume that, even though some degenerative or criminal behavior may be caused by influences beyond our control, ordinary human actions are not similarly generated, but rather are freely chosen, and we can be praiseworthy or blameworthy for them. A less popular and more radical claim is that factors beyond our control produce all of the actions we perform. It is this hard determinist stance that Derk Pereboom articulates in Living With…
Assessing Kant's Master Argument
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
On Bilgrami's Belief and Meaning
Like all topics that generate a fruitful philosophical debate, the issue of psychological content is very complex, while at the same time featuring reasonably clear desiderata for a successful theory. Akeel Bilgrami's book is a splendid response to the challenge that this issue provides, containing an especially lucid analysis of the requirements of a successful theory, a deep understanding of the crucial examples, and a creative development of a…
Conceptual Structure and the Individuation of Content
Self-understanding in Kant's Transcendental Deduction
Kant on Transcendental Freedom 1
Transcendental freedom consists in the power of agents to produce actions without being causally determined by antecedent conditions, nor by their natures, in exercising this power. Kant contends that we cannot establish whether we are actually or even possibly free in this sense. He claims only that our conception of being transcendentally free involves no inconsistency, but that as a result the belief that we have this freedom meets a pertinent…
Self-understanding in Kant's Transcendental Deduction
A Hard‐line Reply to the Multiple‐Case Manipulation Argument
Kant on intentionality
Kant on justification in transcendental philosophy
Bats, Brain Scientists, and the Limitations of Introspection
Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson have advanced influential arguments designed to foil any materialist attempt to account for the mental.' These socalled knowledge arguments assume that if materialism is true, someone who possesses complete physical knowledge will know every fact about mental states there is to know. Thus, because there are facts about mental states that will not be known by someone who possesses complete physical knowledge but has …
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
On Baker's Persons and Bodies
Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist
Kant on intentionality
Kant on justification in transcendental philosophy
Kant’s Amphiboly
Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist
Mathematical expressibility, perceptual relativity, and secondary qualities
Stoic Psychotherapy in Descartes and Spinoza
Bats, Brain Scientists, and the Limitations of Introspection
Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson have advanced influential arguments designed to foil any materialist attempt to account for the mental.' These socalled knowledge arguments assume that if materialism is true, someone who possesses complete physical knowledge will know every fact about mental states there is to know. Thus, because there are facts about mental states that will not be known by someone who possesses complete physical knowledge but has …
Conceptual Structure and the Individuation of Content
Self-understanding in Kant's Transcendental Deduction
On Bilgrami's Belief and Meaning
Like all topics that generate a fruitful philosophical debate, the issue of psychological content is very complex, while at the same time featuring reasonably clear desiderata for a successful theory. Akeel Bilgrami's book is a splendid response to the challenge that this issue provides, containing an especially lucid analysis of the requirements of a successful theory, a deep understanding of the crucial examples, and a creative development of a…
Living without Free Will
Most people assume that, even though some degenerative or criminal behavior may be caused by influences beyond our control, ordinary human actions are not similarly generated, but rather are freely chosen, and we can be praiseworthy or blameworthy for them. A less popular and more radical claim is that factors beyond our control produce all of the actions we perform. It is this hard determinist stance that Derk Pereboom articulates in Living With…
Assessing Kant's Master Argument
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
On Baker's Persons and Bodies
Kant on Transcendental Freedom 1
Transcendental freedom consists in the power of agents to produce actions without being causally determined by antecedent conditions, nor by their natures, in exercising this power. Kant contends that we cannot establish whether we are actually or even possibly free in this sense. He claims only that our conception of being transcendentally free involves no inconsistency, but that as a result the belief that we have this freedom meets a pertinent…
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Four Views on Free Will (Great Debates in Philosophy)
A Hard‐line Reply to the Multiple‐Case Manipulation Argument
Can God Be Free
Book Review| January 01 2009 Can God Be Free? William Rowe, Can God Be Free? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 173 pp. Derk Pereboom Derk Pereboom Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 121–127. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2008-035 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Derk Pereboom; Can God Be Free?. The Philosophica…
Kant's Theory of Causation and Its Eighteenth-Century German Background: Eric Watkins (ed. and Trans.), Kant's ''Critique of Pure Reason'': Background Source Materials and Eric Watkins, Kant and the M…
This essay highlights the important contributions Watkins's books have made to our understanding of theories about causation developed in eighteenth-century German philosophy and by Kant in particular. Watkins provides a convincing argument that central to Kant's theory of causation is the notion of a real ground or causal power that is non-Humean (since it doesn't reduce to regularities or counterfactual dependencies among events or states) and …
Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism
In this work, Derk Pereboom explores how physicalism might best be formulated and defended against the best anti-physicalist arguments. Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out and developed.
Free-Will Skepticism and Meaning in Life
This article discusses and defends a hard incompatibilist position. It first explains why it rejects both compatibilism and libertarianism as adequate solutions to the free-will problem. This rejection of compatibilism is based upon the so-called “four-case manipulation argument.”. Regarding libertarianism, the article notes that the two most prominent theories, (centered) EC libertarianism and agent-causal (AC) libertarianism, fail for different…
Replies to Daniel Stoljar, Robert Adams, and Lynne Baker
Précis of Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism
Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life
Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility. He argues that although we may not possess the kind of free will that is normally considered necessary for moral responsibility, this does not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents, or a robust sense of achievement and meaning in life.
Responsibility, Regret, and Protest
Is morality viable without the notions of desert, moral demand, and moral obligation, notions threatened by possible limitations in human abilities? This essay contends that it may well be. Instead of invoking desert, blame can be largely forward-looking, recast as appropriate moral protest, and aiming at protection, moral formation, and reconciliation. Moral demands in relationships can be re-envisioned as commitments deriving from care, and fai…
Philosophy (25 works) · Epistemology (22 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (15 works) · Psychology (14 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Metaphysics (10 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Free Will and Agency (8 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Sociology (7 works)