Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 23397249 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Derk Pereboom (0000-0002-3891-3417, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2011 |
| Páginas | 195 |
| Data de publicação | 2011-03-02 |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | BOOK |
| Periódico | Consciousness and the prospects of physicalism (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764037.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W637968410 |
| Open Library | OL24468730M |
| ISBN | 9780199764037 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 55 |
In this work, Derk Pereboom explores how physicalism might best be formulated and defended against the best anti-physicalist arguments. Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out and developed.
Cognitive science · Consciousness · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Physicalism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Materialism
The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism
Moving beyond the subset model of realization
Yogācāra Buddhism and the illusion of phenomenal consciousness
Physicalism Deconstructed
Why Ockham’s Razor should be preferred to the Laser
Evaluating Panpsychism
How You Know You’re Conscious
Does the Intuition of Distinctness Result from Valid Reasoning? – Reply to Kammerer
Dis-Illusioning Experiences
Liberal phenomenal concepts
Ruh, Bilinç ve Zombiler
A science of chimeras? The implications of illusionism for non-human consciousness research
Understanding sensory qualities
Physicalism Without Fundamentality
Does Panpsychism Explain Mental Causation
Certainty and Our Sense of Acquaintance with Experiences
Physicalism, Infinite Decomposition, and Constitution
Consciousness and Categorical Properties
Russellian Monism and Structuralism About Physics
How to Understand Russellian Panpsychism
Why illusionism about consciousness is unbelievable
Why Revelation Cannot Favor Panpsychism Over Physicalism
How can you be so sure? Illusionism and the obviousness of phenomenal consciousness
Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong
Chalmers v Chalmers
Kant's nutshell argument for idealism
‘What it is like’
The Super Justification Argument for Phenomenal Transparency
Russellian Monism and Ignorance of Non-structural Properties
Causal Exclusion and Ontic Vagueness
Mendelow On Russellian Monism and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties
Knowing what it's like
Grounding Physicalism and the New Challenge of Consciousness
Grounding the Unreal
Pereboom's Robust Nonreductive Physicalism
How Physicalists Can—and Cannot—Explain the Seeming “Absurdity” of Physicalism
Qualitative Inaccuracy and Unconceived Alternatives
Social Construction and Grounding
Are There Really Social Causes
Fame in the predictive brain
Motion and the affection argument
The illusion of conscious experience
Physicalism, supervenience, and monism
Vertical versus horizontal
Can self-representationalism explain away the apparent irreducibility of consciousness
Illusionism and the distortion thesis
Fred’s red
Physicalism and the burden of parsimony
Defining consciousness and denying its existence. Sailing between Charybdis and Scylla
Physicalism and the Intrinsic Nature of Consciousness
Mad Qualia
An Argument for Power Inheritance
The Russellian Monist's Problems with Mental Causation
The Physicalist's Tight Squeeze
The Knowledge Argument and the Implications of Phenomenal Knowledge
| Obras citantes distintas | 55 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 3,44 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2010 - 2026 (17) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 53 |