Kent W Staley
Biographic Data
| ID | 1051559 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kent W Staley |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kent W |
| FAMILY NAME | Staley |
| SIGNATURE | STALEY K W |
| AFFILIATIONS | Saint Louis University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7536-2087 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 55 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 14 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Making measurement useful
How uncertainty can save measurement from circularity and holism
Measurement results depend upon assumptions, and some of those assumptions are theoretical in character. This paper examines particle physics measurements in which a measurement result depends upon a type of assumption for which that very same result may be evidentially relevant, thus raising a worry about potential circularity in argumentation. We demonstrate how the practice of evaluating measurement uncertainty serves to render any such eviden…
Securing the Empirical Value of Measurement Results
Reports of quantitative experimental results often distinguish between the statistical uncertainty and the systematic uncertainty that characterize measurement outcomes. This article discusses the practice of estimating systematic uncertainty in high-energy physics (HEP). The estimation of systematic uncertainty in HEP should be understood as a minimal form of quantitative robustness analysis. The secure evidence framework is used to explain the …
“Agreement” in the IPCC Confidence measure
Pragmatic warrant for frequentist statistical practice
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science
This book guides readers by gradual steps through the central concepts and debates in the philosophy of science. Using concrete examples from the history of science, Kent W. Staley shows how seemingly abstract philosophical issues are relevant to important aspects of scientific practice. Structured in two parts, the book first tackles the central concepts of the philosophy of science, such as the problem of induction, falsificationism, and underd…
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy)
This book guides readers by gradual steps through the central concepts and debates in the philosophy of science. Using concrete examples from the history of science, Kent Staley shows how seemingly abstract philosophical issues are relevant to important aspects of scientific practice. Structured in two parts, the book first tackles the central concepts of the philosophy of science, such as the problem of induction, falsificationism, and underdete…
Internalist and externalist aspects of justification in scientific inquiry
Error-statistical elimination of alternative hypotheses
A Reasonable Defence of Experimental Physics
Robust Evidence and Secure Evidence Claims
Many philosophers have claimed that evidence for a theory is better when multiple independent tests yield the same result, i.e., when experimental results are robust . Little has been said about the grounds on which such a claim rests, however. The present essay presents an analysis of the evidential value of robustness that rests on the fallibility of assumptions about the reliability of testing procedures and a distinction between the strength …
What Experiment Did We Just Do? Counterfactual Error Statistics and Uncertainties about the Reference Class
Experimenters sometimes insist that it is unwise to examine data before determining how to analyze them, as it creates the potential for biased results. I explore the rationale behind this methodological guideline from the standpoint of an error statistical theory of evidence, and I discuss a method of evaluating evidence in some contexts when this predesignation rule has been violated. I illustrate the problem of potential bias, and the method b…
Logic, liberty, and anarchy
On the surface, J. S. Mill and Paul Feyerabend appear to hold differing views of scientific method. Mill attempts to frame a set of rules or canons for testing evidence based on rationality and inference, whereas Feyerabend, in his so-called “epistemological anarchism”, calls for abandoning any attempt to separate the good from the bad in science according to a fixed view of rationality. Yet, somewhat paradoxically, Feryerabend cites Mill as the …
Novelty, Severity, and History in the Testing of Hypotheses
It is sometimes held that facts confirm a hypothesis only if they were not used in the construction of that hypothesis. This requirement of “use novelty” introduces a historical aspect into the assessment of evidence claims. I examine a methodological principle invoked by physicists in the experimental search for the top quark that bears a striking resemblance to this view. However, this principle is better understood, both historically and philo…
Robust Evidence and Secure Evidence Claims
Many philosophers have claimed that evidence for a theory is better when multiple independent tests yield the same result, i.e., when experimental results are robust . Little has been said about the grounds on which such a claim rests, however. The present essay presents an analysis of the evidential value of robustness that rests on the fallibility of assumptions about the reliability of testing procedures and a distinction between the strength …
Securing the Empirical Value of Measurement Results
Reports of quantitative experimental results often distinguish between the statistical uncertainty and the systematic uncertainty that characterize measurement outcomes. This article discusses the practice of estimating systematic uncertainty in high-energy physics (HEP). The estimation of systematic uncertainty in HEP should be understood as a minimal form of quantitative robustness analysis. The secure evidence framework is used to explain the …
What Experiment Did We Just Do? Counterfactual Error Statistics and Uncertainties about the Reference Class
Experimenters sometimes insist that it is unwise to examine data before determining how to analyze them, as it creates the potential for biased results. I explore the rationale behind this methodological guideline from the standpoint of an error statistical theory of evidence, and I discuss a method of evaluating evidence in some contexts when this predesignation rule has been violated. I illustrate the problem of potential bias, and the method b…
How uncertainty can save measurement from circularity and holism
Measurement results depend upon assumptions, and some of those assumptions are theoretical in character. This paper examines particle physics measurements in which a measurement result depends upon a type of assumption for which that very same result may be evidentially relevant, thus raising a worry about potential circularity in argumentation. We demonstrate how the practice of evaluating measurement uncertainty serves to render any such eviden…
Internalist and externalist aspects of justification in scientific inquiry
Error-statistical elimination of alternative hypotheses
Logic, liberty, and anarchy
On the surface, J. S. Mill and Paul Feyerabend appear to hold differing views of scientific method. Mill attempts to frame a set of rules or canons for testing evidence based on rationality and inference, whereas Feyerabend, in his so-called “epistemological anarchism”, calls for abandoning any attempt to separate the good from the bad in science according to a fixed view of rationality. Yet, somewhat paradoxically, Feryerabend cites Mill as the …
Novelty, Severity, and History in the Testing of Hypotheses
It is sometimes held that facts confirm a hypothesis only if they were not used in the construction of that hypothesis. This requirement of “use novelty” introduces a historical aspect into the assessment of evidence claims. I examine a methodological principle invoked by physicists in the experimental search for the top quark that bears a striking resemblance to this view. However, this principle is better understood, both historically and philo…
Novelty, Severity, and History in the Testing of Hypotheses
It is sometimes held that facts confirm a hypothesis only if they were not used in the construction of that hypothesis. This requirement of “use novelty” introduces a historical aspect into the assessment of evidence claims. I examine a methodological principle invoked by physicists in the experimental search for the top quark that bears a striking resemblance to this view. However, this principle is better understood, both historically and philo…
Logic, liberty, and anarchy
On the surface, J. S. Mill and Paul Feyerabend appear to hold differing views of scientific method. Mill attempts to frame a set of rules or canons for testing evidence based on rationality and inference, whereas Feyerabend, in his so-called “epistemological anarchism”, calls for abandoning any attempt to separate the good from the bad in science according to a fixed view of rationality. Yet, somewhat paradoxically, Feryerabend cites Mill as the …
What Experiment Did We Just Do? Counterfactual Error Statistics and Uncertainties about the Reference Class
Experimenters sometimes insist that it is unwise to examine data before determining how to analyze them, as it creates the potential for biased results. I explore the rationale behind this methodological guideline from the standpoint of an error statistical theory of evidence, and I discuss a method of evaluating evidence in some contexts when this predesignation rule has been violated. I illustrate the problem of potential bias, and the method b…
A Reasonable Defence of Experimental Physics
Robust Evidence and Secure Evidence Claims
Many philosophers have claimed that evidence for a theory is better when multiple independent tests yield the same result, i.e., when experimental results are robust . Little has been said about the grounds on which such a claim rests, however. The present essay presents an analysis of the evidential value of robustness that rests on the fallibility of assumptions about the reliability of testing procedures and a distinction between the strength …
Error-statistical elimination of alternative hypotheses
Internalist and externalist aspects of justification in scientific inquiry
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science
This book guides readers by gradual steps through the central concepts and debates in the philosophy of science. Using concrete examples from the history of science, Kent W. Staley shows how seemingly abstract philosophical issues are relevant to important aspects of scientific practice. Structured in two parts, the book first tackles the central concepts of the philosophy of science, such as the problem of induction, falsificationism, and underd…
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy)
This book guides readers by gradual steps through the central concepts and debates in the philosophy of science. Using concrete examples from the history of science, Kent Staley shows how seemingly abstract philosophical issues are relevant to important aspects of scientific practice. Structured in two parts, the book first tackles the central concepts of the philosophy of science, such as the problem of induction, falsificationism, and underdete…
“Agreement” in the IPCC Confidence measure
Pragmatic warrant for frequentist statistical practice
Securing the Empirical Value of Measurement Results
Reports of quantitative experimental results often distinguish between the statistical uncertainty and the systematic uncertainty that characterize measurement outcomes. This article discusses the practice of estimating systematic uncertainty in high-energy physics (HEP). The estimation of systematic uncertainty in HEP should be understood as a minimal form of quantitative robustness analysis. The secure evidence framework is used to explain the …
How uncertainty can save measurement from circularity and holism
Measurement results depend upon assumptions, and some of those assumptions are theoretical in character. This paper examines particle physics measurements in which a measurement result depends upon a type of assumption for which that very same result may be evidentially relevant, thus raising a worry about potential circularity in argumentation. We demonstrate how the practice of evaluating measurement uncertainty serves to render any such eviden…
Making measurement useful
Epistemology (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (9 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Philosophy of science (7 works) · Mathematics (6 works) · Econometrics (4 works) · Statistics (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works)