What Experiment Did We Just Do? Counterfactual Error Statistics and Uncertainties about the Reference Class
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10708241 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kent W Staley (0000-0002-7536-2087, UCLouvain Saint-Louis Brussels, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 69 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 279-299 |
| Publication date | 2002-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/341054 |
| OpenAlex | W2106576207 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 11 |
Experimenters sometimes insist that it is unwise to examine data before determining how to analyze them, as it creates the potential for biased results. I explore the rationale behind this methodological guideline from the standpoint of an error statistical theory of evidence, and I discuss a method of evaluating evidence in some contexts when this predesignation rule has been violated. I illustrate the problem of potential bias, and the method by which it may be addressed, with an example from the search for the top quark. A point in favor of the error statistical theory is its ability, demonstrated here, to explicate such methodological problems and suggest solutions, within the framework of an objective theory of evidence
Class (philosophy) · Counterfactual thinking · Econometrics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Point (geometry) · Statistical theory · Statistics · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Statistics Education and Methodologies
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Preregistration does not improve the transparent evaluation of severity in Popper’s philosophy of science or when deviations are allowed
Pragmatic warrant for frequentist statistical practice
Acceptibility, Evidence, and Severity
The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Requirement of Total Evidence
In Defense of the Requirement of Total Evidence
A Contractarian Solution to the Experimenter’s Regress
Change and Progress in Modern Science
Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge
A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism
Bayesian statistics and biased procedures
Novelty, Severity, and History in the Testing of Hypotheses
Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (and Ought To Be) Ignored by Scientists
Logical versus Historical Theories of Confirmation
Why did Einstein's Programme supersede Lorentz's? (I)
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
| Citation span | 2002 - 2025 (24) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |