John R Chamberlin
Biographic Data
| ID | 1052093 |
|---|---|
| NAME | John R Chamberlin |
| GIVEN NAMES | John R |
| FAMILY NAME | Chamberlin |
| SIGNATURE | CHAMBERLIN J R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Michigan |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 18 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 120 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 18 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1974 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1991 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Fairness and Secrecy
This article examines the law pertaining to secrecy in contractual bargaining and argues that courts decide cases more consistently with contractarian principles than with economic ones. The economic theory of law claims that courts ought to require people to disclose secret information when that information was acquired as a by-product of other productive activity and to allow people to keep information secret when it was the product of signific…
Ethics and Game Theory
Game Theory has been an essential tool in analyzing national security, international trade, and the global environment since Neumann and Morgenstern introduced it more than 45 years ago. Chamberlin examines the work of these two authors, focusing on the relationship between rationality and morality as it arises in strategic interactions among players in a game based on three essential features: rational behavior, consequentialism, and the self-in…
American Society
Privatization as Institutional Choice
Privatization as institutional choice
A model based upon the common concept of rent‐seeking behavior avoids an exclusive focus on the pecuniary motive in private institutions and the power motive in public institutions. Using this model, the case for privatization ranges from very strong to unpersuasive, with some fascinating intermediate cases. Where purchases are frequent, information is abundant, costs of a bad decision are small, externalities are minimal, and competition is the …
Discovering manipulated social choices
Selecting a Voting System
Selecting a voting system for use in a particular electoral environment poses a challenge that is only partially answered by the empirical social choice literature, for this literature is more concerned with the general behavior of voting systems than with their behavior in particular contexts. We develop a model that addresses this political design task directly. It incorporates information on the structure of collective preferences in an enviro…
An empirical study of some election systems
An empirical study of some election systems
Presidential election data of the Amer- ican Psychological Association for five years are used to compare a number of election systems in frequency of selecting Condorcet winners, consistency over sub- slates, and the effect of relevant and irrelevant can- didates. The results from each system could be scaled in one dimension for each of the five elections, using the Kemeny metric. These scales were closely related to the weighting given to the v…
Pension Plan Equity
Social Choice Observed
There have been few opportunities to assess the implications of social choice theory using data from large, naturally occurring elections. We examine here five presidential elections of the American Psychological Association. These elections involve ten to fifteen thousand voters who express rank-ordered preferences over five candidates. We investigate the occurrence of the "paradox of voting," the ability of various voting systems to select majo…
Pension Plan Equity
Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions
The development of social choice theory over the past three decades has brought many new insights into democratic theory. Surprisingly, the theory of representation has gone almost untouched by social choice theorists. This article redresses this neglect and provides an axiomatic study of one means of implementing proportional representation.The distinguishing feature of proportional representation is its concern for the representativeness of del…
A collective goods model of pluralist political systems
A linear inequality method of establishing certain social choice conjectures
Toward Applicable Social Choice Theory
This article develops a formal framework to aid political designers in the comparison of social choice functions. It generalizes earlier assumptions of "impartial culture" so that we may begin to investigate the effect of politically interesting variations on the probability that different social choice functions will satisfy given performance criteria. As an application of the framework, a detailed Monte Carlo study compares the ability of four …
A diagrammatic exposition of the logic of collection action
Provision of Collective Goods As a Function of Group Size
In The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson shows how the activities of various political organizations can be fruitfully analyzed using the theory of collective goods. Several of Olson's major conclusions concern the relationship between the size of a group and its ability to provide its members with collective benefits. He concludes that as group size increases, the amount of collective benefits provided will become increasingly suboptimal,…
Provision of Collective Goods As a Function of Group Size
In The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson shows how the activities of various political organizations can be fruitfully analyzed using the theory of collective goods. Several of Olson's major conclusions concern the relationship between the size of a group and its ability to provide its members with collective benefits. He concludes that as group size increases, the amount of collective benefits provided will become increasingly suboptimal,…
Social Choice Observed
There have been few opportunities to assess the implications of social choice theory using data from large, naturally occurring elections. We examine here five presidential elections of the American Psychological Association. These elections involve ten to fifteen thousand voters who express rank-ordered preferences over five candidates. We investigate the occurrence of the "paradox of voting," the ability of various voting systems to select majo…
Toward Applicable Social Choice Theory
This article develops a formal framework to aid political designers in the comparison of social choice functions. It generalizes earlier assumptions of "impartial culture" so that we may begin to investigate the effect of politically interesting variations on the probability that different social choice functions will satisfy given performance criteria. As an application of the framework, a detailed Monte Carlo study compares the ability of four …
Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions
The development of social choice theory over the past three decades has brought many new insights into democratic theory. Surprisingly, the theory of representation has gone almost untouched by social choice theorists. This article redresses this neglect and provides an axiomatic study of one means of implementing proportional representation.The distinguishing feature of proportional representation is its concern for the representativeness of del…
A collective goods model of pluralist political systems
A diagrammatic exposition of the logic of collection action
Discovering manipulated social choices
Pension Plan Equity
Ethics and Game Theory
Game Theory has been an essential tool in analyzing national security, international trade, and the global environment since Neumann and Morgenstern introduced it more than 45 years ago. Chamberlin examines the work of these two authors, focusing on the relationship between rationality and morality as it arises in strategic interactions among players in a game based on three essential features: rational behavior, consequentialism, and the self-in…
Privatization as Institutional Choice
Selecting a Voting System
Selecting a voting system for use in a particular electoral environment poses a challenge that is only partially answered by the empirical social choice literature, for this literature is more concerned with the general behavior of voting systems than with their behavior in particular contexts. We develop a model that addresses this political design task directly. It incorporates information on the structure of collective preferences in an enviro…
Pension Plan Equity
Provision of Collective Goods As a Function of Group Size
In The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson shows how the activities of various political organizations can be fruitfully analyzed using the theory of collective goods. Several of Olson's major conclusions concern the relationship between the size of a group and its ability to provide its members with collective benefits. He concludes that as group size increases, the amount of collective benefits provided will become increasingly suboptimal,…
A diagrammatic exposition of the logic of collection action
A collective goods model of pluralist political systems
A linear inequality method of establishing certain social choice conjectures
Toward Applicable Social Choice Theory
This article develops a formal framework to aid political designers in the comparison of social choice functions. It generalizes earlier assumptions of "impartial culture" so that we may begin to investigate the effect of politically interesting variations on the probability that different social choice functions will satisfy given performance criteria. As an application of the framework, a detailed Monte Carlo study compares the ability of four …
Pension Plan Equity
Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions
The development of social choice theory over the past three decades has brought many new insights into democratic theory. Surprisingly, the theory of representation has gone almost untouched by social choice theorists. This article redresses this neglect and provides an axiomatic study of one means of implementing proportional representation.The distinguishing feature of proportional representation is its concern for the representativeness of del…
An empirical study of some election systems
An empirical study of some election systems
Presidential election data of the Amer- ican Psychological Association for five years are used to compare a number of election systems in frequency of selecting Condorcet winners, consistency over sub- slates, and the effect of relevant and irrelevant can- didates. The results from each system could be scaled in one dimension for each of the five elections, using the Kemeny metric. These scales were closely related to the weighting given to the v…
Pension Plan Equity
Social Choice Observed
There have been few opportunities to assess the implications of social choice theory using data from large, naturally occurring elections. We examine here five presidential elections of the American Psychological Association. These elections involve ten to fifteen thousand voters who express rank-ordered preferences over five candidates. We investigate the occurrence of the "paradox of voting," the ability of various voting systems to select majo…
Discovering manipulated social choices
Selecting a Voting System
Selecting a voting system for use in a particular electoral environment poses a challenge that is only partially answered by the empirical social choice literature, for this literature is more concerned with the general behavior of voting systems than with their behavior in particular contexts. We develop a model that addresses this political design task directly. It incorporates information on the structure of collective preferences in an enviro…
Privatization as Institutional Choice
Privatization as institutional choice
A model based upon the common concept of rent‐seeking behavior avoids an exclusive focus on the pecuniary motive in private institutions and the power motive in public institutions. Using this model, the case for privatization ranges from very strong to unpersuasive, with some fascinating intermediate cases. Where purchases are frequent, information is abundant, costs of a bad decision are small, externalities are minimal, and competition is the …
American Society
Ethics and Game Theory
Game Theory has been an essential tool in analyzing national security, international trade, and the global environment since Neumann and Morgenstern introduced it more than 45 years ago. Chamberlin examines the work of these two authors, focusing on the relationship between rationality and morality as it arises in strategic interactions among players in a game based on three essential features: rational behavior, consequentialism, and the self-in…
Fairness and Secrecy
This article examines the law pertaining to secrecy in contractual bargaining and argues that courts decide cases more consistently with contractarian principles than with economic ones. The economic theory of law claims that courts ought to require people to disclose secret information when that information was acquired as a by-product of other productive activity and to allow people to keep information secret when it was the product of signific…
Economics (13 works) · Political science (13 works) · Law (10 works) · Law (9 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (7 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (7 works) · Politics (7 works) · Business (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Law and economics (5 works)