Toward Applicable Social Choice Theory
A Comparison of Social Choice Functions under Spatial Model Assumptions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3307072 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John R Chamberlin (University of Michigan), Michael D Cohen (0000-0001-6557-2075, University of Michigan) |
| Year | 1978 |
| Volume | 72 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1341-1356 |
| Publication date | 1978-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1954543 |
| OpenAlex | W2316630507 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 22 |
| References cited | 41 |
This article develops a formal framework to aid political designers in the comparison of social choice functions. It generalizes earlier assumptions of "impartial culture" so that we may begin to investigate the effect of politically interesting variations on the probability that different social choice functions will satisfy given performance criteria. As an application of the framework, a detailed Monte Carlo study compares the ability of four different social choice functions to select a Condorcet winner when voter preference orders have been generated from a spatial representation of ideal points and alternatives. We also investigate the potential of alternative methods of selecting winners in presidential primary elections
Condorcet method · Econometrics · Economics · Epistemology · Ideal (ethics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Monte Carlo method · Political science · Politics · Preference · Presidential system · Representation (politics · Social choice theory · Statistics · Voting · Computer Science · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics
An empirical study of some election systems
Random-Subset Voting
Polls and Elections Without Rhyme or Reason? Understanding Presidential Nomination Delegate Allocation Rules
Research in decision theory
An assessment of voting systems under the proximity and directional models of the vote
Centripetal forces in spatial voting
Optimal sophisticated voting strategies in single ballot elections involving three candidates
A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions
Voting behavior under the directional spatial model of electoral competition
Running off empty
The Borda count in n-dimensional issue space
The Alternative Vote and Coombs Rule versus First-Past-the-Post
Discovering manipulated social choices
Le scrutin binominal paritaire
Social Choice Observed
Condorcet Efficiency and the Behavioral Model of the Vote
Selecting a Voting System
Presidential Nomination Politics in the Post-Reform Era
Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Cycle? Evidence from 36 Elections
A Comparison of Efficiency of Multicandidate Electoral Systems
A Social Choice Perspective on Expertise and Authority in Bureaucracy
A Pragmatic Method for Evaluating Election Schemes through Simulation
Ideology and discontent
An axiomatization of Borda's rule
An economic theory of democracy
The Theory of Committees and Elections
The impact of decision rules in multi-candidate campaigns
Graph-theoretic approaches to the theory of social choice
The voter's paradox and the homogeneity of individual preference orders
Candidate support functions in the 1968 election
Voting methods
The occurrence of the paradox of voting in University elections
A linear inequality method of establishing certain social choice conjectures
A Measure of the Importance of Cyclical Majorities
Computer Simulation of a Small Voting System
Plurality Maximization vs Vote Maximization
Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response
The Closed Rule and the Paradox of Voting
Single Transferrable Vote
One Good Term Deserves Another
The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments
An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process
A Computer Simulation of the Paradox of Voting
| Unique citing works | 22 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,48 |
| Citation span | 1980 - 2018 (39) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 22 |