Kenneth Scheve
Biographic Data
| ID | 1056334 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kenneth Scheve |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kenneth |
| FAMILY NAME | Scheve |
| SIGNATURE | SCHEVE K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Yale University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6809-0060 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 43 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1690 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 43 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 18 |
Compensation, Beliefs in State Intervention, and Support for the Energy Transition
Transitioning away from carbon-intensive to renewable energy sources is one key lever through which countries can mitigate climate change. Governments have implemented interventionist policies that simultaneously seek to promote a transition to greener energy sources and shield producers and consumers from the costs of this change. We examine the impact of this enhanced role of the state on public opinion about environmental reforms. Using data f…
Testing the Compensatory Theory: A Survey Experiment on Covid-19 and Redistributive Preferences in the UK
The COVID-19 pandemic motivated a lot of research to study whether the pandemic altered redistributive preferences. Less effort has gone into testing theories that might explain how and why the pandemic could affect these preferences. We conducted an online information provision survey experiment in the United Kingdom to test the compensatory theory of progressive taxation—which maintains that higher taxes on the rich may be justified as a way of…
Democracy, Inequality, and Antitrust
This article investigates the relationship between democracy and antitrust policy. Strong antitrust policies advance the economic and political interests of most citizens, making their adoption more likely in institutional settings that weigh the interests of consumers. We examine the empirical relationship between democracy, inequality, and antitrust policies in a broad panel of countries from 1951 to 2010. Using a variety of empirical strategie…
Learning to Love Government? Technological Change and the Political Economy of Higher Education
Inequality, information, and income tax policy preferences in Austria and Germany
Inequality has increased over recent decades in many advanced industrial democracies, but taxes have rarely become more progressive. One possible explanation for the lack of a policy response is that, despite rising inequality, voters support higher taxes on incomes weakly, if at all. Using original representative surveys in Austria and Germany, we elicit voters’ preferences over the progressivity of income tax policy and examine whether exposing…
Trains, trade, and transformation: A spatial Rogowski theory of America's 19th‐century protectionism
We study the effect of expanding trade on societal coalitions through its impact on development. We combine a majoritarian political model with a spatial model of trade to argue that trade‐induced economic change—by bringing new workers to locations closer to world markets—can lead to losses rather than gains in political power for the factors of production advantaged by increased trade. We study how this phenomenon explains rising protectionism …
Measuring time preferences in large surveys
Time preferences may explain public opinion about a wide range of long-term policy problems with costs and benefits realized in the distant future. However, mass publics may discount these costs and benefits because they are later or because they are more uncertain. Standard methods to elicit individual-level time preferences tend to conflate risk and time attitudes and are susceptible to social desirability bias. A potential solution relies on a…
In Memoriam: Bruce Russett
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Equal Treatment and the Inelasticity of Tax Policy to Rising Inequality
We argue that tax policy typically does not respond to inequality because many voters hold equal treatment fairness beliefs for which the expectation is that, just as all have one vote, the state should treat citizens equally on other dimensions of policy. In the tax domain, this means all should pay the same rate. We propose a new survey instrument to measure equal treatment beliefs and implement it in surveys in Germany, the United Kingdom, and…
The German Trade Shock and the Rise of the Neo-Welfare State in Early Twentieth-Century Britain
We study the international origins of the neo-welfare state in Britain during the era of globalization before World War I. We introduce a new mechanism linking trade to the expansion of the state. In addition to increasing assessments of the volatility of employment in a market economy, trade shocks changed beliefs about the deservingness of the poor. Employing a shift-share measure of local exposure to German imports, we show that rising imports…
Foundations of a New Democracy: Schooling, Inequality, and Voting in the Early Republic
Democratic theorists have long argued that states can create more resilient democracies through education. Educational investments are thought to produce more economic equality and instill in citizens greater capacity and responsibility to participate in politics. Using a geographic regression discontinuity design and township-level data from Antebellum New York State, we examine whether state funding for common schools led to higher voter turnou…
Sustaining Capitalism and Democracy: Lessons from Global Competition Policy
Competition policy has been a central forum for contesting the uneasy relationship between capitalism and democracy since the late nineteenth century. From the earliest policy debates, concerns that robust competition policies aimed at limiting economic concentration would disadvantage domestic producers featured prominently. This dynamic creates an international cooperation problem over competition policy that has intensified with the dramatic i…
Economic Decline, Social Identity, and Authoritarian Values in the United States
Why does the contemporary backlash against globalization in the United States have such a substantial authoritarian character? We argue that sustained economic decline has a negative effect on the social identity of historically dominant groups. These losses lead individuals to be more likely to want to enforce social norm conformity—that is, adopt more authoritarian values—as a way to preserve social status and this effect is greater the larger …
Most people prefer constant carbon costs over increasing cost schedules even if costs are high
City limits to partisan polarization in the American public
How pervasive is partisan sorting and polarization over public policies in the American public? We examine whether the barriers of partisan sorting and polarization seen in national politics extend to important local policies that shape economic development. To describe the extent of partisan sorting and polarization over local development policies, we employ conjoint survey experiments in representative surveys of eight US metropolitan areas and…
The Economic Origins of Authoritarian Values: Evidence From Local Trade Shocks in the United Kingdom
What explains the backlash against the liberal international order? Are its causes economic or cultural? We argue that while cultural values are central to understanding the backlash, those values are, in part, endogenous and shaped by long-run economic change. Using an original survey of the British population, we show that individuals living in regions where the local labor market was more substantially affected by imports from China have signi…
Public Opinion, International Economic Integration, and the Welfare State
Constant carbon pricing increases support for climate action compared to ramping up costs over time
Interests, Norms and Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Case of Climate Co-operation
Mitigating climate change requires countries to provide a global public good. This means that the domestic cleavages underlying mass attitudes toward international climate policy are a central determinant of its provision. We argue that the industry-specific costs of emission abatement and internalized social norms help explain support for climate policy. To evaluate our predictions we develop novel measures of industry-specific interests by cros…
Who Cooperates? Reciprocity and the Causal Effect of Expected Cooperation in Representative Samples
When do societies succeed in providing public goods? Previous research suggests that public goods contributions correlate with expectations about cooperation by others among students and other demographic subgroups. However, we lack knowledge about whether the effect of expected cooperation is causal and a general feature of populations. We fielded representative surveys ( N = 8,500) in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States t…
The Structure of American Income Tax Policy Preferences
In recent decades inequality in the United States has increased dramatically, but policy responses in terms of redistribution have been limited. This is not easily explained by standard political economy theory, which predicts a positive relationship between inequality and redistribution. One set of explanations for this puzzle focuses on whether and why redistributive preferences are muted in the presence of high inequality. While much recent re…
Wealth Inequality and Democracy
What do we know about wealth inequality and democracy? Our review shows that the simple conjectures that democracy produces wealth equality and that wealth inequality leads to democratic failure are not supported by the evidence. Why are democracy and high levels of wealth inequality sustainable together? Three key features of democratic politics can make this outcome possible. When societies are divided along cleavages other than wealth, this ca…
Taxing the Rich: A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe
Self-Centered Inequity Aversion and the Mass Politics of Taxation
The politics of economic crises brings distributive economic conflict to the fore of national political debates. How policy should be used to transfer resources between citizens becomes a central political question, and the answers chosen often influence the trajectory of policy for a generation. This context provides an ideal setting for evaluating the importance of self-interest and other-regarding preferences in shaping public opinion about ec…
Technology and the Era of the Mass Army
We investigate how technology has influenced the size of armies. During the nineteenth century, the development of the railroad made it possible to field and support mass armies, significantly increasing the observed size of military forces. During the late twentieth century, further advances in technology made it possible to deliver explosive force from a distance and with precision, making mass armies less desirable. We find support for our tec…
Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation
We propose a remedy for the discrepancy between the way political scientists analyze data with missing values and the recommendations of the statistics community. Methodologists and statisticians agree that "multiple imputation" is a superior approach to the problem of missing data scattered through one's explanatory and dependent variables than the methods currently used in applied data analysis. The discrepancy occurs because the computational …
Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production
A central question in the international and comparative political economy literatures on globalization is whether economic integration increases worker insecurity in advanced economies. Previous research has focused on the role of international trade and has failed to produce convincing evidence that such a link exists. In this article, we argue that globalization increases worker insecurity, but that foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinatio…
Estimating the Effect of Elite Communications on Public Opinion Using Instrumental Variables
A central question in the study of democratic polities is the extent to which elite opinion about policy shapes public opinion. Estimating the impact of elites on mass opinion is difficult because of endogeneity, omitted variables, and measurement error. This article proposes an identification strategy for estimating the causal effect of elite messages on public support for European integration employing changes in political institutions as instr…
The Structure of American Income Tax Policy Preferences
In recent decades inequality in the United States has increased dramatically, but policy responses in terms of redistribution have been limited. This is not easily explained by standard political economy theory, which predicts a positive relationship between inequality and redistribution. One set of explanations for this puzzle focuses on whether and why redistributive preferences are muted in the presence of high inequality. While much recent re…
The Conscription of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation
The dominant narrative of the politics of redistribution in political science and economics highlights the signature role of the rise of electoral democracy and the development of political parties that mobilize working-class groups. We argue in this article that this narrative ignores the critical role played by mass warfare in the development of redistributive public policies. Focusing attention on the determinants of progressive taxation, we a…
Democracy, War, and Wealth: Lessons from Two Centuries of Inheritance Taxation
In this article we use an original data set to provide the first empirical analysis of the political economy of inherited wealth taxation that covers a significant number of countries and a long time frame (1816-2000). Our goal is to understand why, if inheritance taxes are often very old taxes, the implementation of inheritance tax rates significant enough to affect wealth inequality is a much more recent phenomenon. We hypothesize alternatively…
Mixed Messages: Party Dissent and Mass Opinion on European Integration
Mass opposition to Europe may stem from mainstream as well as formally Euroskeptic parties. Large parties in the member states of the European Union (EU) tend to combine support for Europe with a high level of intra-party dissent over the issue. Thus, these parties provide heterogeneous yet potentially influential signals about European integration to their supporters. In this paper, we examine the effect of intra-party dissent on the opinion of …
Interests, Norms and Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Case of Climate Co-operation
Mitigating climate change requires countries to provide a global public good. This means that the domestic cleavages underlying mass attitudes toward international climate policy are a central determinant of its provision. We argue that the industry-specific costs of emission abatement and internalized social norms help explain support for climate policy. To evaluate our predictions we develop novel measures of industry-specific interests by cros…
The Economic Origins of Authoritarian Values: Evidence From Local Trade Shocks in the United Kingdom
What explains the backlash against the liberal international order? Are its causes economic or cultural? We argue that while cultural values are central to understanding the backlash, those values are, in part, endogenous and shaped by long-run economic change. Using an original survey of the British population, we show that individuals living in regions where the local labor market was more substantially affected by imports from China have signi…
Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection
One important puzzle in international political economy is why lower‐earning and less‐skilled intensive industries tend to receive relatively high levels of trade protection. This pattern of protection holds across countries with vastly different economic and political characteristics and is not well accounted for in existing political economy models. We propose and model one possible explanation: that individual inequity aversion leads to system…
Social Identity, Political Speech, and Electoral Competition
Much research in political science suggests that social identity can be an important factor in motivating behavior. If voters care about social identity, when will politicians find it in their interests to make group-based appeals? Do social identity concerns affect the policy platforms offered by candidates? In a model of political speech and electoral competition, in which voters care about both social identities and policy, we demonstrate that…
Institutions, Partisanship, and Inequality in the Long Run
It has been widely suggested by political scientists and economists, based on empirical evidence for the period since 1970, that the institution of centralized wage bargaining and the presence of a government of the left are associated with lower levels of income inequality. The authors make use of new data on top income shares as well as long-run series on wage inequality to examine the effects of partisanship and wage bargaining over a much lon…
Economic Decline, Social Identity, and Authoritarian Values in the United States
Why does the contemporary backlash against globalization in the United States have such a substantial authoritarian character? We argue that sustained economic decline has a negative effect on the social identity of historically dominant groups. These losses lead individuals to be more likely to want to enforce social norm conformity—that is, adopt more authoritarian values—as a way to preserve social status and this effect is greater the larger …
Wealth Inequality and Democracy
What do we know about wealth inequality and democracy? Our review shows that the simple conjectures that democracy produces wealth equality and that wealth inequality leads to democratic failure are not supported by the evidence. Why are democracy and high levels of wealth inequality sustainable together? Three key features of democratic politics can make this outcome possible. When societies are divided along cleavages other than wealth, this ca…
Public Inflation Aversion and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policymaking
Do the macroeconomic priorities of citizens differ across countries? If so, what accounts for this variation and what are its consequences for explanations of the choice of monetary institutions, macroeconomic policy, and international monetary cooperation? This article uses survey data from twenty advanced economies to examine individual preferences about macroeconomic priorities. The analysis establishes three key findings. First, the results s…
Self-Centered Inequity Aversion and the Mass Politics of Taxation
The politics of economic crises brings distributive economic conflict to the fore of national political debates. How policy should be used to transfer resources between citizens becomes a central political question, and the answers chosen often influence the trajectory of policy for a generation. This context provides an ideal setting for evaluating the importance of self-interest and other-regarding preferences in shaping public opinion about ec…
City limits to partisan polarization in the American public
How pervasive is partisan sorting and polarization over public policies in the American public? We examine whether the barriers of partisan sorting and polarization seen in national politics extend to important local policies that shape economic development. To describe the extent of partisan sorting and polarization over local development policies, we employ conjoint survey experiments in representative surveys of eight US metropolitan areas and…
Electoral Surprise and the Midterm Loss in US Congressional Elections
Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal argue that surprise about the outcomes of US presidential elections accounts for two important features of the American political economy: the regular loss of votes experienced by the president's party in midterm congressional elections, and the systematic relationship between the party of the incoming president and macroeconomic performance. Scholars recently have begun conducting rigorous tests of the relati…
Social Identity, Electoral Institutions and the Number of Candidates
The empirical literature in comparative politics holds that social cleavages affect the number of candidates or parties when electoral institutions are ‘permissive’, but it lacks a theoretical account of the strategic candidate entry and exit decisions that ultimately determine electoral coalitions in plural societies. This article incorporates citizen-candidate social identities into game-theoretic models of electoral competition under plurality…
Technology and the Era of the Mass Army
We investigate how technology has influenced the size of armies. During the nineteenth century, the development of the railroad made it possible to field and support mass armies, significantly increasing the observed size of military forces. During the late twentieth century, further advances in technology made it possible to deliver explosive force from a distance and with precision, making mass armies less desirable. We find support for our tec…
The Political Economy of Religion and Social Insurance in the United States, 1910–1939
There are few scholars who would disagree with the proposition that individual economic position and economic risk play a critical role in shaping preferences for income redistribution and social insurance. There is less consensus, however, about the extent to which non-economic factors also influence individual preferences regarding social insurance provision. A number of scholars have examined how issues of race and identity have influenced the…
Equal Treatment and the Inelasticity of Tax Policy to Rising Inequality
We argue that tax policy typically does not respond to inequality because many voters hold equal treatment fairness beliefs for which the expectation is that, just as all have one vote, the state should treat citizens equally on other dimensions of policy. In the tax domain, this means all should pay the same rate. We propose a new survey instrument to measure equal treatment beliefs and implement it in surveys in Germany, the United Kingdom, and…
Taxing the Rich: A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe
Foundations of a New Democracy: Schooling, Inequality, and Voting in the Early Republic
Democratic theorists have long argued that states can create more resilient democracies through education. Educational investments are thought to produce more economic equality and instill in citizens greater capacity and responsibility to participate in politics. Using a geographic regression discontinuity design and township-level data from Antebellum New York State, we examine whether state funding for common schools led to higher voter turnou…
Who Cooperates? Reciprocity and the Causal Effect of Expected Cooperation in Representative Samples
When do societies succeed in providing public goods? Previous research suggests that public goods contributions correlate with expectations about cooperation by others among students and other demographic subgroups. However, we lack knowledge about whether the effect of expected cooperation is causal and a general feature of populations. We fielded representative surveys ( N = 8,500) in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States t…
Electoral Surprise and the Midterm Loss in US Congressional Elections
Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal argue that surprise about the outcomes of US presidential elections accounts for two important features of the American political economy: the regular loss of votes experienced by the president's party in midterm congressional elections, and the systematic relationship between the party of the incoming president and macroeconomic performance. Scholars recently have begun conducting rigorous tests of the relati…
What determines individual trade-policy preferences?
Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences Over Immigration Policy
This paper uses three years of individual-level data to analyze the determinants of individual preferences over immigration policy in the United States. We have two main empirical results. First, less-skilled workers are significantly more likely to prefer limiting immigrant inflows into the United States. Our finding suggests that, over the time horizons that are relevant to individuals when evaluating immigration policy, individuals think that …
Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation
We propose a remedy for the discrepancy between the way political scientists analyze data with missing values and the recommendations of the statistics community. Methodologists and statisticians agree that "multiple imputation" is a superior approach to the problem of missing data scattered through one's explanatory and dependent variables than the methods currently used in applied data analysis. The discrepancy occurs because the computational …
Public Inflation Aversion and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policymaking
Do the macroeconomic priorities of citizens differ across countries? If so, what accounts for this variation and what are its consequences for explanations of the choice of monetary institutions, macroeconomic policy, and international monetary cooperation? This article uses survey data from twenty advanced economies to examine individual preferences about macroeconomic priorities. The analysis establishes three key findings. First, the results s…
Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production
A central question in the international and comparative political economy literatures on globalization is whether economic integration increases worker insecurity in advanced economies. Previous research has focused on the role of international trade and has failed to produce convincing evidence that such a link exists. In this article, we argue that globalization increases worker insecurity, but that foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinatio…
Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance
(Konstanz), and the International Studies Association annual meetings for comments on an earlier draft. This research was initiated while Scheve was a visitor at the STICERD (LSE). In this paper we argue that religion and welfare state spending are substitute mechanisms that insure individuals against adverse life events. As a result, individuals who are religious will prefer lower levels of social insurance than will individuals who are secular.…
The Political Economy of Religion and Social Insurance in the United States, 1910–1939
There are few scholars who would disagree with the proposition that individual economic position and economic risk play a critical role in shaping preferences for income redistribution and social insurance. There is less consensus, however, about the extent to which non-economic factors also influence individual preferences regarding social insurance provision. A number of scholars have examined how issues of race and identity have influenced the…
Social Identity, Political Speech, and Electoral Competition
Much research in political science suggests that social identity can be an important factor in motivating behavior. If voters care about social identity, when will politicians find it in their interests to make group-based appeals? Do social identity concerns affect the policy platforms offered by candidates? In a model of political speech and electoral competition, in which voters care about both social identities and policy, we demonstrate that…
Public Finance and Individual Preferences Over Globalization Strategies
Do preferences toward globalization strategies vary across public‐finance regimes? In this paper, we use data on individual preferences toward immigration and trade policy to examine how pre‐tax and post‐tax cleavages differ across globalization strategies and state fiscal jurisdictions. High exposure to immigrant fiscal pressures reduces support for freer immigration among U.S. natives, especially the more skilled. The magnitude of this post‐tax…
Estimating the Effect of Elite Communications on Public Opinion Using Instrumental Variables
A central question in the study of democratic polities is the extent to which elite opinion about policy shapes public opinion. Estimating the impact of elites on mass opinion is difficult because of endogeneity, omitted variables, and measurement error. This article proposes an identification strategy for estimating the causal effect of elite messages on public support for European integration employing changes in political institutions as instr…
Mixed Messages: Party Dissent and Mass Opinion on European Integration
Mass opposition to Europe may stem from mainstream as well as formally Euroskeptic parties. Large parties in the member states of the European Union (EU) tend to combine support for Europe with a high level of intra-party dissent over the issue. Thus, these parties provide heterogeneous yet potentially influential signals about European integration to their supporters. In this paper, we examine the effect of intra-party dissent on the opinion of …
Institutions, Partisanship, and Inequality in the Long Run
It has been widely suggested by political scientists and economists, based on empirical evidence for the period since 1970, that the institution of centralized wage bargaining and the presence of a government of the left are associated with lower levels of income inequality. The authors make use of new data on top income shares as well as long-run series on wage inequality to examine the effects of partisanship and wage bargaining over a much lon…
The Conscription of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation
The dominant narrative of the politics of redistribution in political science and economics highlights the signature role of the rise of electoral democracy and the development of political parties that mobilize working-class groups. We argue in this article that this narrative ignores the critical role played by mass warfare in the development of redistributive public policies. Focusing attention on the determinants of progressive taxation, we a…
Social Identity, Electoral Institutions and the Number of Candidates
The empirical literature in comparative politics holds that social cleavages affect the number of candidates or parties when electoral institutions are ‘permissive’, but it lacks a theoretical account of the strategic candidate entry and exit decisions that ultimately determine electoral coalitions in plural societies. This article incorporates citizen-candidate social identities into game-theoretic models of electoral competition under plurality…
Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection
One important puzzle in international political economy is why lower‐earning and less‐skilled intensive industries tend to receive relatively high levels of trade protection. This pattern of protection holds across countries with vastly different economic and political characteristics and is not well accounted for in existing political economy models. We propose and model one possible explanation: that individual inequity aversion leads to system…
Democracy, War, and Wealth: Lessons from Two Centuries of Inheritance Taxation
In this article we use an original data set to provide the first empirical analysis of the political economy of inherited wealth taxation that covers a significant number of countries and a long time frame (1816-2000). Our goal is to understand why, if inheritance taxes are often very old taxes, the implementation of inheritance tax rates significant enough to affect wealth inequality is a much more recent phenomenon. We hypothesize alternatively…
Mass support for global climate agreements depends on institutional design
Effective climate mitigation requires international cooperation, and these global efforts need broad public support to be sustainable over the long run. We provide estimates of public support for different types of climate agreements in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Using data from a large-scale experimental survey, we explore how three key dimensions of global climate cooperation—costs and distribution, participatio…
Technology and the Era of the Mass Army
We investigate how technology has influenced the size of armies. During the nineteenth century, the development of the railroad made it possible to field and support mass armies, significantly increasing the observed size of military forces. During the late twentieth century, further advances in technology made it possible to deliver explosive force from a distance and with precision, making mass armies less desirable. We find support for our tec…
Taxing the Rich: A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe
Self-Centered Inequity Aversion and the Mass Politics of Taxation
The politics of economic crises brings distributive economic conflict to the fore of national political debates. How policy should be used to transfer resources between citizens becomes a central political question, and the answers chosen often influence the trajectory of policy for a generation. This context provides an ideal setting for evaluating the importance of self-interest and other-regarding preferences in shaping public opinion about ec…
Who Cooperates? Reciprocity and the Causal Effect of Expected Cooperation in Representative Samples
When do societies succeed in providing public goods? Previous research suggests that public goods contributions correlate with expectations about cooperation by others among students and other demographic subgroups. However, we lack knowledge about whether the effect of expected cooperation is causal and a general feature of populations. We fielded representative surveys ( N = 8,500) in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States t…
The Structure of American Income Tax Policy Preferences
In recent decades inequality in the United States has increased dramatically, but policy responses in terms of redistribution have been limited. This is not easily explained by standard political economy theory, which predicts a positive relationship between inequality and redistribution. One set of explanations for this puzzle focuses on whether and why redistributive preferences are muted in the presence of high inequality. While much recent re…
Wealth Inequality and Democracy
What do we know about wealth inequality and democracy? Our review shows that the simple conjectures that democracy produces wealth equality and that wealth inequality leads to democratic failure are not supported by the evidence. Why are democracy and high levels of wealth inequality sustainable together? Three key features of democratic politics can make this outcome possible. When societies are divided along cleavages other than wealth, this ca…
Interests, Norms and Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Case of Climate Co-operation
Mitigating climate change requires countries to provide a global public good. This means that the domestic cleavages underlying mass attitudes toward international climate policy are a central determinant of its provision. We argue that the industry-specific costs of emission abatement and internalized social norms help explain support for climate policy. To evaluate our predictions we develop novel measures of industry-specific interests by cros…
Economics (38 works) · Political science (34 works) · Politics (25 works) · Law (19 works) · Law (17 works) · Political economy (16 works) · Public economics (13 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (10 works) · Inequality (9 works) · Psychology (9 works)