Democracy, Inequality, and Antitrust
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10185804 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael O Allen (0000-0002-3775-0628, Stanford University), Kenneth Scheve (0000-0002-6809-0060, University of Notre Dame), David Stasavage (0000-0001-9964-716X, New York University) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 000-000 |
| Publication date | 2025-04-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3816 • E-ISSN: 1468-2508 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/736023 |
| OpenAlex | W4409139552 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 59 |
This article investigates the relationship between democracy and antitrust policy. Strong antitrust policies advance the economic and political interests of most citizens, making their adoption more likely in institutional settings that weigh the interests of consumers. We examine the empirical relationship between democracy, inequality, and antitrust policies in a broad panel of countries from 1951 to 2010. Using a variety of empirical strategies, we find that democracy is predictive of stricter antitrust policies in countries with low but not high levels of inequality. This result accords with the idea that economic inequality can undermine the political forces that tend toward stronger antitrust policy in democracies. We then investigate a supposed exception to this pattern: the United States in the late 19th century. Through a mixed-methods analysis, we present evidence that democracy and inequality shaped the politics of antitrust in this era in a way that resonates with our cross-country analysis.
Democracy · Economics · Inequality · Law and economics · Mathematical analysis · Neoclassical economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law · Mathematics · Political Economy and Marxism · Social Policy and Reform Studies
The Curse of Bigness
Tying the Autocrat's Hands
Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century
Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions
Covariate Balancing Propensity Score
The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications
The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms
Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share
Two-Way Fixed Effects Estimators with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Difference-in-differences with variation in treatment timing
A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents in the Rise in Inequality
The New Brandeis Movement
The Struggle for Constitutional Power
Sustaining Capitalism and Democracy
Cartels, competition, and coalitions
Regulation of privatized utilities
Measuring Income Inequality Across Countries and Over Time
Killer Acquisitions
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
Law and Economic Policy in America
Conditional Status Quo Bias and Top Income Shares
The Remaking of an American Senate
From rule‐takerto rule‐promotingregulatory state
Institutional Change and the Electoral Connection in the Senate
How Much Should We Trust Estimates from Multiplicative Interaction Models? Simple Tools to Improve Empirical Practice
Testing Theories of American Politics
A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800–2007
Matching Methods for Causal Inference with Time‐Series Cross‐Sectional Data
Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic Parties
The politics of market reforms
Towards a Political Theory of the Firm
A Muted Fury
Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State
How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas
The History of the Standard Oil Company
Winner-Take-All Politics
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |