Towards a Political Theory of the Firm
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4030176 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Luigi Zingales (0000-0002-6804-1883, Luigi Zingales is the Robert C. McCormack Distinguished Service Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Chicago, Illinois. His email address is, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 113-130 |
| Publication date | 2017-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Economic Perspectives (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0895-3309 • E-ISSN: 1944-7965 |
| Publisher | American Economic Association (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1257/jep.31.3.113 |
| OpenAlex | W2735987018 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 47 |
| References cited | 10 |
The revenues of large companies often rival those of national governments, and some companies have annual revenues higher than many national governments. Among the largest corporations in 2015, some had private security forces that rivaled the best secret services, public relations offices that dwarfed a US presidential campaign headquarters, more lawyers than the US Justice Department, and enough money to capture (through campaign donations, lobbying, and even explicit bribes) a majority of the elected representatives. The only powers these large corporations missed were the power to wage war and the legal power of detaining people, although their political influence was sufficiently large that many would argue that, at least in certain settings, large corporations can exercise those powers by proxy. Yet in economics, the commonly prevailing view of the firm ignores all these elements of politics and power. We must recognize that large firms have considerable power to influence the rules of the game. I call attention to the risk of a "Medici vicious circle," in which economic and political power reinforce each other. The possibility and extent of a "Medici vicious circle" depends upon several nonmarket factors. I discuss how they should be incorporated in a broader "Political Theory" of the firm
Economic power · Economics · Law and economics · Market economy · Nonmarket forces · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Revenue · Virtuous circle and vicious circle · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Finance
French Nonprofit Organizations Facing Covid-19 and Lockdown
Conceptualizing and Measuring Political Inequality in a Cross-National Perspective
Stakes, stakeholders and urban governance
The Responsibility of Intellectuals
System Change, Not Climate Change
The Foundational Economy as a Cornerstone for a Social–Ecological Transformation
How inequality fuels climate change
Corporate Lobbying as Anticompetitive Behaviour in the EU
All politics is local
“The Greatest and Noblest of all Characters”
Business Concentration Data for Germany
The Top 100 Companies Panel Database
The law and economics of the data economy
Political elections and corporate investment
Diagnosing pharmaceutical regulatory agencies
Misrepresentation and migration
Ideology, power, and progress
Adam Smith in his time and ours
A new (theory-congruent, practice-informed and sustainability-fostering) industrial strategy
Conglomerates at the court
The limits of insulation
The Vast and Unsolved Enigma of Power”
Introduction
The ‘Administered Labor Market’ Reconsidered
Guerilla capitalism and the platform economy
Exploiting bullets
Maximising the wealth of few at the expense of the health of many
A Political Capability Approach to Corporate Power
Individual self‐control and collective outcomes
Strategic management and regional industrial strategy
Family Ties as Corporate Power
Democracy, Inequality, and Antitrust
Are Bigger Banks Better? Firm-Level Evidence from Germany
Econ 101—In need of a sustainability transition
Corporate lobbying, political action committees, and market concentration
Islamic revolution and Anfal
Unexpected politics
Income and the (eventual) rise of democracy
Corruption, bribery, and market reform
Capture and passive predation in times of Covid-19 pandemic
Yes to Koch, No to Woke
Rules or legacies? Industry and political revolving doors in regulators' careers in Portugal
The relationship between neoliberal ideology and state practice
Digital provision inclusion in trade agreements
The Privatization Origins of Political Corporations
Supermarketisation, Agro-Industrial Concentration and the Food System's Shrinking Interstices
Poor and powerless
| Unique citing works | 47 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 5,88 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 44 |