Fritz Rohrlich
Biographic Data
| ID | 1058832 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Fritz Rohrlich |
| GIVEN NAMES | Fritz |
| FAMILY NAME | Rohrlich |
| SIGNATURE | ROHRLICH F |
| AFFILIATIONS | Syracuse University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 20 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1983 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Cognitive Scientific Realism
Our cognitive capabilities force us into a description of the world by levels. But theories on different levels result in descriptions that differ qualitatively. Therefore, the resulting incommensurability requires ontological bridges between such theories. These are obtained uniquely when the equations of the reduced theory are compared with a suitable limit of the equations of the reducing theory. Four case studies from theoretical physics and …
Causality and the Arrow of Classical Time
Cognitive Emergence
Examination of attempts at theory reduction (S to T) shows that a process of cognitive emergence is involved in which concepts of S, C s , emerge from T. This permits the ‘bridge laws’ to be stated. These are not in conflict with incommensurability of the C s with the C T . Cognitive emergence may occur asymptotically or because of similarities of mathematical expressions; it is not necessarily holistic. Mereologically and nonmereologically relat…
Interpreting quantum field theory
Response to Criticism
From Paradox to Reality
Four philosophical issues essential for good science teaching
(1988). Four philosophical issues essential for good science teaching. Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 1-6
Pluralistic Ontology and Theory Reduction in the Physical Sciences
It is demonstrated that the reduction of a physical theory S to another one, T, in the sense that S can be derived from T holds in general only for the mathematical framework. The interpretation of S and the associated central terms cannot all be derived from those of T because of the qualitative differences between the cognitive levels of S and T. Their cognitively autonomous status leads to an epistemic as well as an ontological pluralism. This…
Established Theories
Criteria are given to characterize mature theories in contradistinction to developing theories. We lean heavily on the physical sciences. An established theory is defined as a mature one with known validity limits. The approximate truth of such theories is thereby given a quantitative character. Superseding theories do not falsify established theories because the latter are protected by their validity limits. This view of scientific realism leads…
Established Theories
Criteria are given to characterize mature theories in contradistinction to developing theories. We lean heavily on the physical sciences. An established theory is defined as a mature one with known validity limits. The approximate truth of such theories is thereby given a quantitative character. Superseding theories do not falsify established theories because the latter are protected by their validity limits. This view of scientific realism leads…
Pluralistic Ontology and Theory Reduction in the Physical Sciences
It is demonstrated that the reduction of a physical theory S to another one, T, in the sense that S can be derived from T holds in general only for the mathematical framework. The interpretation of S and the associated central terms cannot all be derived from those of T because of the qualitative differences between the cognitive levels of S and T. Their cognitively autonomous status leads to an epistemic as well as an ontological pluralism. This…
Cognitive Emergence
Examination of attempts at theory reduction (S to T) shows that a process of cognitive emergence is involved in which concepts of S, C s , emerge from T. This permits the ‘bridge laws’ to be stated. These are not in conflict with incommensurability of the C s with the C T . Cognitive emergence may occur asymptotically or because of similarities of mathematical expressions; it is not necessarily holistic. Mereologically and nonmereologically relat…
Cognitive Scientific Realism
Our cognitive capabilities force us into a description of the world by levels. But theories on different levels result in descriptions that differ qualitatively. Therefore, the resulting incommensurability requires ontological bridges between such theories. These are obtained uniquely when the equations of the reduced theory are compared with a suitable limit of the equations of the reducing theory. Four case studies from theoretical physics and …
Four philosophical issues essential for good science teaching
(1988). Four philosophical issues essential for good science teaching. Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 1-6
Established Theories
Criteria are given to characterize mature theories in contradistinction to developing theories. We lean heavily on the physical sciences. An established theory is defined as a mature one with known validity limits. The approximate truth of such theories is thereby given a quantitative character. Superseding theories do not falsify established theories because the latter are protected by their validity limits. This view of scientific realism leads…
Four philosophical issues essential for good science teaching
(1988). Four philosophical issues essential for good science teaching. Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 1-6
Pluralistic Ontology and Theory Reduction in the Physical Sciences
It is demonstrated that the reduction of a physical theory S to another one, T, in the sense that S can be derived from T holds in general only for the mathematical framework. The interpretation of S and the associated central terms cannot all be derived from those of T because of the qualitative differences between the cognitive levels of S and T. Their cognitively autonomous status leads to an epistemic as well as an ontological pluralism. This…
From Paradox to Reality
Response to Criticism
Interpreting quantum field theory
Cognitive Emergence
Examination of attempts at theory reduction (S to T) shows that a process of cognitive emergence is involved in which concepts of S, C s , emerge from T. This permits the ‘bridge laws’ to be stated. These are not in conflict with incommensurability of the C s with the C T . Cognitive emergence may occur asymptotically or because of similarities of mathematical expressions; it is not necessarily holistic. Mereologically and nonmereologically relat…
Causality and the Arrow of Classical Time
Cognitive Scientific Realism
Our cognitive capabilities force us into a description of the world by levels. But theories on different levels result in descriptions that differ qualitatively. Therefore, the resulting incommensurability requires ontological bridges between such theories. These are obtained uniquely when the equations of the reduced theory are compared with a suitable limit of the equations of the reducing theory. Four case studies from theoretical physics and …
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Physics (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Quantum Mechanics and Applications (3 works) · Theoretical physics (3 works)