Richard Yetter Chappell
Biographic Data
| ID | 1060049 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Richard Yetter Chappell |
| GIVEN NAMES | Richard Yetter |
| FAMILY NAME | Chappell |
| SIGNATURE | CHAPPELL R Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Miami |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3322-4935 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Parfit's Ethics
The Ethics of Deliberate Exposure to Sars‐CoV‐2 to Induce Immunity
We explore the ethics of deliberately exposing consenting adults to SARS‐CoV‐2 to induce immunity to the virus (‘DEI’ for short). We explain what a responsible DEI program might look like. We explore a consequentialist argument for DEI according to which DEI is a viable harm‐reduction strategy. Then we consider a nonconsequentialist argument for DEI that draws on the moral significance of consent. Additionally, we consider arguments for the view …
Negative Utility Monsters
Many consider Nozick's “utility monster” – a being more efficient than ordinary people at converting resources into wellbeing, with no upper limit – to constitute a damning counterexample to utilitarianism. But our intuitions may be reversed by considering a variation in which the utility monster starts from a baseline status of massive suffering. This suggests a rethinking of the force of the original objection
Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good
Consequentialist views have traditionally taken a maximizing form, requiring agents to bring about the very best outcome that they can. But this maximizing function may be questioned. Satisficing views instead allow agents to bring about any outcome that exceeds a satisfactory threshold or qualifies as “good enough.” Scalar consequentialism, by contrast, eschews moral requirements altogether, instead evaluating acts in purely comparative terms, t…
Pandemic ethics
There is too much that we do not know about COVID-19. The longer we take to find it out, the more lives will be lost. In this paper, we will defend a principle of risk parity: if it is permissible to expose some members of society (e.g. health workers or the economically vulnerable) to a certain level of ex ante risk in order to minimize overall harm from the virus, then it is permissible to expose fully informed volunteers to a comparable level …
The Right Wrong‐Makers
Right‐ and wrong‐making features (“moral grounds”) are widely believed to play important normative roles, e.g. in morally apt or virtuous motivation. This paper argues that moral grounds have been systematically misidentified. Canonical statements of our moral theories tend to summarize, rather than directly state, the full range of moral grounds posited by the theory. Further work is required to “unpack” a theory’s criterion of rightness and ide…
Value Receptacles
Utilitarianism is often rejected on the grounds that it fails to respect the separateness of persons, instead treating people as mere “receptacles of value”. I develop several different versions of this objection, and argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, they are all mistaken. Although there are crude forms of utilitarianism that run afoul of these objections, I advance a new form of the view—‘token‐pluralistic utilitarianism’—that…
Fittingness
Journal Article Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive Get access Richard Yetter Chappell Richard Yetter Chappell Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 62, Issue 249, October 2012, Pages 684-704, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00075.x Published: 07 June 2012
Fittingness
Journal Article Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive Get access Richard Yetter Chappell Richard Yetter Chappell Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 62, Issue 249, October 2012, Pages 684-704, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00075.x Published: 07 June 2012
The Right Wrong‐Makers
Right‐ and wrong‐making features (“moral grounds”) are widely believed to play important normative roles, e.g. in morally apt or virtuous motivation. This paper argues that moral grounds have been systematically misidentified. Canonical statements of our moral theories tend to summarize, rather than directly state, the full range of moral grounds posited by the theory. Further work is required to “unpack” a theory’s criterion of rightness and ide…
Fittingness
Journal Article Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive Get access Richard Yetter Chappell Richard Yetter Chappell Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 62, Issue 249, October 2012, Pages 684-704, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00075.x Published: 07 June 2012
Value Receptacles
Utilitarianism is often rejected on the grounds that it fails to respect the separateness of persons, instead treating people as mere “receptacles of value”. I develop several different versions of this objection, and argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, they are all mistaken. Although there are crude forms of utilitarianism that run afoul of these objections, I advance a new form of the view—‘token‐pluralistic utilitarianism’—that…
Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good
Consequentialist views have traditionally taken a maximizing form, requiring agents to bring about the very best outcome that they can. But this maximizing function may be questioned. Satisficing views instead allow agents to bring about any outcome that exceeds a satisfactory threshold or qualifies as “good enough.” Scalar consequentialism, by contrast, eschews moral requirements altogether, instead evaluating acts in purely comparative terms, t…
Pandemic ethics
There is too much that we do not know about COVID-19. The longer we take to find it out, the more lives will be lost. In this paper, we will defend a principle of risk parity: if it is permissible to expose some members of society (e.g. health workers or the economically vulnerable) to a certain level of ex ante risk in order to minimize overall harm from the virus, then it is permissible to expose fully informed volunteers to a comparable level …
The Right Wrong‐Makers
Right‐ and wrong‐making features (“moral grounds”) are widely believed to play important normative roles, e.g. in morally apt or virtuous motivation. This paper argues that moral grounds have been systematically misidentified. Canonical statements of our moral theories tend to summarize, rather than directly state, the full range of moral grounds posited by the theory. Further work is required to “unpack” a theory’s criterion of rightness and ide…
Parfit's Ethics
The Ethics of Deliberate Exposure to Sars‐CoV‐2 to Induce Immunity
We explore the ethics of deliberately exposing consenting adults to SARS‐CoV‐2 to induce immunity to the virus (‘DEI’ for short). We explain what a responsible DEI program might look like. We explore a consequentialist argument for DEI according to which DEI is a viable harm‐reduction strategy. Then we consider a nonconsequentialist argument for DEI that draws on the moral significance of consent. Additionally, we consider arguments for the view …
Negative Utility Monsters
Many consider Nozick's “utility monster” – a being more efficient than ordinary people at converting resources into wellbeing, with no upper limit – to constitute a damning counterexample to utilitarianism. But our intuitions may be reversed by considering a variation in which the utility monster starts from a baseline status of massive suffering. This suggests a rethinking of the force of the original objection
Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Free Will and Agency (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works)