Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good

Bibliographic Data

ID23613134
AuthorsRichard Yetter Chappell (0000-0003-3322-4935, University of Miami, corresponding author)
Year2020
Pages498-512
Publication date2020-10-08
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueOxford Handbook of Consequentialism (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190905323.013.10
OpenAlexW3092850577
ISBN9780190905323
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited10

Consequentialist views have traditionally taken a maximizing form, requiring agents to bring about the very best outcome that they can. But this maximizing function may be questioned. Satisficing views instead allow agents to bring about any outcome that exceeds a satisfactory threshold or qualifies as “good enough.” Scalar consequentialism, by contrast, eschews moral requirements altogether, instead evaluating acts in purely comparative terms, that is, as better or worse than their alternatives. After surveying the main considerations for and against each of these three views, I argue that the core insights of each are not (despite appearances) in conflict. Consequentialists should be deontic pluralists and accept a maximizing account of the ought of most reason, a satisficing account of obligation, and a scalar account of the weight of reasons.

Consequentialism · Deontic logic · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Normative · Obligation · Outcome (game theory) · Pluralism (philosophy) · Political science · Positive economics · Satisficing · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification

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