Pär Sundström
Biographic Data
| ID | 1062148 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Pär Sundström |
| GIVEN NAMES | Pär |
| FAMILY NAME | Sundström |
| SIGNATURE | SUNDSTRÖM P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Umeå University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5378-3094 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 14 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
How Physicalists Can—and Cannot—Explain the Seeming “Absurdity” of Physicalism
According to a widely held physicalist view, consciousness is identical with some physical or functional phenomenon just as liquidity is identical with loose molecular connection. To many of us, this claim about consciousness seems more problematic than the claim about liquidity. To many—including many physicalists—the identification of consciousness with some physical phenomenon even seems “absurd” (Papineau 2002) or “crazy” (Perry 2001). A full…
Phenomenal Concepts
It's a common idea in philosophy that we possess concepts of a peculiar kind by which we can think about our conscious states in 'inner' and 'direct' ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such. Such 'phenomenal concepts' figure in a variety of theoretical contexts. The bulk of this article discusses their use in a certain strategy - thephenomenal concept strategy- for defending the phy…
On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought
Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers. However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue
Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness
Phenomenal Concepts
It's a common idea in philosophy that we possess concepts of a peculiar kind by which we can think about our conscious states in 'inner' and 'direct' ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such. Such 'phenomenal concepts' figure in a variety of theoretical contexts. The bulk of this article discusses their use in a certain strategy - thephenomenal concept strategy- for defending the phy…
Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness
How Physicalists Can—and Cannot—Explain the Seeming “Absurdity” of Physicalism
According to a widely held physicalist view, consciousness is identical with some physical or functional phenomenon just as liquidity is identical with loose molecular connection. To many of us, this claim about consciousness seems more problematic than the claim about liquidity. To many—including many physicalists—the identification of consciousness with some physical phenomenon even seems “absurd” (Papineau 2002) or “crazy” (Perry 2001). A full…
On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought
Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers. However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue
Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness
On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought
Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers. However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue
Phenomenal Concepts
It's a common idea in philosophy that we possess concepts of a peculiar kind by which we can think about our conscious states in 'inner' and 'direct' ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such. Such 'phenomenal concepts' figure in a variety of theoretical contexts. The bulk of this article discusses their use in a certain strategy - thephenomenal concept strategy- for defending the phy…
How Physicalists Can—and Cannot—Explain the Seeming “Absurdity” of Physicalism
According to a widely held physicalist view, consciousness is identical with some physical or functional phenomenon just as liquidity is identical with loose molecular connection. To many of us, this claim about consciousness seems more problematic than the claim about liquidity. To many—including many physicalists—the identification of consciousness with some physical phenomenon even seems “absurd” (Papineau 2002) or “crazy” (Perry 2001). A full…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Consciousness (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Physicalism (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works)