On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought

Bibliographic Data

ID10344503
AuthorsPär Sundström (0000-0001-5378-3094, Umeå University, corresponding author)
Year2010
Volume120
Issue1
Pages43-95
Publication date2010-12-17
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-2010-018
OpenAlexW2123645180
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited37

Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers. However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue

Aesthetics · Epistemology · Quality (philosophy · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

Tools

Open DOISci-HubOpen Access